The French connection
France supports India's multi-alignment with flexible defence deals, from helicopters to submarines, fortifying Indo-Pacific security ties.
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 "Harsh V Pant")
 "Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron during a meeting in Mumbai in February 2026 (Photo:MEA)")
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron during a meeting in Mumbai in February 2026 (Photo:MEA)
What stood out during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to India from February 17-19, at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was not merely the breadth of engagement, but the clarity of purpose that underpinned it. The optics of summitry, participation in the India AI Impact Summit, and the launch of the 2026 India–France Year of Innovation were all significant. Yet, beneath these headlines, moments lay a deeper strategic recalibration: an unmistakable shift toward embedding defence cooperation at the very core of the bilateral relationship.
At one level, the decision to elevate ties to a “Special Global Strategic Partnership” appears as a logical extension of a relationship that has matured steadily over decades. However, such nomenclature often obscures more than it reveals. What is consequential here is not the label itself, but what it signals: an intent in both France and India to move beyond the incrementalism that has long characterised defence ties and toward a more integrated, forward-looking framework. The renewal and intensification of the 10-year defence cooperation agreement reinforce this trajectory, suggesting that both sides now view defence collaboration not as a transactional necessity but as a strategic imperative.
This shift is most visible in the evolving discourse around co-development and co-production. For years, India’s defence engagements were largely defined by a buyer-seller dynamic, with limited scope for domestic value addition. That model is now being steadily dismantled. The emphasis during Macron’s visit on joint manufacturing, technology transfers, and industrial partnerships underscores India’s determination to align external acquisitions with its domestic capacity-building agenda under the Make in India programme. France, unlike many other partners, has shown a consistent willingness to engage with this agenda in substantive terms.
Defence ties
The ongoing discussions around the expansion of India’s Rafale fleet are emblematic of this transition. The possibility of acquiring over a hundred additional aircraft has generated considerable attention. But to reduce the Rafale conversation to mere numbers would be to miss the larger point. What is at stake here is the creation of an ecosystem. The insistence on co-production in India, the integration of local supply chains, and the prospect of sustained maintenance and upgrade cycles within the country all point to a more structural transformation. In effect, the Rafale is being positioned not just as a platform, but as a catalyst for the broader indigenisation of India’s aerospace sector.
At the operational level, the significance of the Rafale for India’s defence preparedness remains undeniable. The Indian Air Force currently operates 36 of these aircraft, with deliveries beginning in 2020, and deployed at strategically critical bases such as Ambala and Hasimara.
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These deployments are not incidental. They reflect the aircraft’s role in addressing India’s dual-front challenge. With tensions along both the Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China remaining volatile, the need for a platform that can deliver across a spectrum of missions — air superiority, deep strike, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare — has become increasingly acute.
The Rafale’s technological attributes — its advanced radar systems, sensor fusion capabilities, and integration of long-range precision weaponry — provide India with a qualitative edge that is difficult to replicate in the short term. In an environment where adversaries are rapidly modernising their own air capabilities, including the induction of fifth-generation platforms, such advantages are critical. Yet, it would be reductive to view the Rafale solely through a tactical lens. Its acquisition also reflects a broader strategic logic: the need to bridge immediate capability gaps while indigenous platforms such as the Tejas Mk2 and the advanced medium combat aircraft remain under-development.
This interplay between short-term necessity and long-term ambition lies at the heart of India’s defence policy.
The persistent shortfall in squadron strength — hovering around 29 against a sanctioned requirement of 42 — has created an urgent demand for rapid capability augmentation. At the same time, there is a clear recognition that over-reliance on imports is neither sustainable nor strategically desirable. The Rafale, particularly in its proposed expanded and locally integrated form, offers a way to navigate this tension.
The India–France defence partnership provides a conducive framework for this balancing act. Unlike many of India’s other major defence relationships, it is underpinned by a relatively higher degree of trust and predictability. France’s track record as a supplier, marked by timely deliveries and an absence of politically driven disruptions, has contributed significantly to this perception. Equally important is France’s approach to technology sharing and end-use conditions, which has generally been more flexible than that of other Western partners.
The outcomes of Macron’s 2026 visit reinforce the depth of this engagement. The remote inauguration of an Airbus H125 helicopter assembly line in Bengaluru, for instance, is indicative of a broader trend toward localised production. Similarly, the proposed joint venture between Bharat Electronics Limited and Safran for the manufacture of highly agile and manoeuvrable munition extended range (HAMMER) precision-guided munitions reflects an effort to embed critical technologies within India’s industrial base. These initiatives are not isolated; they form part of a larger architecture aimed at creating enduring industrial linkages.
