Inside China's military upheaval: Power struggle or consolidation?

General Zhang Youxia, the senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), sacked in January, is most likely to be officially removed from his current position after the ongoing investigations related to “serious discipline and law violations” are over or during the annual Two Sessions meeting scheduled this month. He is ranked second only to its chairman, President Xi. Zhang Youxia, known as a staunch loyalist of Xi, are together described in the media as childhood friends. Their fathers had fought in the revolutionary war under Mao Zedong; both grew up as “princelings” — the sons of veteran CPC members who were celebrated as revolutionary heroes; their fathers were also purged during the Cultural Revolution during the 1960s and were rehabilitated as PLA generals in the 1980s. Zhang Youxia was promoted by Xi to the party’s CMC as senior vice-chairman and also to the party’s powerful political bureau in 2017.

Interestingly, of the seven-member CMC formed following the CPC 20th Party Congress in October 2022, all but two members are left — Xi, chairman and the top-ranking member, and General Zhang Shengmin, the seventh and the lowest-ranking member. The remaining three generals on the CMC who were removed are CMC Vice-Chairman He Weidong, Defence Minister Li Shangfu, and Miao Hua, director of the CMC’s political work department. What is most intriguing is that neither Xi nor Zhang Shengmin carry any real combat experience. This fact has led many outside China to speculate that a forceful reunification with Taiwan now does not seem imminent, as stated by the Lowy Institute.

So, what after all is happening in China? It is not that Zhang Youxia is the first military general to be probed on corruption and indiscipline charges. Since Xi launched an over a decade-long anti-corruption campaign, which turned towards China’s military a couple of years ago, nearly a dozen high-ranking generals and military personnel, including a former defence minister, have been purged and jailed. However, the sudden downfall of Zhang Youxia, the second most powerful military leader beneath Xi and perhaps the only military officer in China who was known to be the confidante of the Chinese President for nearly a decade, has created nervousness and tension in China’s political landscape.

The sudden announcement of disciplinary action against the party-controlled PLA’s two top figures in the last week of January by the CPC has caused great unease and huge insecurity even among those privileged members of the party’s elites who believed themselves to be “secure” on account of their professed full loyalty to the “core” leader, President Xi, according to the ThinkChina. Given the opaque character of the Chinese communist regime and total censorship on writing about the party’s internal conflicts in the media, there are only remote hints and mostly speculations on what possibly might have gone wrong between Xi and his “favourite” military general.     

Not surprisingly, there are as many interpretations available in the world media as the number of interlocutors. The diverse nature of theories being circulated include Xi and his second-in-command in the CMC differed in their respective assessment on determining the timing of attacking Taiwan, especially in the backdrop of first Japan crossing China’s red line on Taiwan aimed at questioning “One China” policy in early November last year, and then following the most provocative United States (US) kidnapping and arrest of the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in the presence of Xi’s personal envoy in Caracas, reported the Wyzxwk.

A leading western media outlet, The Wall Street Journal, claimed accusations against Zhang included “leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons to the US”; the widely respected Lowy Institute reported that Zhang allegedly “trampled on” and undermined the “chairman responsibility system”. Or, in other words, he (Zhang Youxia) challenged and contradicted Chairman Xi on several policy matters; Washington-based reputed think tank, Jamestown Foundation known for closely monitoring the PLA Daily, stated Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli most likely fell from power due to disagreements with Xi over PLA development; closer home; then there were reports of power struggle, regime in crisis, factional infighting, etc. and so on.

Notwithstanding the above, be that as it may, let’s go by as one China specialist stated in The Epoch Times: “With the regime highly opaque and its information system tightly controlled, the best clues often aren’t in dramatic announcements, but in subtle shifts in how the CPC talks to (its members).” As mentioned, in what is seen by most China observers and military affairs experts as highly unusual, the Chinese military newspaper, the PLA Daily, published four front-page write-ups, one editorial and three special commentaries, in an attempt to justify the charges against the two purged generals. “The PLA is not just China’s military — it is the Communist Party’s ultimate power base,” the China specialist added.

The first of the four PLA Daily articles was an editorial published on January 25, a day after the MND announced the probe against the two CMC top generals. Without specifying the charges, the first edit was more in the nature of “a summing up of the harm inflicted on the PLA by the downfall of Zhang and other purged CMC leaders”. The editorial firmly pointed out that Zhang and Liu have “seriously trampled on and undermined the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the CMC chairman”. A Singapore-based China specialist, Yu Zeyuan, has explained, “Although these characterisations are framed in principled terms and do not spell out the specific offences involved, they are by no means empty rhetoric”. The language of the charges points to Zhang and others merely paying lip service to Xi’s instructions while covertly undermining Xi’s authority, Yu Zeyuan said.

