| Pakistan's problems are just starting. And Musharraf is the least of them.
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| It is all very confusing. Frightening, actually, because it’s India’s policy towards Pakistan we’re talking about, not Burkina Faso or Papua New Guinea.
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| The Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, Shyam Saran, said at a public lecture just days ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were not safe and in a situation of chaos,“mindless jihadis” could lay their hands on them any time, leading to a global risk of a nuclear conflagration. This statement was made just before the Pakistan elections and it can be safely assumed that chaos in Pakistan has not abated and India — and the world — continue to be at nuclear risk.
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| But weeks before this, in an interview in December, National Security Advisor MK Narayanan scoffed at fears about Pakistan’s nuclear assets and said they were “largely” safe. “It is extremely difficult for any outside element just walking away with a readymade nuclear device (sic),” Narayanan said, adding that the US was looking at Pakistan’s nuclear safety closely, therefore, India didn’t really need to worry much about it.
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| Whom are we to believe? Given that India has welcomed a “stable and democratic” Pakistan, was Pervez Musharraf’s regime good for India or bad for it? Is it in India’s national interest to see him out? Or is it better (and safer) for India to endorse him in saddle as a civilian, conscious of the inevitability of instability if he continues to be a factor in politics armed with the license to mess with the system?
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| Hard to tell. What is more, it is clear that in Pakistan, the regime of the jarheads is not going to go away in a hurry. In a country where institutions of power are shot and individuals enjoy enormous autonomy to do pretty much as they like, it is important to take stock of Pervez Musharraf’s legacy for India-Pakistan relations to evaluate the political risk to India from Pakistan in the short-term future.
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| There are several firsts about the election: for the first time in the history of Pakistan, a successful civil government was elected without interruption or interference from the Army; it is the first time a free, fair and transparent election was held with 3,000 foreign observers and 700 journalists. Violence during the elections was low (under 100 dead), compared to 2007 which was the most violent year in Pakistan since the Partition riots of 1947. Pervez Musharraf deserves credit for this. That he managed to get 98 per cent of the popular vote when he was ‘elected’ President the first time may have spurred him on the road to democracy. Who knows!
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| There are other things he must get kudos for. Whatever India and Pakistan might say in sniping mode, the fact is that on Kashmir, India and Pakistan have stopped fighting and started living together with India having given up very little.
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| The parameters of the India-Pakistan dialogue — no exchange of territory; soft borders across LoC; self-governance with greater autonomy on both sides; cross-LoC consultative mechanism; and demilitarization commensurate with decline in violence — are Pakistan’s virtual endorsement of India’s unarticulated stand of ‘status quo plus’ on Kashmir. While small successes don’t constitute a breakthrough, there has been no breakdown either. In fact, more progress had been made in the last four years than at any time earlier, especially on the core issue of Kashmir.
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| Musharraf made political mistakes: sacking Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary, the storming of Red Mosque in Islamabad and doing a deal with the religious Majlis-e-Muttahida Amal (MMA), to name only a few. The first turned civil society against him, the second turned virtually everybody against him; and the third unleashed ‘soft’ Islam on Pakistan, making the limits to fundamentalist activity elastic. The MMA has lost the election, but it has legitimised a change in societal norms and attitudes to fundamentalism.
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| But can Pakistan — and India — do without Musharraf now? The US has clearly said it can’t. Although he is the first General who is a civilian President in Pakistan’s history (the others were all uniformed), he continues to control the Pakistan Army’s assets. He also derives power from the constitution that can be changed only if unnatural allies come together.
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| The dealmaking season is on in Islamabad. Haggling has begun in smoke-filled rooms. If the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) join hands — this is like the Congress and the BJP coming together — Musharraf might find the going hard. As he is not the sort to saddle up Tonto and ride off into the sunset, he will be tempted to fight back to remain relevant. In that situation, if the Army is called out to quell popular protest, whom will it obey ?
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| Can the mere exercise of people coming out to cast their votes be termed a democracy? And does this alone mean Islamic militancy can be controlled? What about regional aspirations and (that pompous word) the nationalities question? What about skyrocketing flour prices and plumetting sugar prices ?
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| So are we going to see the end of a dictatorship and a “stable and democratic” Pakistan? Pakistan’s problems are just starting. And Musharraf is the least of them. |
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