A Dark Matter

Although India eventually prevailed in the Kargil conflict, the inability to “see” the theatre of operation in real time exposed a critical gap, pointing to the need for a dedicated space security architecture.

It wasn’t as if India did not have the scientific or technical infrastructure in place — technological prowess, after all, had long been the nation’s calling card. The problem, if it can be called that, was that India’s satellite communication programme was heavily skewed towards civilian use, something in which it had a real edge globally.

In the years that followed Kargil, the civilian-led Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) expanded its observation satellites, such as Cartosat and Radar Imaging Satellite (RISAT), which served the dual purpose of supporting both civilian and military needs.

However, the absence of a dedicated space doctrine or a unified military doctrine meant that space assets remained fragmented.

Discussions began to emerge within the armed forces, which recognised this gap. In 2012, the Indian Air Force (IAF) proposed the creation of a dedicated space command, an idea that had also been proposed by the 2011 Naresh Chandra Task Force, which had called for new tri-service commands, including an aerospace command.

“The IAF wanted ownership of defending the space domain and recommended the creation of a space command,” a defence source familiar with the discussions said on condition of anonymity. The proposal soon became entangled in inter-service disagreements, the person added, with the army and navy also asserting that space-based assets and capabilities were integral to their respective operations.

“Funding considerations were another factor,” the source added.

It was only in 2019 that three new agencies were formally established, among them the Defence Space Agency (DSA), which was tasked with coordinating space-based capabilities across the three services. Even so, the full realisation of a space command has remained elusive. 

Twenty-five years after the Kargil conflict, the importance of satellite imagery resurfaced. A surge in demand for private satellite images of Kashmir’s Pahalgam was noted. Soon after, on April 22, a terrorist attack occurred at the same site. This incident prompted India to launch a reprisal operation, named Operation Sindoor.

In the days that followed India had to again turn to commercial satellite data providers like Maxar, an American firm, for high-resolution data during the May 7-10 skirmishes. Although this time around ISRO provided most of the images, through its Cartosat and RISAT satellites, the operation highlighted that India was still not fully self-reliant in the space domain.

The looming question for the country is whether India’s current space architecture is capable of meeting the country’s growing space security needs.

India’s space security architecture has come from a civilian programme led by ISRO. Earlier satellites like IRS-1A were primarily designed for civilian purposes but served dual-use functions like remote sensing and basic satellite imaging.

Change came after ISRO launched the Cartosat series in 2005 — Cartosat-1 began to send sharper images, while Cartosat-2 and -3 were capable of providing ‘sub-meter’ resolution, giving images the finer detail needed for defence purposes like tracking and monitoring of borders and infrastructure. Though these satellites were officially ‘civilian’, they became critical for gathering military intelligence.

Experts say India’s space programme was never designed as a purely military system – but it evolved as a dual-use architecture, where civilian capabilities were leveraged for strategic needs. “Much of military space technology is inherently dual-use, and it follows that civilian components, both organisationally and in terms of assets, are essential to supporting the armed forces,” former Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Anil Golani, Director General of the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, told the Blueprint. 

In parallel, India began developing satellites for weather surveillance with the launch of the RISAT series, which began with RISAT-2 in 2009, which began providing round-the-clock satellite images for border protection and disaster management. The anomaly in sequence numbering was linked to security: RISAT-2 was launched earlier because India urgently needed an operational radar satellite for security after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, while RISAT-1’s indigenous radar system was still under development.

RISAT-2 was the first Indian satellite to use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology but it relied on Israeli payloads. Later satellites like RISAT-2B and RISAT-2BR1 improved on the model.

Communication capabilities improved, too, with the launch of GSAT-7 in 2013, the first dedicated military satellite that gave real-time connectivity to the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It was followed by GSAT-7A, which enhanced communication for the Indian Air Force for network-centric use. These were among the first explicitly defence-oriented satellites in India’s inventory.

“Electro-optical satellites were the mainstay of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) for a long time. However, SAR has become increasingly important because it provides all-weather capability through day and night and can ‘see’ through cloud cover,” Lt Gen A K Bhatt (retired), director general of the Indian Space Association (ISpA), told the Blueprint.

“This makes SAR a preferred tool for modern ISR and remote sensing,” he added.

Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC), further strengthened India's navigation capabilities. Although initially designed for civilian purposes, it provided encrypted signals which were useful for military use.