The PLA Daily ran the second front-page commentary on the subject six days later, i.e., on January 31. The tone and tenor of the language employed in the edit on January 25, which was entirely political and called for a total internal military shakeup as symbolised in the use of the phrase “shed its (military’s)  feathers and be reborn”, had completely shifted in the second commentary. In contrast, the second write-up was a shift in the gear in that instead of asserting political values and principles, it focused on corruption and highlighted the downfall of the two CMC top -ranking generals as a major victory in Xi’s “anti-corruption” campaign targeting the military. Its title was almost self-explanatory: “Strengthening Confidence in Certain Victory in Anti-Corruption and Building a Strong Military.”

Interestingly, the phrase “shed its feathers and be reborn” reappeared in the second commentary, which was interpreted by a US-based Chinese military affairs specialist as “likely signalling further purges — an attempt to present the upheaval as discipline and a cleanup, rather than a political rupture”. Furthermore, the second PLA commentary that ran on January 31 explicitly linked the purging of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli to advancing the PLA centenary goal and removing obstacles to building combat capability. Remember, the PLA will be celebrating its 100th anniversary in August 2027 — just a couple of months before the CPC is scheduled to hold its 21st National Congress. Don’t forget that for several years, the US defence establishment has been fixated on the year 2027 as the deadline set by Xi Jinping to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.

The remaining two articles, published as front-page commentaries in the PLA Daily on February 1 and February 2, respectively, talked little about the two fallen generals. The commentaries not only did not provide details of the political charges, but they were vague even on corruption allegations. The two commentaries, in fact, gave the impression as if the write-ups were seeking support for Xi among the PLA rank and file rather than targeting the two “corrupt” generals. In the opinion of some experts, the four editorials, when seen together, gave the impression that Xi and the party leadership lacked the support and backing from within the PLA hierarchy. “The CPC often uses the PLA Daily to impose a unified ‘correct’ narrative across the military. When that narrative becomes subtler and less explicit, he said, it usually signals friction at the top—or fear about how the message will be received within the ranks,” an overseas military expert explained in The Epoch Times.

With the purging of the PLA top brass, China’s most powerful military body, which ultimately decides on how China fights its war, the CMC, has been left with only two members — Xi as the chairman and low-ranking general Zhang Shengmin, both are without combat experience. This unique situation has left most foreign observers confused and clueless as to what is next for Taiwan. While debate in the military circles overseas, especially in Taiwan, is getting traction on whether this accelerates or delays a Taiwan conflict, a more consequential question may be “how risk is structured, assessed, and misread?”   

Though it is true that scholars and media in the West have been more concerned about what  China will do next with regard to Taiwan. Within Taiwan, however, the experts seem to be divided over whether it should be feeling worried following the top-level military purges by Xi. Chieh Chung, an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense Strategy and Resources, Institute for National Defence and Security Research, Taiwan, believed “Zhang Youxia’s downfall will not have any direct impact on the process of China using force to invade Taiwan. Xi Jinping’s attempt to unify Taiwan has not changed. He prioritises peaceful reunification and has no clear ‘timetable for reunification by force’”, as reported by the DW.com.

Echoing similar sentiments, Lin Ying-you, associate professor at the Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, Taiwan, said: “This wave of purges represents Xi Jinping's intention to ‘thoroughly reorganize the personnel system of the PLA’.  Whether it will pose a military threat or crisis to Taiwan is ‘too early to say’. But due to the gap in military leadership, the CPC is unlikely to launch large-scale, cross-strait military operations against Taiwan in the short term.” Instead, it will likely focus on small-scale harassment, such as the increasingly routine “grey zone” operations involving military aircraft and warships, Lin added. 

Not disagreeing with the above assessments expressed by Taiwan scholars, the island nation’s Defence Minister Wellington Koo did not seem particularly alarmed or worried because of high-level military purges in the mainland. “It’s not enough to draw conclusions that any high-level (military) personnel changes will lead to CPC’s potential military invasion of Taiwan,” the defence minister of Taiwan said. 

