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| Devangshu Datta: A bumpy spacewalk | | Indian avionics needs to put transparent disaster and failure analysis systems in place to achieve self-sufficiency |
| Devangshu Datta / New Delhi Dec 31, 2010, 00:58 IST |
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Aviation history is studded with spectacular disasters. Hundreds of pioneers crashed before man mastered the air. Space exploration has so far resulted in much fewer fatalities. But the toll has been high in percentage terms.
As far as is known, 18 astronauts (Americans) and five cosmonauts (Russians) have died on flights. That’s roughly a 1:20 fatality ratio since less than 450 people have ever been into space. Space shuttles Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) crashed, with seven-person crews killed on both occasions. In the Soyuz I tragedy of 1971, three cosmonauts died after an air leak due to valve malfunctions. In 1967, Apollo 1 caught fire during a practice launch, killing the three-man crew.
In addition to these fatalities, there have been many near-disasters. Also, there have been on-ground accidents and explosions. The worst was when a Soviet rocket blew up on the pad in 1960, killing 120-odd people. The most recent was at the Satish Dhawan Centre, Sriharikota, in 2004 when six engineers died in an explosion.
Any actuary would reckon there’s a significant chance of something going wrong with a given mission. It’s a sobering thought, given India’s stated determination to launch a manned moon mission. Especially so, after two successive failures with India’s Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) programme and the early termination of Chandrayaan-I in 2009.
The Christmas day abort of the GSLV F06 mission came within 60 seconds of launch. The rocket had to be blown up while it was over the ocean to prevent debris landing on population centres. The previous April 15 launch of GSLV-D3 was also unsuccessful.
In fact, the “strike rate” with GSLV consists of four successful launches and three failures spread over almost a decade. The initial launch in April 2001 was successful and so were the next two. GSLV-F02 in July 2006 failed.
There is no question the satellite programme must carry on. It has paid for itself many times over and the future payoffs could be exponentially higher. India’s electronic media and its telecom footprint, especially in remote areas, is based on indigenous satellite capability.
Satellites are also integral to accurate meteorological forecasts, and assessments of forest cover, agricultural land under plantation, and other environmental indicators, search and rescue operations and so on. In the future, there could be many more applications including distance education, municipal tax assessments, rural road network design and mapping, and so on.
Indigenous satellite capability is orders of magnitude cheaper, and more reliable than a dependence on foreign sats. In the worst case of international conflict, it could be vital to maintaining communications. Plus, India has realistic ambitions of being a player in the commercial satellite launch market where it could be very competitive vis-a-vis the current players.
There’s also an elephant in the bedroom. The Indian Space Research Organisation’s (Isro) civilian space programmes are detached from Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) missile programmes. But the technical capabilities developed by Isro and its contractors could sharply accelerate missile development if such a political decision was ever taken.
The PSLV and GSLV programmes could be converted to inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability within two years, according to a CIA briefing to the US Congress. Exercising such an option would open many cans of worms. But possessing the potential is useful power projection.
But even if the rationale for Isro’s programmes is a no-brainer, the future failure rate is likely to remain high. GSLV-D3 went down when the Fuel Booster Turbo Pump (FBTP) to the third stage cryogenic engine failed. GSLV-F06 had a connector problem, which meant that ground control could no longer communicate with the first-stage engines, after the signal cords snapped.
Other technical hitches will arise as India develops its own cryogenic engines moving on from the current reliance on Russian cryos. GSLV-III, which is scheduled to be operational by 2011, will attempt to do that (in a joint Indo-Russian programme), which would eventually be capable of putting 4,500 Kg satellites into orbit. GSLV F06 was carrying a 2,310 Kg satellite and very few countries have even that capability.
GSLV is designed around three thrust stages. The first is a liquid propellant (LP) “Vikas” motor derived from the Eurospace Ariane’s Viking-2 design. That burns for 170 seconds and produces 680 kN (kilo-newton) thrust. The second stage L37.5/L37.5H employs another LP Vikas based on the Viking-4A engine. That burns for 150 seconds and provides around 800 kN thrust.
The third stage is a C12 cryogenic developed by Glavkosmos, Russia. It burns for around 720 seconds and is re-startable. Hence, it can be used for extended delicate manoeuvres to dump satellites into perfect orbits. While the first and second stage technology are indigenised, the third stage engine is Russian though it’s controlled by Indian avionics and software.
The guarantee of future hitches and glitches as Isro forges ahead also means that it needs to put transparent disaster and failure analysis systems in place. The history of space exploration tells us systems can fail despite the most stringent technical safety standards. If those standards are not in place, the future of Indian space exploration could be at stake.
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