Developed by ISRO, NavIC is intended to enable users to determine their own precise geographic location  and track their movements across India and up to 1,500 km beyond the country’s territorial boundaries.

As of July 2025, 11 NavIC satellites had been placed in orbit but, in a reply to Parliament that month, the government acknowledged that “some of them are not functioning”.

At the time of the reply, four satellites were providing position, navigation and timing services, another four were being used for one-way message broadcast, and one had been decommissioned after the end of its service-life. Two others had failed to reach their orbit.

A major doctrinal shift came in 2019 with Mission Shakti, the code name for India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, with the launch of a Prithvi Defence Vehicle Mark-II (PDV Mk-II) interceptor missile to shoot down one of its own satellites. Thus, India became the fourth country after the United States, Russia and China to demonstrate ASAT capabilities using indigenous technology.

While India built its ISR capabilities through its Cartosat, RISAT, and GSAT satellites, there was a need for a more structured defence-related surveillance architecture, and the first step in this direction came with the creation of the Space-Based Surveillance (SBS-1) programme. It was launched by the government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2001 and marked the initiation of an indigenous satellite constellation for military intelligence.

Using Cartosat-2A, Cartosat-2B, EROS-B, and RISAT-2, the programme was aimed at deploying a small constellation of satellites to track the movement of ships and strategic activity in the Indian Ocean region. But although it brought together multiple satellite systems, its capabilities were limited in terms of scope and coverage.

Building on this, SBS-2 was launched in 2013 with six satellites, including Cartosat 2C and RISAT 2A, marking a gradual shift towards integrating different types of sensors, such as electro-optical and radar imaging systems, which can ensure more reliable surveillance under varying conditions.

A planned SBS-3 programme represents the most ambitious leap in this series. Approved in late 2024 for ₹26,968 crore, it aims to deploy a 52-satellite constellation by 2029 in a joint effort of ISRO and the private sector.

“SBS-3 is not just a project - it is a continuous mission. The challenge is command, tasking, and data fusion, not just building satellites,” C V S Kiran, a former ISRO engineer and co-founder of Red Balloon Aerospace, an Indian near-space startup, told the Blueprint.

“After recent operational experiences, it became clear that there was a gap between what we have and what the armed forces require. SBS-3 is a direct response to that gap," Bhatt said. “I am confident that this will not stop here; we will likely see SBS-4 and SBS-5 as well.”

For the armed forces in particular, there is a need for markedly stronger ISR coverage over the sensitive northern and western borders, where current satellites can take several days before they revisit a spot.

Although SBS Phase-3 is expected to reduce revisit times significantly, meeting operational requirements and achieving real-time situational awareness will require a reduction to one-to-two hours. This will also require a layered architecture that combines satellites with unmanned aerial vehicles and high-altitude balloons.

“The challenge is not really about who is building the satellites. The real challenge is who commands, who tasks, who fuses the data, and how that data is delivered to the forces with operational readiness across services,” Kiran said.

“What is needed is a mission-owned programme authority, integrated tasking, and real-time data-to-decision workflows. Ultimately, success will not be measured by the number of launches, but by revisit time, latency, and availability, and how fast actionable intelligence reaches commanders.”

While India's space programme has been a success in what it has set out to do, it is a largely civilian system that comes with limitations. The Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (INSPACe), which was created to promote, authorise, and oversee private sector participation in India’s space activities, had projected 30 launches between January 2024 and March 2025. But over the past two years, ISRO has not managed to launch even half that number.

The defence source cited earlier outlined the objectives shaping India’s future space capabilities.

India, the source said, is working on establishing persistent surveillance, the ability to continuously monitor areas of interest, including border regions, parts of neighbouring countries, and the IOR.

This would require a constellation of satellites that enables short revisit times, allowing the same locations to be observed at brief intervals, even multiple times in a day, with minimal gaps in coverage.

One of the armed forces’ most critical requirements is launch-on-demand capability, the ability to replace or augment space-based assets at short notice during a conflict.

Against this backdrop, the central questions are whether ISRO alone can realistically meet this requirement and, if not, whether the private sector has the technological and industrial depth to step in.

Recent parliamentary assessments have pointed to deeper structural constraints that go beyond launch capacity alone. A standing committee review of India’s space sector noted that while policy reforms have opened the door to private participation, institutional mechanisms such as IN-SPACe are still evolving, lacking the operational agility required to support a high-tempo space ecosystem.