A BBC Chinese commentary on the impact of recent military purges in China on the situation across the Taiwan Strait sees a window of opportunity for Taiwan. It was observed that Zhang Youxia’s downfall reflects not only Xi’s severe crackdown on the PLA, but also the Taiwan factor behind it, which is receiving close attention. The commentary further noted, “Zhang Youxia’s downfall means that the Chinese military is now more subservient to Xi Jinping, and that Xi’s policy toward Taiwan has been adjusted, giving Taiwan more time to deal with Chinese military pressure and challenges.”

The Asia Society’s China specialist, Neil Thomas, in an analysis in Chinese Politics, opined that the lack of experienced generals like Zhang Youxia who can provide objective advice will increase the “operational risks” of Xi Jinping commanding a million-strong army, especially on the Taiwan issue, which may lead to more unstable decision-making or misjudgments.

However, if one goes by what the Associated Press (AP) had reported about General Zhang Youxia’s hardened views on Taiwan reunification two years ago, there is very little to doubt Zhang’s ability to either defy Xi Jinping or “cultivate” his own line on the use of force to bring about reunification. Reporting on Zhang Youxia’s strongly-worded speech at a two-day forum of the Asia Pacific nation’s top navy official’s meet in Qingdao, China in April 2024, the AP stated: “Zhang has spoken in the past of Beijing’s determination to take control of the self-governing island republic of Taiwan, which it claims as its own territory, using force if necessary.”

“Zhang appeared to press China’s unilateralist approach to foreign relations and military conflicts as espoused by Xi Jinping, the top military commander, Communist Party leader and head-of-state for life, who has eliminated all dissenting views,” the AP added.

At another level, in a surprise move, a Financial Times (FT) report claimed on February 10, “China steps up dangerous air encounters near Taiwan”. According to the report, Chinese fighter jets carried out unusually dangerous manoeuvres near Taiwanese F-16 aircraft during the ‘Justice Mission’ military exercise that the PLA conducted around Taiwan in December 2025. As reported, Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund, told the FT, the PLA was becoming “increasingly reckless” as it stepped up the pressure on Taiwan. “The next likely step in the escalation ladder is PLA aircraft operating inside Taiwan’s 12 nautical miles territorial airspace, which would further heighten the risk of an accident,” she said.

The FT report further concluded that people familiar with the incidents of last year suggested that PLA pilots were being pushed to do things beyond normal training, in a possible sign that Xi’s military purges might be disrupting the PLA command.

To sum up, there is no denying the fact, largely due to communist China’s opaque regime and its information channels highly controlled, there are no clear answers to questions such as why did President Xi purge Zhang — apparently Xi’s “sworn brother”; can a leader as powerful as Xi continue — and for how long — to single-handedly run a huge and large army consisting of 2 to 2.5 million soldiers; are corruption and disloyalty really the reasons a series of senior military officials and leaders being purged, etc.

Internally in China, as mentioned, the purging of General Zhang Youxia will send shockwaves through the PLA and the Communist Party itself. The previous sacking of nine senior military generals over the past few years and now this latest purging of the top two CMC leaders are definitely pointers that there is turmoil not only in the ranks of the PLA, but also within the party leadership. What is disturbing and maybe shocking to millions of PLA men and women is that, just like in the case of the sacked nine generals, in the case of General Zhang and General Liu too, details of specific charges may never be made public. Perhaps the only striking difference between the official announcement of probe being initiated against the generals is that against nine generals the party said, “They seriously violated party discipline and are suspected of serious duty-related crimes involving an extremely large amount of money”; and in the announcement of probe against Zhang and Liu, the party only charged them with “serious violation of arty discipline” but did not mention their “involvement in extremely large amount of money”.

Quite surprisingly, there is a strange similarity in the timing of the expulsion of the nine generals in the past and the current purging of two senior-most CMC leaders. The previous purge occurred on the eve of the fourth plenum of the party central committee — an important party meeting that finalises and approves the next five-year plan. As Zhang and Liu were sacked in the backdrop of China looking to implement its new 15th five-year plan, which is set to be formally approved this month. Also, the previous purge took place just before President Xi was preparing to meet with President Trump at the APEC leaders’ summit in South Korea last October; the two CMC senior generals were sacked at a time when China is gearing up to welcome President Trump in Beijing during the first week of April.

Assumably, the actual reasons for the top military purges will remain shrouded in mystery as long as President Xi has the reins of the party in his hands. But a series of purges, no doubt, is indicative of not political unity, but a highly fractured party-military regime.