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| Incentives and accountability | |
| Business Standard / New Delhi June 29, 2009, 0:55 IST | |
Private, public interests can co-exist in higher education.
The 24-member committee on higher education chaired by Prof Yash Pal submitted its report to the human resource development ministry last week. The broad thrust of the recommendations is to achieve greater integration at two levels: between the university/research institute structure and society at large, and within the structure itself, encouraging greater communication and collaboration between different institutions and disciplines. Significant reform in the regulatory framework has been suggested in the form of a National Commission on Higher Education and Research. This will have a Constitutional mandate to protect it from the whims of successive governments and allow it to develop and implement a long-term strategy for the sector. It would further the goal of external integration through its composition which, besides academic representatives, would also comprise public representatives and members from the government and the main opposition parties. It would promote internal integration by superseding the existing regulatory bodies — the University Grants Commission (UGC) and the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), which currently have well-defined turfs and come in the way of a seamless system.
All 24 members apparently agreed on the key recommendations, but one of them, Kaushik Basu, did not believe that they went far enough. Beyond structure and regulation, there are the basic issues of incentives and accountability. In his dissent note, Prof Basu argues for a significant role for market forces in servicing the demand for many streams of professional education, for which people are willing to pay significant amounts. This, he argues, will bring private investment into these segments, allowing public funds to focus on less commercially attractive, though equally important, areas. In such areas, he advocates differentiation in terms of compensation and infrastructure support between institutions and/or individuals, to provide greater incentives for excellence. Prof Yash Pal himself, as articulated in an interview with this newspaper, is against such differentiation. Be that as it may, a reality check on the sector would indicate that (i) the profit motive, however disguised, is already playing a significant role (ii) there is enormous quality variation across the system and higher fees are no guarantee of better quality, and (iii) the overall quantity and quality of research output is way below any reasonable standard. Reforming the regulatory framework is clearly one part of any solution, but cannot by itself carry out a task of such enormity. Incentives, in the form of both profit and compensation differentials, will have to be brought into play if there is to be any hope of achieving the “renovation and rejuvenation” of the system that the committee aims for. The challenge for the regulators is how to resolve potential conflicts that could become “counter-productive” in Prof Yash Pal’s words. This requires that the ministry take due note of Prof Basu’s suggestions and quickly flesh out a regulatory model that will formally create the space for them. Incrementalism will not do; radical change is necessary.
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