How India can lead the Global South

  Successive Indian governments, whether ideologically of the centre, left-of-centre, or right-of-centre, have identified the country’s interests with the poor countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and have asserted a desire for leadership of the putative bloc. 

Most recently, at the third Voice of Global South Summit in August 2024 in New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the meeting which hosted 21 heads of state, 34 foreign ministers, and 118 ministers and vice ministers. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, he “reiterated India’s commitment to share its experiences and capabilities with partner countries of the Global South”.

  The Modi government takes pride in its advocacy for the group. At the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, it was India that championed the inclusion of the African Union in future gatherings, and this is held as a badge of honour and a necessity. In his book, Why Bharat Matters (2024), External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar writes: “As it ascends the international hierarchy, India speaks not just for itself but for a larger Global South constituency as well… For India, this is both a moral responsibility as well as an expression of global strategy… India is well served by investing deeply in the Global South.”

  What is the Global South that we in India claim to represent and lead?

  The term Global South has never been clearly defined in terms of who belongs in it. Probably the best way to think about belonging is in economic terms. If we define the Global South countries as those with a per capita income below the global average (approximately $13,000, according to World Bank data), then in 2024 the category consists of some 120 countries, with Malaysia and China at the top of the group with a per capita income of just over $13,000 and Burundi at the bottom with a per capita income of less than $300. India, with a per capita income of just below $2,700, is firmly a member of the Global South in economic terms — now and for the foreseeable future.

  Who, then, are the 120 or so countries of the Global South? If we leave out China and the other countries with per capita income above $13,000, they are primarily from Asia and Africa: roughly two-thirds are Asian and African countries, the rest being from South America (only three countries are above the global average), Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and Oceania. How much economic weight do these Global South countries have? Probably no more than 20 per cent of the global economy in nominal terms. The group’s weight comes instead from demography and votes: it has 60 per cent of the world’s population and 65 per cent of the votes in the United Nations (UN).

  Why is the Global South important to India?

  First, the bloc’s weight of population and votes in the UN make it important. In dealing with the great powers and the developed world, Indian interests can be served by mobilising these countries. The opposition of such huge numbers to the will of the dominant powers could stop them from policies inimical to India (and others in the Global South). Better still, the support of these societies and states may help shape policies beneficial to India and others. So, the Global South may have stopping- and shaping-power. 

  Second, the Global South is an important geopolitical arena vis-à-vis China. Despite the recent détente with China, India must be wary of ceding influence to it, including in the Global South. China could wield its influence not only to deny India economic access to key Global South countries but also to undercut the Indian quest for global status. India needs Global South countries to stand up to China and stand up for India. When UN reforms eventually roll round, Indian diplomats will need the strong support of the Global South if India is to gain permanent membership of the UN Security Council in the teeth of Chinese opposition.

  Third, the Global South represents economic opportunities for India. At 20 per cent of the global economy (approximately $23-24 trillion in total nominal gross domestic product or GDP), it is in aggregate larger than the European Union and China. It represents markets for Indian exports, particularly at a time when India may be losing export orders in the US and possibly elsewhere due to US tariffs and other punitive measures. The Global South is also potentially an investment destination for Indian companies. Plus, Global South countries, particularly in South America and parts of Africa, are energy- and mineral-rich, and could help diversify India’s sources of crucial inputs into its growing economy.

  If the Global South is important to India, is India important to the Global South?

  The comparison with China is revealing. China brings far more to the table than India. And this is likely to be true for many years to come, for four reasons. For one thing, China is an economic powerhouse, nearly five times India’s size. This means that it provides development aid, investments, and goods and services on a scale that India cannot match. It is also a huge market for Global South exports, once again beyond anything that India can offer. 

