Attrition's new rule
India needs low-cost interceptors to confront the new dynamics of drone warfare
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 "Mohammad Asif Khan")
 "A Sting interceptor drone flies during a training in Ukraine in April 2026")
A Sting interceptor drone flies during a training in Ukraine in April 2026. Photo: Reuters
When a $35,000 drone can force the enemy to scramble for a $4 million interceptor, the logic of air defence begins to break down. Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, former United States vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said the outcome of a modern conflict comes down to a simple question: “Which side runs out of weapons first?”
The United States (US) is already grappling with this challenge: Weeks into its war with Iran, it began running out of its stockpile of advanced air defence systems like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile interceptors. A THAAD battery can cost up to $2.8 billion, and a single Patriot missile costs roughly $4 million. This creates a cost asymmetry, as the Iranian Shahed drone, which costs between $20,000 and $35,000, can overwhelm these expensive air defences.
Defending against a drone swarm costs millions of dollars, and building or rebuilding defensive interceptors inventories takes longer than it takes your enemy to produce hundreds of offensive drones. This asymmetry can give an advantage to the underdogs, such as Iran or Ukraine, over far more powerful adversaries.
“Iran was willing to absorb losses and did not chase the best technology; it built what it could and used it effectively,” said Group Captain R K Narang (retired), a senior fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Such tactics have prompted armies and arms makers to look at developing low-cost interceptors that can deal with these threats for a prolonged period.
 "Drones, Mysterious objects in US")
A RAND Corporation commentary published in March 2025 observed, “These new threats place enormous strain on government finances and industrial supply chains responsible for replenishing depleted missile stockpiles.”
India experienced the same cost asymmetry during Operation Sindoor last year when it intercepted Pakistan’s Turkish-made drones, such as the Byker Yiha Kamikaze and the Asisguard Songar. These drones cost around reportedly $30,000 and $70,000 each, and were intercepted with Akash interceptor missiles, which cost about ₹2.5 crore ($300,000) each. This means the defender is spending several times more per engagement than the attacker.
Experts say building a layered defence architecture that includes cheap interceptors and counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) technologies can help tackle this issue.
Indian armoury
India’s air defence inventory includes Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missile (QRSAM) with a range of 25-30 kilometres (km). But nothing to engage targets in the critical 6-12 km band, a gap where many drones and cruise missiles operate.
As a result, in that band, the army depends only on upgraded anti-aircraft guns like the L-70 and Zu-23, which can shoot shells only up to about 10 km.
“We need to develop a missile of about 10 km range. That will close the gap between QR-SAM and shoulder-fired missiles,” Narang said.
The upgraded L-70 and Zu-23 guns performed well during Operation Sindoor, downing over 50 drones, and they remain critical to India’s defence. Yet, these systems still lack the artificial intelligence (AI)-driven coordination needed for true swarm defence.
“These guns will need to have AI integrated in them so that different guns can point at different drones to take on a drone swarm threat. If 5-6 guns are integrated, each gun is taking on different targets with a single operator,” Narang said. The shooting could remain under human oversight, but detection, tracking and target allocation would be fully automated.
The most promising solution lies in the use of drones to intercept enemy drones. India has tested promising autonomous interceptors like the vajR (reusable, AI-enabled), the FWD YAMA ($10,000 per unit), and the Falcon (AI-powered kinetic). However, these are still in the developmental or early-testing phase and not yet in mass production.
“Unless procurement policies prioritise indigenous critical systems, innovation schemes alone will not translate into battlefield-ready capabilities,” Narang added.
Integrated counter-drone systems are another cost-effective measure to counter hostile drones and drone swarms. Days after Operation Sindoor ended, on May 14, 2025, India successfully tested Bhargavastra, an indigenous counter-swarm system developed by the Solar Defence and Aerospace Ltd. The system uses unguided micro-rockets (lethal radius 20 metres) and guided micro-missiles to neutralise drone swarms at ranges of 2–4 km.
Another company, Zen Technologies, has entered the CUAS market. In October 2025, the company received a ₹37 crore ($444,000) order to supply hard-kill anti-drone systems, followed by two more orders worth ₹289 crore for advanced anti-drone system upgrades.
By January, Zen had secured orders worth ₹4.04 billion ($48 million) for counter-drone systems and training equipment. The company’s Vyomkavach system, unveiled at the Aero India 2025 exhibition in Bengaluru, is an AI-driven, multi-layered counter-drone shield that integrates radar detection beyond 20 km and has both soft-kill (jamming, spoofing) and hard-kill (guns, missiles, interceptor drones) options.
“Vyomkavach is important not because it introduces a single new sensor or weapon, but because it reflects a shift from platform-based C-UAS to AI-driven, integrated kill webs,” Col Aravind Mulimani, vice-president (retired) —Projects (air defence), Zen Technologies, said. “Zen Technologies has conceived and developed Vyomkavach for addressing the futuristic battlefield threats,” he added.
The Indian armed forces have also moved institutionally. In January, they began establishing a joint C-UAS grid, separate from the existing air defence network.
However, a civil and military unmanned traffic management system is still needed to monitor drone traffic. “Without a civil and military unmanned traffic management system, you cannot distinguish between friendly and rogue drones. That is a foundational gap in any counter-drone architecture,” Narang said.
