New Labour, New Europe
Labours statement is more than a break with the Eurosceptic attitudes of its Conservative predecessors. It removes an important source of friction with European governments which saw the UK opt-out as a device to gain competitive advantage by refusing to adopt EU minimum social standards for workers.
Whether Labours policy of constructive engagement with the EU amounts to more that John Majors promise in 1990 to put Britain at the heart of Europe remains unclear. But the immediate impact of Labours declaration is to give a fillip to the inter-governmental conference (IGC) on the future of the Union, which is due to reach its climax at the Amsterdam summit in six weeks.
Originally, the IGCs task was to review the 1991 Maastricht treaty signed in a mood of euphoria after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Maastricht was always an uneasy compromise among self-conscious defenders of the nation state, which harbour dreams of a deeper political union.
The treaty established a fixed timetable for economic and monetary union (Emu) by 1999 and extended the powers of the European Parliament to block or amend EU laws. But it left matters of internal and external security subject to loose co-operation between national governments.
Maastricht barely secured ratification in Britain, Denmark and France. And a clause providing for a follow-up IGC to complete what one European Commission official calls an unfinished symphony threatens to reopen divisions over the treaty.
Impetus for further institutional reform emerged through the EUs commitment to enlarge the Union to former communists of central and eastern Europe most likely early in the next century. At least 11 countries are queuing to join the 15-member Union creating irresistible pressure to reform the EU institutions and decision-making.
Or so the argument goes. In the run-up to the Amsterdam summit, the main question is whether EU leaders accept the thesis of the impossible status quo or they put off tough choices.
Since the IGCs ceremonial launch 15 months ago in a refurbished car factory in Turin, the pace of negotiations has been glacial. Most blame an intransigent British Conservative government with an ideological antipathy towards greater integration which has grown under pressure from a tiny group of Tory Euro-sceptics exploiting Majors vanishing Commons majority.
Blairs landslide victory fundamentally alters the dynamic of the negotiations for Maastricht II. Labours willingness to countenance a limited extension of majority voting in EU decision-making provides scope for horse-trading.
The first signs of movement will appear in the next three weeks. The Dutch presidency is due to unveil a draft treaty text ahead of a European summit in the coastal town of Noordwijk on May 23, where Tony Blair, the British prime minister, will make his official EU debut.
The smart money, says Maastricht II, will be far more modest than Maastricht I. But the devil lies in the detail of the treaty. There are several benchmarks for assessing how far EU leaders are ready to stretch ambitions.
The first test is the embryonic common foreign and security policy which should better reflect the EUs economic power on the world stage. The latest proposals are little more than tinkering: a new policy-planning department in Brussels and a new face to represent EU.
Far from moving toward a federal superstate, big European countries are increasingly going their own way on foreign policy.
The second test for the inter-governmental conference is whether member states are ready to support an extension of EU powers in areas such as asylum, visas and home affairs. Here the picture is blurred.
Most countries see co-operation as the most effective means of tackling organised crime and illegal immigration.
Countries, led by Germany, also want to introduce majority voting on such matters and extend the role of the Commission and the European Court of Justice. The idea is to unblock the impasse in decision-making and strengthen democratic accountability.
The new Labour government is as wary as its Conservative predecessor of moving away from the Maastricht I model which rests on loose co-operation between national governments on matters of internal security. It fears losing control over British borders which, for an island nation, are relatively easy to police.
The prospective compromise is to allow Britain (and Ireland, which enjoys a common travel area with the UK) some form of extended opt-out. This would leave frontier controls intact, while allowing other member states to forge ahead with their growing co-operation under the Schengen accord, which would be incorporated into the new treaty.
This model of flexible integration could be adopted in other areas, subject to strict rules and supervision from the European Commission.
The new British government is not alone in voicing suspicions about calls for a general flexibility clause in the new treaty. The Italians and Spanish are nervous that it could be used by rich northerners to create their own elite club around membership of the future single currency zone.
Thus, the degree to which flexibility develops will depend on how far Britain and others are willing to soften the national veto, says one IGC negotiator.
The trade-off for Britain is a redistribution of voting power in the council of ministers towards the larger member states. This is essential, not only because eastern enlargement involves mainly small countries but also because the disproportionate power wielded by less populous countries raises questions of democracy and legitimacy.
Thus, in the original six EU member states, decisions could go ahead only with the support of countries representing 70 per cent of the total population. Today, the figure has fallen below 60 per cent. In a Union of 26 countries, a qualified majority could outvote France, Germany, Spain and the UK.
The most likely compromise is a double majority, whereby decisions require the support of more than half the member states which also represent at least 60 per cent of the total EU population. But the small countries will expect preservation of their right to an individual EU Commissioner in Brussels.
The Dutch, Finns and Luxembourgers have threatened to block the IGC unless they get their way. Big countries are likely to lose one of their two EU Commissioners, while the present ceiling of 20 Commissioners would remain. This would allow the first phase of enlargement of up to five new members to go ahead without revisiting the issue.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany recognised the limits of change when he spoke recently of a need for a Maastricht III, IV, and V. But the prospect of yet another constitutional debate is not one which member states such as France and the Scandinavian countries look forward to. This may be the greatest incentive to strike a decent deal in Amsterdam in mid- June or early July.
Yet Kohls words carry a deeper meaning. He is warning the German public that his old promise of European political union in exchange for Emu no longer holds, says a German diplomat.
From the point of view of Britains new government, this means Maastricht II ought to be manageable. The bad news is that Kohl is more determined than ever that Emu goes ahead on time. Blair has bought himself much goodwill with last weeks initiative but on the issue that matters most monetary union Labour is offering no more than an open mind.