A strategic shift in India-EU ties

The strategic significance of these agreements lies thus in the fact that Belgium and India have realised that the future of their relationship lies not in the field of trade and economics alone: the security dimension of the relationship, economic as well as geopolitical, has taken centre stage. It encompasses  not only economic resilience, secure supply chains, diversification of markets, but also defence industry and military security.

Economic de-risking from China is a pressing common objective for both the EU and India to proceed with the FTA. Realistically, however, it will take a long time before India can become a real alternative trading partner to China. The positive results of the FTA will be felt once India will have made the necessary reforms to make its economy more attractive for European investors. These will have a positive impact on investment flows from Europe to India.

But more significantly, the EU, since 2022, directly confronted with the security challenges posed on its borders by an aggressive Russia, and by an ever-closer alliance between China and Russia, started to become conscious of its role as a geopolitical actor. The evolution of transatlantic relations under the Trump II administration further encouraged the Union to start looking for other security and defence partners in the world. It took a political reawakening in Belgium, at the highest levels of the EU institutions (Commission and European Council), for the EU to see the potential of a real strategic partnership with India.

India, more than ever, realised that it needed more Western, European inputs into its economy to achieve its developmental goals. India furthermore became aware of the geopolitical ‘awakening’ of the EU.

It should be pointed out that India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, had for their part already understood that India had to pay more attention to the EU as a Union, and not just as a collection of individual member states. Prime Minister Modi’s first summit with the EU took place in Brussels in May 2016 during the 13th EU-India Summit. The 14th Summit was held in New Delhi in October 2017). The 12th Summit happened in New Delhi in February 2012.

To carry forward this re-start of their strategic relationship, both sides will now have to implement the above-mentioned agreements in a coherent and sustained way.

The credibility of the ‘strategic part’ of these ties will depend to a large degree upon real common actions in the field of security and defence. This means that the SDP will have to be implemented in full.

For a start, the different dialogue-mechanism of the partnership should be operationalised in a way that is relevant for the evolving global security-context. One could, for example, hope that India and the EU would have started a meaningful exchange on the unfolding Iran war and its consequences.

The areas mentioned in the SDP for enhanced cooperation include a whole range of domains, some more general in nature, others more specific and of particular security-interest such as maritime security and space security.

It will be important for both sides to not get lost in endless working parties on a multitude of subjects, thereby losing sight of the overall objective of strategic coherence.

Furthermore, the Union will have to show that it can operate as a real actor in these fields. After all, security and defence are domains in which the member states still have full competence. In these fields, the Union can only go as far as the member states will allow it to go.

Regarding defence industry cooperation between the EU and India, the wording of the SDP is rather vague. This can be explained by the fact that the EU member states tend to approach the Indian defence market individually. The European defence industry is very much a national affair of each member state.

In general terms, the EU realises that things will have to change in this area.

The European Commission has now for the first time, a commissioner responsible for defence (Andrius Kubilius). The Commission also tries to develop programmes that encourage transnational defence projects (Cfr ReArm Europe Plan, and its SAFE-pillar for joint procurement). It is yet unclear if and how India will be able to participate in any of these programmes.

The ‘Towards 2030’ agenda is somewhat more explicit about possible defence industrial cooperation: 3.2.1 Consult on respective defence initiatives, including through exchanges on defence industry related matters. Explore, where there are mutual interest and alignment of security priorities, possibilities for India’s participation in relevant EU defence initiatives, as appropriate, in line with respective legal frameworks.

3.2.2 Set up an industry-led India-EU Defence Industry Forum to bring together businesses from both sides, with official participation as observers and associating EU member states, for further focused discussions on defence industry to explore opportunities.

These are very promising incentives to start meaningful cooperation in the defence industrial domain. To achieve the declared objectives in the security and defence field, strategies between both sides will have to align significantly. This implies trust in each other. Clearly, the EU and India do trust each other.

The conclusion of the agreement on the FTA proves it. Trust thus exists in the fields of trade and economics. Also, both sides want a system based on rules, a system they respect and are willing to defend. But trust has to further develop in the security and defence domain. For this, the EU and India have to develop real understanding for the security concerns of each other. This implies regular interaction on the highest political levels to discuss these issues. The SDP has instituted a solid mechanism to this effect.

A subject that will have to be tackled in depth in those fora are the Russia and China relationships of both the EU and India. The complicated and complicating nature of these has come up regularly in studies and commentaries about the EU-India relationship — whereby several analysts see this as an obstacle to come to an overarching strategic relationship.

The Ukraine war has turned Russia from a not very friendly neighbour into an outright enemy of the EU. This is a fact that many in India fail to appreciate  — just as real threats posed by the Chinese behaviour on the Line of Actual Control, as well as China’s arming of Pakistan, are not always understood in Europe.

An important element to create real trust would be to conclude the Agreement on Security of Information. The intention to start negotiations to this effect were announced on January 27. If you can agree to exchange confidential and sensitive information, you build real trust. It goes without saying that it would give a big boost to cooperation in the defence-industrial domain.

To understand the broader significance of the results of the recent EU-India Summit, one should look at the wider geopolitical context, some elements of which were already highlighted earlier in this text.

Recent events in the world have shown that the EU and India have no significant impact on what happens in the world. While being confronted with very similar problems provoked by the US-Israeli war on Iran, for example, neither has any influence on either side of this conflict.

The EU and its member states have to deal, for the first time since the end of WWII, with a hostile US. Secretary of State Marco Rubio may have declared in Munich on February 14 how much the Trump administration is attached to Europe.

However, present-day US’s idea of the old continent is the complete opposite of what its own people and governments want it to be. US President Donald Trump’s policies have led the Europeans to realise that they will have to stand on their own feet in this world. They have discovered the potential virtues of strategic autonomy  — a policy that France has been advocating for many years. At the Munich Security Conference, President Emmanuel Macron declared that Europe has to learn how to become a geopolitical power.

Institutional complexities will make it hard for the EU to deliver results in the field of common security and defence. But it has no other choice. The EU now needs to invest in its own military and economic capacities to achieve genuine autonomy. Its relationship with India has the potential of becoming an important element towards this goal.

India has practised strategic autonomy in different shapes and forms since it became independent. Europe could learn some useful lessons from India in this regard. It, however, seems that strategic autonomy in the age of ­­Trump II has not shielded India from the onslaughts of US’s transactional policies. While not being an alternative to the US, the EU can nevertheless provide India with a stable and dependable relationship.

Within the EU, a serious discussion will have to be held between the member states as to how they see their own relationship with India and how these align with the EU- strategic partnership with India. After all, at least seven member states have already established a strategic partnership with India. The Union and the member states cannot continue to have their own separate strategic relationship with India.

For the EU and India to make progress in their strategic relationship, they will have to transcend the commercial-economic dynamics of their relationship. In these times of geopolitical uncertainty, economic security has become an important element of overall security. However, closer economic ties are in themselves not sufficient to create a real strategic partnership.

For this to happen, the EU and India will have to start meaningful cooperation in the field of security and defence  — they will have to go beyond declaratory language, to create real mutual understanding on the highest political levels. The three elements about which an agreement was reached on January 27 are significant in this regard. Together, they form a solid basis for a credible EU-India strategic partnership.

They are a political signal to the world that the EU and India are aiming, through their cooperation, to be beacons of stability in the world. Implementing these agreements fully, thereby building up trust and better understanding, as well as deep and regular political dialogue at the highest levels, will make the EU and India into the real partners they aim to be.