Alok Sheel: Euro zone's impossible trinity

The European Union had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union

The economic and monetary union of the had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union. This flaw was derived from the “impossible trinity” embedded in the Mundell-Fleming equation. According to this equation, a country can have only two of the following: an open capital account, a stable and monetary independence.

While several developing countries, including India, have at times tried – with little success – to get around this impossible trinity, countries have mostly adopted different solutions to this equation. Thus, the United States has an open capital account, but a floating (India’s solution largely resembles this model with a big BUT). has adopted a stable exchange rate, but a closed capital account. The solution to the equation was to have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account, while it sacrificed monetary independence.

Given the solution adopted by countries, fiscal balances needed to be kept in check because there was no lender of the last resort. This was done by setting a budget deficit limit of three per cent of the for each country, and public debt limit of 60 per cent of the GDP. This was critical. Though countries are expected to keep fiscal deficits and public debt within prudent limits for sustainable growth, they can never be held hostage by the market because the can always step in to buy government debt by printing money. It is for this reason that credit rating agencies assign the highest ratings to sovereigns for debt repayable in their own currencies, while they rely primarily on macro-economic fundamentals in rating external debt.

Since countries, including Germany, did not have this backstop, it is intriguing that credit rating agencies assigned risk-free status to the sovereign debt of these countries, instead of basing them on macro-economic fundamentals. Economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also seem to have missed this fine distinction between domestic debt and external debt: the domestic debt of countries had some features of external debt, as a result of which they could be held hostage by markets, as appears to be happening at present. Had such a distinction been made, the ratings assigned to the weaker countries would have been so calibrated as to make it difficult for them to run up such high levels of euro-denominated public debt.

What also seems to have been missed was the “impossibility” of the holy trinity attempted by the European Maastricht Treaty: a currency union with “no bailout, no exit and no default” in the event of the public debt of a country becoming unsustainable through a market revolt.

It is perhaps because this second, but related, impossible trinity was not highlighted by economists, the and even rating agencies that markets were lulled into pricing the sovereign domestic debt of all countries on an equal footing as risk-free, despite vastly differing macro-economic fundamentals. In hindsight it is now clear that:

(a) If there was to be no bailout and no exit, a country might have to default on its debt since it could not inflate its way out through the printing press.

(b) If there was to be no bail out and no default, a country might need to exit to regain monetary independence to enable it to honour its debt obligations through a depreciated new currency that its could print at will; and finally,

(c) If there was to be no exit and no default, a country would need to be bailed out, through either budgetary support from other countries (such as through the European Financial Stability Facility) or the common (the European or ECB) acting as lender of the last resort.

The impossible trinity attempted by the Maastricht treaty now threatens to bring down not only the but also the global financial system, unless one of the three nays is abandoned. This alone would rectify the fatal flaw in the Maastricht Treaty, short of full fiscal and monetary – which effectively means political – integration for which European civil society is not quite prepared yet. And Germany would not allow the to become a printing press without such integration — for good reasons.

The writer is a civil servant Views are personal

image
Business Standard
177 22
Business Standard

Alok Sheel: Euro zone's impossible trinity

The European Union had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union

Alok Sheel 

The economic and monetary union of the had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union. This flaw was derived from the “impossible trinity” embedded in the Mundell-Fleming equation. According to this equation, a country can have only two of the following: an open capital account, a stable and monetary independence.

While several developing countries, including India, have at times tried – with little success – to get around this impossible trinity, countries have mostly adopted different solutions to this equation. Thus, the United States has an open capital account, but a floating (India’s solution largely resembles this model with a big BUT). has adopted a stable exchange rate, but a closed capital account. The solution to the equation was to have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account, while it sacrificed monetary independence.

Given the solution adopted by countries, fiscal balances needed to be kept in check because there was no lender of the last resort. This was done by setting a budget deficit limit of three per cent of the for each country, and public debt limit of 60 per cent of the GDP. This was critical. Though countries are expected to keep fiscal deficits and public debt within prudent limits for sustainable growth, they can never be held hostage by the market because the can always step in to buy government debt by printing money. It is for this reason that credit rating agencies assign the highest ratings to sovereigns for debt repayable in their own currencies, while they rely primarily on macro-economic fundamentals in rating external debt.

Since countries, including Germany, did not have this backstop, it is intriguing that credit rating agencies assigned risk-free status to the sovereign debt of these countries, instead of basing them on macro-economic fundamentals. Economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also seem to have missed this fine distinction between domestic debt and external debt: the domestic debt of countries had some features of external debt, as a result of which they could be held hostage by markets, as appears to be happening at present. Had such a distinction been made, the ratings assigned to the weaker countries would have been so calibrated as to make it difficult for them to run up such high levels of euro-denominated public debt.

What also seems to have been missed was the “impossibility” of the holy trinity attempted by the European Maastricht Treaty: a currency union with “no bailout, no exit and no default” in the event of the public debt of a country becoming unsustainable through a market revolt.