Under the SBS-3 programme, a significant portion of the satellite constellation is being developed by private companies, marking a shift from ISRO’s traditional role as the sole builder of space assets.

As many as 31 out of the 52 satellites will be manufactured by private space companies. The first batch of these satellites is expected to be launched in April 2026. 

The private sector's rapid development of capabilities is now beginning to fill two major gaps in the Indian space programme, demonstrating improved agility and response times for launch systems.

Skyroot Aerospace, a private aerospace company, completed a successful rocket flight with the Vikram-S, demonstrating its ability to build and operate a small satellite launch vehicle. The Vikram rocket series has been designed for rapid turnarounds and modular deployments, capabilities that match well with the military’s requirement for on-demand launch services.

Another private player is Agnikul Cosmos, whose Agnibaan launch vehicle is powered by a semi-cryogenic engine, built using 3D printing techniques that greatly reduce production time and provide added flexibility with ground launch sites such as mobile or semi-mobile infrastructures for launching small payloads.

“The private sector is still at a very early stage. Companies like Skyroot, Agnikul, and others are working towards launch-on-demand, but they are still in the phase where they must prove their launch reliability,” Kiran said.

Private sector companies are developing commercial capabilities for satellite manufacturing and data processing as well as advanced remote sensing satellites that will allow users greater insight into the material makeup of the land they are observing, such as the location of a camouflage, material changes from environmental factors, etc., which can all provide considerable advantages for military users.

Such companies include Pixxel, which is working to build a hyperspectral imaging constellation to improve the frequency of observations. Other companies like Dhruva Space are working on developing small satellite platforms and payload services, allowing for more customised satellite missions for defence users. There are also numerous private sector companies such as Kawa Space and SatSure that are operating in the downstream space market.

This growing role of private players, however, also raises deeper strategic questions about dependence on commercial participation in national security.

“Commercial players are fixated on the financial and geopolitical interests of their investors and promoters. We must recognise that reality, and Indian decision-makers must stop being enamoured of the clamour and glamour in these narrative spaces,” Chaitanya Giri, a space policy expert at Observer Research Foundation (ORF) said.

“This is not a domain where we can adopt the adage ‘Make in India, Make for the World’. There are limits to that. India may export missiles and artillery, but it will not export the K-family missiles. In precisely the same way, we must approach the ambition for a space shield,” he added.

There is also a financing challenge. Space remains a high-risk, capital-intensive sector with long gestation periods, and the absence of sovereign-backed funding mechanisms limits the ability of private firms to scale beyond niche capabilities.

Parliamentary observations have underlined the need for targeted financial instruments and long-term capital support to build a globally competitive space industry base.

Former AVM Golani said while the direction of warfighting must always remain the responsibility of the military, other elements, particularly on the civilian side, must integrate seamlessly into a whole-of-nation framework.

“Start-ups have made their mark, and private participation is growing. But for the foreseeable future, critical infrastructure such as launch stations will remain with ISRO,” he said, adding that no single actor can do everything. “Clear roles and clarity of purpose are required for all stakeholders.”

The militarisation of space has accelerated over the past decades; it has transformed outer space from a support layer to a warfighting domain. India’s next-door neighbour, China, represents one of the most sophisticated and integrated satellite ecosystems in the world.

An American assessment notes that since the end of 2015, China’s orbital presence has expanded by roughly 620 per cent, with close to 900 satellites added over that period. By October 2024, China had more than 1,015 satellites in orbit. The Chinese military draws on the services of over 510 satellites fitted with optical, multispectral, radar, and radio-frequency sensors.

This not only significantly enhances Beijing’s capacity to monitor Indian military activity but also becomes an additional factor in any potential conflict between India and Pakistan, given China’s ability to share intelligence gathered by its space-based assets.

By contrast, India is reported to have 57 operational satellites in orbit as of December 2025. Seen together, these factors point to a clear imperative for India to build up adequate space-based assets if it is to secure an edge in modern warfare.

In 2015, China announced its new Strategic Support Force (SSF), which was subsequently aligned with the Central Military Commission in Beijing. China’s military space operations were integrated under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) SSF, which centralises space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities.

In 2024, China announced the creation of the PLA Aerospace Force, which will treat space as a separate warfighting domain. It took over aerospace units and assets from the PLA SSF, which was disbanded.