The army has issued a request for information for new-generation gun systems specifically designed for “cost-effective neutralisation” of drones. The Indian Navy has inducted a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-developed D4 C-UAS, which uses active phased-array radars and radio frequency sensors for 360-degree surveillance, with capabilities including global positioning system (GPS) spoofing, electronic jamming and laser interception.
“India is well-positioned to lead in scalable C-UAS, especially in mid-tier global market (cost-sensitive buyers), swarm defence solutions and AI-driven modular systems. However, to truly lead, India must scale production, mature in AI + sensor tech, build export-focused variants and most importantly achieve combat credibility,” Mulimani added.
Crucially, India’s Akhasteer air defence command system, an AI-driven, fully-automated platform that integrates satellite surveillance, NavIC system and real-time battlefield AI, achieved a high-rate of success during Operation Sindoor.
The Ukrainian model
While the US was burning through Patriot stocks, Ukraine, which is in its fourth year of war with Russia, has successfully built a low-cost interceptor arsenal. Early on in the war, Ukraine faced swarms of Shahed drones, which Iran had supplied to Russia to destroy Ukrainian infrastructure.
The most successful example is the Sting first person view (FPV) interceptor drone, developed by the Ukrainian volunteer group Wild Hornets. Costing $2,100- $2,500 each, these drones can reach speeds exceeding 315 km/h and altitudes of up to 11 km, placing them well within the range of even the latest jet-powered Shahed variants.
Wild Hornets reports a success rate of more than 70 per cent, with some units achieving 80 to 90 per cent depending on crew experience. In four months of serial production, Ukrainian forces using Sting destroyed more than 1,000 Shahed and Gerbera drones.
The economics are transformative. Even accounting for a multi-drone approach, the total cost to neutralise a single Shahed using Sting interceptors is approximately $6,300, which is a fraction of the cost of a single SAM.
Ukraine has scaled production exponentially. In 2025, the country produced 100,000 interceptor drones, with more than 20 companies active in the sector. Production capacity has since increased eightfold.
Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky had announced: “We have automated command systems. Interception lines are being created. In particular, drones are now getting intercepted at the first line, as soon as they cross the line of contact.”
Ukraine has also aggressively pursued international co-production. The United Kingdom (UK) has started mass production of Ukrainian-designed interceptors. The 20-nation Drone Coalition led by the UK has pledged €2.75 billion in support.
This contrasts with the US approach. While the US is shelling out $4 million to intercept a $35,000 drone, Ukraine is spending $2,100-$2,500. The cost exchange ratio, once a crushing disadvantage for the defender, now favours Ukraine.
Iran’s Shahed fleet is estimated to be around 80,000 units-strong across variants, with production continuing at roughly 500 per month. At full capacity, that could translate into sustained waves of drones daily for weeks.
In the first six days, US military spending reportedly reached $11.3 billion. Estimates say total costs had risen to $25-$35 billion by early April, with expensive missile interceptors forming the bulk of the expenditure.
“Iran’s Shahed-131/136 family of drones didn’t merely introduce a new challenge in the combat zone, they exposed a new economic model of war which gave an asymmetric advantage to the attacker,” Mulimani said. “The result being, the defender goes broke first if they respond with premium interceptors.”
Iron Dome’s limitations
Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system faces the same problem of the cost equation. Iron Dome interceptors are Tamirs, which cost between $40,000- $80,000 each. Their main target: Qassam rockets that cost a mere $800-$1,500
per unit. This results in a cost equation of 30 or 50 times in favour of the aggressor. The situation changes slightly in favour of the Iron Dome when it comes to the Shahed class of drones, at a price difference of $50,000 and $35,000.
Even though it boasts a 90 per cent success rate against rockets that threaten inhabited locations, the Israeli interceptor has certain limitations. In times of intense warfare, saturation attacks have pushed the system past its limit. On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian militant group Hamas fired several thousand rockets towards southern Israel in a very short span of time. It was temporarily overwhelmed by the sheer volume of launches.
Israel realised that relying solely on missiles as a means of aerial defence was impractical. It is now working on an alternative project called the Iron Beam, which is a laser-based weapon system that costs essentially the price of electricity, which is minimal. It gives Israel an “endless magazine”, allowing it to fire as long as there is fire.
Following a successful testing in September 2025, it was delivered to the Israel Defense Forces on December 30 and deployed in combat to intercept Hezbollah rockets and drones in early 2026, marking the world’s first operational high-power laser
defence system.
There is a clear lesson for India. Missile systems such as the Iron Dome and Akash are essential, but they are not enough: India needs a cost-effective system of interceptors.
“The answer is not a single system but a hybrid approach — missiles, guns, interceptor drones, and airborne platforms, all integrated into a flexible, multi-layered defence network,”
Narang said. “India has the technology and talent, but what is missing is sustained investment and the push to take these systems to the next level after initial development.”
The lesson is clear: In a prolonged war of attrition, the side that wins isn’t necessarily the one that knocks down the most enemy missiles, but the one that can continue knocking them down over time.
Written By
Mohammad Asif Khan
Mohammad Asif Khan is a Senior Correspondent at Business Standard, where he covers defence, security, and strategic affairs.
 "Mohammad Asif Khan")
First Published: May 10 2026 | 8:35 AM IST
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