A new world of uncertainty unfolds

Under Bush, at the Cold War’s end, the US sought to forge a new grand strategy. This quest did not really emerge into a full-blown form until the advent of the first (Bill) Clinton administration. Clinton’s grand strategy was composed of two key elements, democratic enlargement and the expansion of free markets. The first, was pursued somewhat fitfully, but nevertheless remained as a key plank of his foreign policy. It would be an interesting exercise in counter-factual history to consider what grand strategy Bush would have pursued were it not for the horrific, multiple terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. What we do know, however, is that the al Qaeda terrorist attacks led Bush to embrace the so-called “war on terror” which became one of the defining features of his foreign and security policies. To vanquish the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, Bush invaded Afghanistan following the refusal of the Taliban regime to hand them over. In 2003, ostensibly because of Saddam Hussein’s failure to terminate his nuclear weapons programme, he also invaded Iraq.

Many of post-Cold War policy choices had a range of intended as well as unintended consequences for the global order. For example, ironically, the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, led to substantial losses in terms of blood and treasure for the US. According to reliable estimates, the Afghan war alone cost the US as much as $2.3 trillion. That figure does not include the losses that American and allied military personnel sustained owing to the protracted effort and ultimate failure to dislodge the Taliban regime. Flawed post-invasion policy choices in Iraq also helped spawn the Islamic State with dire consequences for the country, the region and beyond.

These misadventures, despite the costs they imposed on others and even on the US, nevertheless did not undermine the fundamental structure of the global order even though they faced much criticism and enjoyed varying degrees of support from both within the US and abroad. President (Barack) Obama, other than sustaining the war in Afghanistan, carried out a handful of discrete military operations, most notably the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Biden, to the chagrin of many who believed that the US could have prevailed in Afghanistan against the Taliban, withdrew from the country ending a two-decade long war.

Trump, in his first term despite expressing misgivings about America’s European allies in particular owing to their failure to spend enough on the common defence, did not dramatically change the course of American foreign policy. He did withdraw from several multilateral treaties and organisations and the bilateral nuclear accord that had been forged with Iran under President Obama. He also orchestrated the killing of Qasim Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, a component of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, an elite Iranian military unit. However, adhering to his principle of “America First”, he chose not to embark on another war.

This was entirely in keeping with his belief that American allies should bear greater burdens for their defence and that it was not the task of the US to police the world. It is also entirely possible that at least two of his key defence officials,

H R McMaster, his initial national security adviser, whom he summarily dismissed, and his first secretary of defence, General James Mattis, a former Marine Corps Commandant, who resigned over policy differences, had restrained some of his more feckless impulses. Furthermore, as many political commentators and analysts have argued, Trump, a newcomer to the workings of the US may not have known how to pull the levers of power. That too, may have acted as a restraint on some of his instincts. In his second term, he is far more knowledgeable about how to exercise power.

Furthermore, he has surrounded himself with several Cabinet members who either share his policy agenda or are willing to cater to his mercurial ways. Consequently, any restraints that either stemmed from his inexperience with US’ folkways or from the counsel of those advisers who were prepared to try and rein him in are gone.

Accordingly, he, no doubt, feels at liberty to act on his whims and vagaries. Furthermore, it can be surmised that since this is, owing to constitutional limits, his second and final term in office (despite his occasional musings about pursuing a third term), he can burn up any amount of political capital at home and abroad without facing any electoral consequences.

Resultantly, he is pursuing foreign and security policies as though they were entirely his personal prerogatives. To that end, he has, as is well known, publicly discussed his interest in absorbing Canada and Greenland, abducted a leader, albeit thuggish, from Venezuela and has brought Cuba to the verge of economic collapse through a near-complete oil embargo. Now he is publicly musing that he would be in favour of overthrowing the existing regime in Cuba. Most disturbingly, in concert with Israel (and perhaps at the urging of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu), he has embarked on a full-scale war against Iran without even an attempt to seek Congressional authorisation, let alone the imprimatur of the United Nations. Nor, for that matter, did he make the slightest effort to consult with his European or other allies before starting this war.

The consequences of this unilateral action are now sweeping across the global economy and have also imposed significant economic costs at home. He is now asking Congress to authorise another $200 billion in defence spending as a host of domestic programmes have been drastically cut. Of course, even prior to undertaking this war, until the US Supreme Court struck down his sweeping tariffs, he had effectively wielded them as an economic cudgel trying to browbeat allies, partners and rivals alike in attempts to get them to kowtow to his policy preferences.

In the wake of all these developments, both political leaders as well as policy analysts have lamented the demise of what they have referred to as the “rules-based liberal order”. Others, of a more sardonic bent, have contended that this order was either not that robust in the first place or was mostly a form of organised hypocrisy. It is possible to argue that the first of these two arguments have some validity. When it suited the US and some of its allies, they violated the canons of the order. In this regard, one may wish to recall that President (Richard) Nixon in 1971 had unilaterally taken the US off the gold standard to the shock of many, especially American allies. Also, when the US deemed it necessary, both under Democratic and Republican presidents, it intervened in the affairs of other states even to the extent of overthrowing democratically- elected regimes that were not to its liking ranging from Latin America to West Asia. Furthermore, during much of the Cold War, several of its allies, especially within the Atlantic alliance, were far from liberal democracies ranging from Greece to Portugal and Spain. Nevertheless, the US, as the founder of this order in the immediate postwar era, had tried to uphold it albeit fitfully.

Trump’s policy choices, which seem based more on personal whims, rather than strategic imperatives, has now all but upended any sense of predictability that had existed in the global order both during and after the end of the Cold War. Given the size and scope of America’s economy and its overweening military might, it will probably maintain its global dominance for a few more years and be able to unilaterally assert its will. That said, with Trump’s idiosyncratic policy choices, his reckless disregard for the sentiments of allies and partners and the economic costs of his wars and interventions, he is creating a world of unpredictability and increasing chaos. Under these circumstances, he will soon discover that even allies and partners will not be available to come to the assistance of the US in its time of need. Already, the bulk of its European partners have refused to come to its assistance to douse the flames in the Persian Gulf.

Those choices may well be a harbinger of the future. Given that the self-inflicted wounds to American reliability and credibility are likely to fester well into the future, the world is entering a phase of intense uncertainty. Though there had been differences between the US and many of its allies, those, for the most part, fell within the ambit of normal politics. Even the differences that the US had with many of its West European allies during the Second Gulf War of 2003, were eventually set aside.

This time, however, the unilateral exercise of American power without any attempt to consult, let alone bring on board its allies and partners could well result in a breach that could result in the loss of multiple forms of trust that had undergirded the links between the US  and its vast network of friends and partners not only in the Atlantic alliance but beyond.

The global milieu that Trump, through his idiosyncratic and highly personalistic policy choices, without the slightest regard for national and global institutions and norms, is creating, may even make the staunchest critics of the previous world order, for all its flaws, seriously lament its passing. The old Latin adage, “cave hic dragones” (beware here be dragons) may well be the only counsel that national leaders should turn to as the world appears to enter a Hobbesian era.