The establishment of a Joint Advanced Technology Development Group further underscores the forward-looking nature of the partnership. By focusing on emerging and disruptive technologies, most of which have direct military applications, both countries are seeking to future-proof their defence collaboration. Discussions around areas such as nuclear-powered submarines, advanced jet engines, and underwater systems add another layer of strategic depth, even if many of these proposals remain at a preliminary stage.
Beyond the hardware and industrial dimensions, the partnership is also expanding in terms of institutional and operational linkages. The reciprocal deployment of officers at Indian Army and French Land Forces establishments, enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation, and regular strategic dialogues contribute to a growing degree of interoperability. These mechanisms, while less visible than major acquisitions, are crucial for sustaining long-term collaboration.
Aligned interests
Geopolitically, the convergence between India and France is becoming increasingly pronounced. Both countries share a commitment to strategic autonomy and a multipolar international order. For India, this translates into a policy of multi-alignment, aimed at maximising its strategic options while avoiding excessive dependence on any single partner.
For France, it reflects a broader European aspiration to carve out an independent role in global affairs, distinct from that of the United States (US).
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key theatre for this convergence. France’s territorial presence in the Indian Ocean, including regions such as Réunion, gives it a direct stake in the stability of the region. India, for its part, faces a complex security environment shaped by the rise of China and the persistence of regional tensions. Cooperation in areas such as maritime domain awareness, joint exercises, and naval interoperability thus serves shared strategic interests.
It is within this broader context that the role of US President Donald Trump’s disruption of the global order needs to be understood. The impact of the so-called “Trump factor” on India–France ties is neither linear nor deterministic. However, it has undeniably introduced a set of variables that have influenced India’s strategic calculus. The re-emergence of a more transactional and, at times, unpredictable US foreign policy — characterised by tariff pressures, criticism of India’s ties with Russia, and a selective approach to alliances — has reinforced India’s instinct to diversify its partnerships.
In this environment, France’s positioning as a reliable and relatively non-intrusive partner has gained added salience. The absence of stringent end-use monitoring regimes, coupled with a willingness to engage in substantive technology transfers, makes French defence offerings particularly attractive. The momentum behind the proposed expansion of the Rafale fleet and other collaborative initiatives cannot be entirely divorced from this shifting geopolitical landscape.
At the same time, it would be simplistic to attribute the deepening of India–France ties solely to external factors. The relationship has its own internal logic, shaped by decades of engagement and a shared strategic outlook. The Trump factor, in this sense, acts more as an accelerant than a primary driver. It sharpens existing trends rather than creating new ones.
For France, the partnership with India also carries significant strategic and economic implications. As Europe grapples with questions of strategic autonomy and seeks to reduce its dependence on external actors, India emerges as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific. The scale of India’s defence market, combined with its growing technological capabilities, offers substantial opportunities for long-term collaboration. Moreover, engagement with India allows France to position itself as a credible actor in the Indo-Pacific, complementing its broader global ambitions.
The 2026 visit, therefore, needs to be seen as part of a larger continuum. The approximately 21 agreements and memoranda of understanding signed across sectors, including defence, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals, reflect the expanding scope of the partnership.
Defence, however, remains the anchor, providing both the strategic rationale and the institutional framework for deeper engagement.
What emerges from this is a relationship that is gradually transitioning from transactional exchanges to a more embedded form of cooperation. The emphasis on co-production, joint research and development, and technological collaboration points to a model that goes beyond immediate gains and seeks to build long-term resilience. In an era marked by supply chain disruptions, geopolitical uncertainties, and rapid technological change, such an approach carries clear advantages.
The notion of “co-sovereignty”, often invoked in discussions of India–France ties, captures this evolving dynamic. It suggests a partnership in which both sides retain their strategic autonomy while working together to enhance their collective capabilities.
This is not an alliance in the traditional sense. There are no binding security guarantees or mutual defence obligations. Yet, the depth and breadth of cooperation increasingly give it a quasi-alliance character.
Ultimately, the significance of Macron’s visit lies less in the specific agreements concluded and more in the direction it sets. It reflects a mutual recognition that the challenges of the contemporary strategic environment, ranging from great power competition to technological disruption, cannot be addressed in isolation. By deepening their defence partnership and expanding cooperation into new domains, India and France are seeking to position themselves more effectively within an evolving global order.
In that sense, the visit marks not an endpoint but a waypoint. The real test will lie in the implementation of the ambitious agenda that has been outlined. If the momentum generated in February can be sustained, the India–France partnership has the potential to emerge as one of the more consequential bilateral relationships in the coming decade — anchored in defence, but extending well beyond it into the broader terrain of strategic and technological collaboration.
Written By
Harsh V Pant
Professor Harsh V Pant is Vice President - Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at King's College London. He is also Director (Honorary) of Delhi School of Transnational Affairs at Delhi University.
 "Harsh V Pant")
First Published: Apr 10 2026 | 5:40 AM IST
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