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India's stature in South Asia

India is holding its own for now, but the pressures on its regional stature are substantial

7 min read | Updated On : Sep 10 2026 | 6:00 AM IST
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Kanti BajpaiKanti Bajpai
Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi in October 2024 (Reuters)

Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi in October 2024 (Reuters)

What is India’s stature in South Asia? A regional power’s stature is refracted through two main prisms — its geopolitical stature (its control of regional space against outside powers and regional rivals); and its economic stature (gross domestic product, or GDP; per capita GDP; human development; and connectivity/ infrastructure aid to neighbours).
 
Why does stature, or acknowledgment of superior status, matter? Because it is a short cut to getting one’s way. Stature makes others more deferential, predisposing them to do what you want. Every regional power wants its neighbours to do its will so that it is free(r) to concentrate on challenges at home and from extraregional powers.
 
I argue that India’s stature in South Asia is under pressure from China’s large presence, the changing grand strategy of the United States (US), and Pakistan’s recent activism in West Asia.
 

Geopolitical

How much does India control its regional space against the actions of China, the US, and Pakistan? The biggest concern here is China. Is India able to keep China at bay in South Asia in terms of limiting reciprocal high-level visits and arms sales to the smaller South Asian countries (SSACs)?
 
From 2012 to 2026, high-level visits to and from China are 90 and 35, respectively, for a total of 125 visits. Drawing on a parallel table (not presented here), the comparable figures for India are 111 and 62, for a total of 173 visits. India is ahead in terms of total visits. The SSACs are “deferential”: they go to China and India more often than the other way round. That said, senior Indian leaders visit the SSACs more than senior Chinese leaders do so.
 
China’s to-and-from visits in South Asia show that the top three countries are Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. For India, the top three countries are Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. The “battle” for stature between China and India is, therefore, most apparent in Sri Lanka. Also, in 2024-26, top-level leaders of Bangladesh (Rahman) and the Maldives (Muizzu) chose China for their first visit abroad while Prime Minister Amarasuriya of Sri Lanka visited China before she visited India. It is unclear if prioritising China presages a trend.
 
China supplies arms to all South Asian countries except Bhutan. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are key recipients, and for the first two, China is the largest supplier. India’s main arms relationship is with Bhutan and Nepal. Overall, India has diplomatic stature in South Asia, but China is certainly cultivating and being cultivated by the SSACs. 
Major China, India projects
 
What about the US’ challenge to India’s stature? America had gone along with India in South Asia since the early 2000s, hoping that India would help contain Chinese power. By 2016, the containment partnership with India deepened in the free and open Indo-Pacific. Yet, the US never abandoned Pakistan, despite Indian unease. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan once again became a frontline state in American counterterrorism policy. India saw Pakistan as the main source of terrorism, but for the US, Pakistan was an ally against “global terrorism”.
 
Bangladesh too came to be an area of contention. India maintained strong ties with Sheikh Hasina, whereas the US criticised her human rights abuses and electoral malpractices. Since her ouster, the US has deepened ties with Bangladesh. The US Ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, is also special envoy for South and Central Asia. He is, therefore, a roving representative of President Donald Trump in the region, including Bangladesh. The US has ignored Indian sensitivities on this.
 
Clearly, the US-India partnership in South Asia has plateaued. US and Indian interests are not quite aligned; and America may have concluded India cannot stem China’s regional influence. The US must, therefore, expand its role. Most telling is US policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan’s role as mediator in the Iran war and the cryptocurrencies and critical minerals deals with Islamabad have invigorated ties. Trump’s laudatory hospitality towards Field Marshal Asim Munir and the administration’s frequent embarrassment of India over Operation Sindoor, trade, and Russian oil purchases suggest that the US’s ambivalence towards Pakistan has dramatically receded.
 
In addition to deepening US ties, Pakistan boasts a near-alliance understanding with China and cordial relations with Russia (including arms purchases). Pakistan’s stock has risen, thanks to astute diplomacy and new activism in West Asia. In Operation Sindoor it succeeded in creating a perception that it fought India to a standstill. It followed up by signing a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025 and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in August 2026. Beyond this, Pakistan has re-kindled ties with the new government in Bangladesh. It also remains close to Sri Lanka, which it helped during the civil war, and to Muslim-majority Maldives as well.
 
In sum, China and the US’ diplomacy in South Asia pose a challenge to India’s regional stature. Nor has India been able to curtail Pakistan’s growing assertiveness and strategic independence in the region or farther afield.
 

Economic

Is India an economic leader in South Asia? India is the biggest economy and has unmatched strengths — in manufacturing, agriculture, natural resources, and services. According to the government, the country is also “one of the world’s largest startup ecosystems”.
 
However, India slips to 4th position in the region in terms of per capita income. If we compare GDP growth rates from 2015 to 2024, India stands third, behind Bangladesh and the Maldives. Finally, if we move beyond GDP accounting to human development, in 2025, India’s human development index was 0.685, placing it in 4th position behind Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Bhutan. 
High-level official China-south asia visits: 2012-26
 
What about India’s trade engagement with South Asia? Except for Pakistan, all its South Asian neighbours have a robust economic relationship with India. Since they all border India and none of them borders one another, most of their regional trade is with India.
 
But in terms of trade partnerships, it is China and not India that leads. China is the biggest trading partner of all South Asian countries except for Nepal, while India is the second-largest trading partner for the rest of the region (it is Nepal’s biggest trading partner). It bears saying that China is the leading trading partner of most countries globally.
 
As for major aid projects from China and India to the SSACs, it is a balanced picture if we go by the number of projects populating the table (admittedly, a better measure would be the dollar value of aid, but this is difficult to estimate). Broadly, China builds big new connectivity and infrastructure, while India builds more modestly and upgrades existing facilities. China does ports, highways, bridges, tunnels, and energy projects, and India focuses on existing infrastructure, the exception being new hydropower and electricity construction. Given its deep pockets, China’s grander investments are understandable.
 
Our assessment of India’s stature in South Asia is not the last word. Ideally, India’s regional stature would be plotted by tracking the data presented here, and indeed other measures of stature, over a longer period to discern trends more accurately. This preliminary analysis suggests that India is holding its own for now, but the pressures on its regional stature are substantial. Boosting India’s stature in South Asia is not mere image-building because stature impacts internal security as well as external security and a country’s larger international role.
 
Dhriti Bhattacherjee, research analyst, Centre for Social and Economic Progress, contributed to this column.

Written By

Kanti Bajpai

Kanti BajpaiThe author is visiting professor, international relations, Ashoka University. Views expressed are personal

First Published: Sep 10 2026 | 6:00 AM IST

In this article :

South Asia India Foreign Policy US India relations India Pakistan relations