It is perhaps because this second, but related, impossible trinity was not highlighted by economists, the and even rating agencies that markets were lulled into pricing the sovereign domestic debt of all countries on an equal footing as risk-free, despite vastly differing macro-economic fundamentals. In hindsight it is now clear that:

(a) If there was to be no bailout and no exit, a country might have to default on its debt since it could not inflate its way out through the printing press.

(b) If there was to be no bail out and no default, a country might need to exit to regain monetary independence to enable it to honour its debt obligations through a depreciated new currency that its could print at will; and finally,

(c) If there was to be no exit and no default, a country would need to be bailed out, through either budgetary support from other countries (such as through the European Financial Stability Facility) or the common (the European or ECB) acting as lender of the last resort.

The impossible trinity attempted by the Maastricht treaty now threatens to bring down not only the but also the global financial system, unless one of the three nays is abandoned. This alone would rectify the fatal flaw in the Maastricht Treaty, short of full fiscal and monetary – which effectively means political – integration for which European civil society is not quite prepared yet. And Germany would not allow the to become a printing press without such integration — for good reasons.

The writer is a civil servant Views are personal

RECOMMENDED FOR YOU

Alok Sheel: Euro zone's impossible trinity

The European Union had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union

The economic and monetary union of the European Union had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union. This flaw was derived from the “impossible trinity” embedded in the Mundell-Fleming equation. According to this equation, a country can have only two of the following: an open capital account, a stable exchange rate and monetary independence.

The economic and monetary union of the had a basic flaw: monetary integration without fiscal union. This flaw was derived from the “impossible trinity” embedded in the Mundell-Fleming equation. According to this equation, a country can have only two of the following: an open capital account, a stable and monetary independence.

While several developing countries, including India, have at times tried – with little success – to get around this impossible trinity, countries have mostly adopted different solutions to this equation. Thus, the United States has an open capital account, but a floating (India’s solution largely resembles this model with a big BUT). has adopted a stable exchange rate, but a closed capital account. The solution to the equation was to have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account, while it sacrificed monetary independence.

Given the solution adopted by countries, fiscal balances needed to be kept in check because there was no lender of the last resort. This was done by setting a budget deficit limit of three per cent of the for each country, and public debt limit of 60 per cent of the GDP. This was critical. Though countries are expected to keep fiscal deficits and public debt within prudent limits for sustainable growth, they can never be held hostage by the market because the can always step in to buy government debt by printing money. It is for this reason that credit rating agencies assign the highest ratings to sovereigns for debt repayable in their own currencies, while they rely primarily on macro-economic fundamentals in rating external debt.

Since countries, including Germany, did not have this backstop, it is intriguing that credit rating agencies assigned risk-free status to the sovereign debt of these countries, instead of basing them on macro-economic fundamentals. Economists and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also seem to have missed this fine distinction between domestic debt and external debt: the domestic debt of countries had some features of external debt, as a result of which they could be held hostage by markets, as appears to be happening at present. Had such a distinction been made, the ratings assigned to the weaker countries would have been so calibrated as to make it difficult for them to run up such high levels of euro-denominated public debt.

What also seems to have been missed was the “impossibility” of the holy trinity attempted by the European Maastricht Treaty: a currency union with “no bailout, no exit and no default” in the event of the public debt of a country becoming unsustainable through a market revolt.

It is perhaps because this second, but related, impossible trinity was not highlighted by economists, the and even rating agencies that markets were lulled into pricing the sovereign domestic debt of all countries on an equal footing as risk-free, despite vastly differing macro-economic fundamentals. In hindsight it is now clear that:

(a) If there was to be no bailout and no exit, a country might have to default on its debt since it could not inflate its way out through the printing press.

(b) If there was to be no bail out and no default, a country might need to exit to regain monetary independence to enable it to honour its debt obligations through a depreciated new currency that its could print at will; and finally,

(c) If there was to be no exit and no default, a country would need to be bailed out, through either budgetary support from other countries (such as through the European Financial Stability Facility) or the common (the European or ECB) acting as lender of the last resort.

The impossible trinity attempted by the Maastricht treaty now threatens to bring down not only the but also the global financial system, unless one of the three nays is abandoned. This alone would rectify the fatal flaw in the Maastricht Treaty, short of full fiscal and monetary – which effectively means political – integration for which European civil society is not quite prepared yet. And Germany would not allow the to become a printing press without such integration — for good reasons.

The writer is a civil servant Views are personal

image
Business Standard
177 22

Upgrade To Premium Services

Welcome User

Business Standard is happy to inform you of the launch of "Business Standard Premium Services"

As a premium subscriber you get an across device unfettered access to a range of services which include:

  • Access Exclusive content - articles, features & opinion pieces
  • Weekly Industry/Genre specific newsletters - Choose multiple industries/genres
  • Access to 17 plus years of content archives
  • Set Stock price alerts for your portfolio and watch list and get them delivered to your e-mail box
  • End of day news alerts on 5 companies (via email)
  • NEW: Get seamless access to WSJ.com at a great price. No additional sign-up required.
 

Premium Services

In Partnership with

 

Dear Guest,

 

Welcome to the premium services of Business Standard brought to you courtesy FIS.
Kindly visit the Manage my subscription page to discover the benefits of this programme.

Enjoy Reading!
Team Business Standard