  Beyond this, China is a geopolitical balancing power in a way that India is not. If the Global South needs balancing power against the US and other Western powers, the only real possibility is China — with its massive economic, military, and technological capacities. It is not so much that Global South countries ally themselves formally or informally with China to stave off Western pressures. Instead, the threat that these countries can work more closely with China, and give it preferential economic and strategic treatment, provides the Global South with greater room for manoeuvre. It bears saying that China can be a balancer within the Global South as well — for one Global South country against another. 

A third Chinese advantage is its UN and other multilateral power. China’s UN veto power can come in handy against Western censure and intervention. Already, China and Global South countries work together in the UN to push back against Western moves on human rights violations. China also has influence in other multilateral forums such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and various other international development agencies (for instance, the Asian Development Bank). Through the BRICS’ New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (all of which China dominates), and bilateral aid, it is an alternative to the established lending agencies. Here again, India cannot match China.

  China’s influence is also a function of its soft power: the power of attraction. In terms of popularity, Indian and Chinese movies, television dramas, music, and food may be on par; but what makes China more attractive is the fact that it is authoritarian and that this seems to deliver in terms of governance effectiveness. Global South countries marvel at how far China has come and with what speed and, rightly or wrongly, attribute this to its technocratic authoritarianism.

  On the other hand, when they look at India’s troubled governance, they see either a picture of what they are — noisy and seemingly disorganised — or what they do not want to become. In the Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2025, on a measure of “cultural influence” (the Index’s proxy for soft power), India ranks fourth in Asia, behind the US, China, and Japan and just ahead of Australia. The Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ annual State of Southeast Asia survey paints an even less flattering picture. It shows how little the region looks to India for leadership or inspiration: India is thought to have virtually no influence (in the company of the United Kingdom and South Korea).

  So, is India of little use to the Global South, and should it give up on the Global South? India is a source of medicines and vaccines, food (rice, cereals), and some manufacturing products (electronics, automotives, chemicals, textiles). In addition, Indian government training programmes and lately its expertise in Unified Payments Interface are attractive. India has also been a stalwart in UN peacekeeping. But its main use for the Global South is the ability of its diplomats to say things well on the international stage and to speak truth to power when others are too vulnerable to do so. As for giving up on the Global South, for the reasons shared earlier, India cannot walk away from countries in Africa and Asia in particular.

  What of the future?

  By itself, India’s influence and role in the Global South is limited and cannot match China, but with a group of middle powers it could work more closely with the poor countries of the world to the advantage of all sides. This middle-power grouping would include Brazil, Mexico, France, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Japan.

  No grouping is perfect. But with just 10 members (including India), it is small and manageable. These are weighty regional powers, and together they have about 18-20 per cent of global GDP, roughly as much as the entire Global South. They are adept at working global institutions and are friendly to India. They are also strongly linked to China and the US and yet do not shy away from taking an independent stance on select issues.

  Middle or regional powers, rather like the middle classes in a society, are especially well positioned to engage those stronger and weaker than themselves. The powers in this G10, by virtue of their material and diplomatic capabilities, matter to China and the US as well as the smaller countries of the world. So, they possess the credibility to communicate effectively with the two superpowers and with lesser capitals. 

To be effective, this G10 must avoid theatre. The work of the coalition should be private, consultative, and nimble. Professional diplomats, special envoys, and national security advisors, and not publicity-grabbing foreign ministers and heads of government, should lead the continuous flow of ideas and interventions for real problem-solving. Circumstance and short- and longer-term challenges that are amenable to the group’s efforts should dictate what the group does (rather than fanciful, overloaded agendas that become rigid and intractable). And finally, the 10 governments should maintain a constant flow of consultations and discussions, mostly informal and in the shadows. 

In a world where the big powers, and especially the US, threaten to run rampant against any opposition, it is this kind of grouping that holds promise for India. The 10 middle powers represent all the major regions of the world and are politically ecumenical enough so that neither China nor the US — or the rest of the world — would find them politically and geopolitically toxic. In sum, a G10 plus the Global South is a more practicable option for India than going it alone in trying to lead the poor countries of the world.