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| Editorial: Nuclear breakthrough | |
| Business Standard / New Delhi September 8, 2008, 5:59 IST | |
The improbable has happened, and India has gained the nuclear breakthrough that will rank as the Manmohan Singh government’s high point in international relations. It has not been a process free of hiccups, nor has everything that was promised three years ago been delivered — the simple fact is that India is not on the same footing as the five nuclear “haves”. However, it is now in the unique position of being able to carry on its strategic nuclear weapons programme, without international sanctions on its nuclear power programme and without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and that is achievement enough. It is a success that has tested Dr Singh’s stamina, diplomatic skill and political standing. The bitter domestic opposition saw the government risking its parliamentary majority and Dr Singh himself was reportedly ready to resign if his own party was not steadfast in its support. And the reluctance of many members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to sign on the dotted line meant some late-night diplomatic drama late last week.
There will be those who wonder whether the compromises that India has made during the tortuous negotiations mean a real risk to strategic autonomy. The answer comes from the manifest unhappiness of those who are hostile to Indian progress, including China and Pakistan, and those whom an American diplomat once called the “ayatollahs of nuclear apartheid”. If they are upset, and if China wants the same deal for Pakistan, it must be a good deal for India. So the BJP and the Left parties, which continue to be critical of the deal, must ask themselves some questions. Indeed, LK Advani said two years ago that the purpose of the deal is to “cap, roll back and ultimately eliminate” India’s strategic arsenal. This is as manifestly untrue as some of the other criticisms being levelled today.
There will be discomfort about the deal being sold differently in India from what is being said in other countries, including the United States. In President Bush’s letter leaked last week, Condoleezza Rice’s testimony to the US Congress, and the Hyde Act itself, the message that comes through is of furthering the non-proliferation agenda, while India sees it as getting rid of that same agenda insofar as the nuclear denial regime is applied to it. It is hard to see how both positions or intentions can simultaneously hold. Thus, although India has insisted on there being no references to strategic issues like nuclear testing in the “123 agreement” and in the NSG waiver, arguing quite logically that the agreement concerns nuclear electricity, the elephant in the room is without question the issue of what will happen if India tests, and what kind of technology co-operation will actually be on the cards.
If the key clauses are ever put to the test, it will boil down to interpreting the agreement in the context of evolving power equations. If India gains strength as an economic power and strategic player, the interpretations applied will be favourable to this country. If India is perceived as weak, then tougher measures will follow. If the overwhelming thrust of opinion in the country is that India is on the ascendant, then the agreement must be viewed in that light. What can be said at this stage is that India’s diplomats and atomic scientists have negotiated well; it is now up to the latter to make effective use of what they have got to build a successful nuclear power programme. Getting imported uranium to run India’s starved nuclear power plants will be an immediate pay-off.
Part of the problem for the government has been the multi-stage process (with the US government, the US Congress, and the NSG), during which it must adopt maximalist positions, while simultaneously not getting into a corner where those stated positions come in the way of the give-and-take that is the very meaning of negotiation. Has India made concessions? Yes, of course. Are those concessions that the country can live with? On the evidence at hand (the text of the NSG waiver is not yet publicly available), it would seem so. On the basis of that assessment, Dr Singh and India’s negotiators deserve to be congratulated on success on an important and very tricky issue.
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Discussion Board
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| hmdash |
September 08 , 2008 ,17:33 IST |
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| It is indeed a great moment for the country that the NSG waiver has finally been granted to India. The long ostracised stigma is over. Our congratulations to Dr. Manmohan Singh who with his foresight and commitment could do the impossible a possibility and all the accustions by the opposition parties prove wrong. All along, the support extended by President George Bush is appreciable. Let us join hands to enter into big bang in the fied of energy with nearly $40 billion investment. |
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| askulkarni |
September 08 , 2008 ,12:39 IST |
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| I do not agree when you say that they would be interpreted favourably if India gains strength as an economic power. It would also depend on the extent of capital investment made in new nuclear plants by the country. If we invest at the rate of Rs. 25 crore per MW, to install 5000 MW in the next 10 years, would any government carry out a nuclear explosion that would put that investment of Rs. 125000 crore to risk, even if it were to be in our strategic interests? It is here that the trap lies. |
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