At the core of this architecture is the Yaogan constellation, widely believed to be operated by the PLA. These satellites are not a single system but a networked family performing complementary roles. The Yaogan series includes optical imaging satellites, SAR satellites capable of all-weather surveillance, and electronic intelligence satellites designed to intercept communications and radar emissions.

Some Yaogan groups are deployed in triplets in similar orbits that resemble the US Navy’s NOSS system. This configuration allows triangulation of radio-frequency emissions from ships and ground systems which allows precise geolocation of targets through coordinated signal interception and analysis.

Alongside Yaogan, China's Gaofen series, part of the China High-Resolution Earth Observation System, provides high-resolution optical imagery with newer satellites like Gaofen-11. The Ziyuan (ZY) satellites, particularly the Ziyuan-II series, are assessed to support military reconnaissance missions.

This layered architecture is further supported by specialised constellations like Yunhai, which, although appearing to be meteorological in nature, offer atmospheric and ionospheric information that is extremely useful for military purposes like modelling missile trajectories, monitoring borders and optimising communications.

“China’s scale is significantly larger and accelerating rapidly. They have a very large number of operational satellites, including extensive ISR capabilities across optical, radar, and RF (radio frequency) domains. Their resolution and integration capabilities are also very advanced,” Kiran said. “China’s advantage lies in integration across orbital, near-space, and terrestrial layers. India must build a similar layered architecture.”

The US, which has been the traditional power in space since the Cold War, has responded to China’s rise by forming its own space command known as the US Space Force and the US Space Command.

Its National Reconnaissance Office continues to host some of the world’s most sophisticated reconnaissance satellites, including classified optical and radar satellites, while the Space Development Agency is developing proliferated low earth orbit constellations for missile warning and tactical data relay.

One of the most important aspects of the US strategy is the development of proliferated constellations – large numbers of smaller satellites in multiple orbits, to provide resilience against anti-satellite attacks. They also have initiatives such as the proliferated warfighter space architecture, which are designed to offer low-latency data relay and real-time targeting solutions.

The militarisation of space is already underway, and India does not have the option of being a bystander. India’s budgetary priorities have to reflect the reality that space is the new warfighting domain.

However, over the past few years, allocations to India's space programme and ISRO have seen only modest increases. For FY 2026–27, the Department of Space, which funds ISRO, was only allocated ₹13,705.63 crore in the Union Budget — nearly the same as the previous year’s ₹13,416.20 crore. It was ₹13,042.7 crore the year before.

Parliamentary estimates filed in late 2025 showed that the projected requirement for the space department in 2025–26 was about ₹15,983 crore.

The fear in strategic circles is that if India does not move fast, it risks ceding the information advantage in future conflicts. Modern wars are not decided by firepower alone. This is true in the case of air defences as well. Intercepting ballistic missile threats is no longer possible through ground radars alone.

It relies on space-based infrared sensors to detect and track incoming threats. Without strong space-based capabilities, even advanced missile defence systems lose effectiveness.

“We are not moving fast, this is what I hear from many experts around, too,” Chaitanya Giri from ORF said. “Of course, some may view it from a market perspective, but many are those with no financial stakes or business interests. In a multipolar era, a strategic deterrent is needed to have the luxury of being unsurprised.”

In this scenario, the need for a space command becomes all the more urgent, but the question remains which agency will have the mandate to lead the formation of this space command.

“The DSA already has the mandate to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in the space domain. But given the scale of the challenges ahead, and the level of integration and cooperation required to meet them, a space command is needed going forward,” Golani said.

He also argued that while any future space command should be led by the IAF, it must also incorporate civilian functionaries, including scientists and officials from ISRO.

“Space is increasingly contested, congested, and competitive; meeting the challenge requires a whole-of-nation approach.”   

Nearly seven years after the creation of DSA, the question is whether the current space security architecture under DSA needs to be reformed. DSA continues to be headed by a two-star officer and does not possess the full operational autonomy and doctrinal authority. More than a decade ago, the Naresh Chandra Task Force recommended the creation of a dedicated aerospace command. That recommendation was never fully realised — perhaps it is time to revisit it.

A Space Command with clear doctrine, integration, and operational deployment of space assets would signal that India recognises space as a primary domain of warfare. Because at the end of the day, satellites and launch vehicles alone do not constitute space power. Institutions do.