Buying arms faster

in partnership.”

Built into the promise was a caution: Rivalry must not disrupt the modernisation of the country’s military. “Healthy competition is good,” Singh said, “but once the contracts are awarded, it is a good idea to work together to ensure that the contracts are fulfilled in time.”

That single remark pretty much summed up India’s defence priorities. Modernisation demands a broad and deep domestic defence industry, driven by a push from the demand side that is already yielding visible results. But it also increasingly calls for an unforgiving pace, dictated by a battlefield that is changing rapidly, often within weeks. Whatever blocks the induction of capabilities into the armed forces, or even slows it, is now a greater threat than before.

 Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, has brought about what is widely seen as a revolution in military affairs, with new technologies, operational concepts and organisational change making old military doctrines obsolete.

It extends to how, and how fast, weapons are procured, especially by Ukraine, and the speed with which both sides upgrade them.

Before Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine took about 11 years on average to acquire a new military capability, and two decades for a few programmes. The average is now 18 months, and as little as six for small expendable systems, according to the United States (US)-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ukraine also created a separate “commercial-first” defence market, mainly for unmanned and software-intensive systems, with a

ring-fenced budget and drastically simplified acquisition rules.

A separate CSIS study notes that Russia treats its  Geran attack drones as a platform in perpetual evolution, rapidly reworking its propulsion, payloads, navigation, communications and tactics to keep pace with Ukraine’s shifting defences. Makeshift changes are tried out on the battlefield; those that work are standardised and mass-produced, and failures are dropped at once, with battlefield feedback driving production decisions “at a cadence measured in weeks rather than years”.

These disruptions are now reshaping how weapons are procured in Europe and the US. India’s defence planners, too, are grappling with how to compress acquisition timelines. The country’s modernisation requirements extend well beyond drones and other fast-evolving systems. India is short of many major crewed platforms, from combat aircraft to submarines. It also lacks enough tactical essentials such as bulletproof vests and helmets. The money, as Singh made clear, is there. What India is short of is time. In 2025, which it had declared the “Year of Reforms”, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) began work on procedural reforms to the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, which governs the procurement of everything from tanks and warships to fighter jets and drones. The aim was to eliminate redundancies and address the pain points of the defence industry. The result is the draft DAP 2026, which the MoD released in February 2026 for comments from stakeholders and which is slated to replace the 2020 iteration. Does it cut the time it takes to acquire weapons? If it does, will its procedures work as intended once applied, and what more can be done to build on what it gets right?

“There is no doubt that in our setup, we have a (development and procurement) cycle that is too long…” Singh said at the aforementioned industry gathering in New Delhi. The timeline he went on to outline applies to the induction of homegrown technologies and platforms: “The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), when it is developing a technology, usually asks for five years’ time… Thereafter, the process of acquisition takes another two to three years, and then, absorption takes another one or two years thereafter. So we are really looking at a decade-long cycle, which is obviously not good enough in this day and age.”

The draft DAP 2026 seeks to speed up the procurement of emerging and disruptive military technologies, drones in particular. In October, the defence secretary said, “The Russia-Ukraine war has shown how things can be done much faster. We have to look at all of those options… We are trying to make ‘Fast Track Procurement’ (FTP) the norm with quick trials and quick inductions, at least for some of these low-cost technology options. That is also a process that we have included within the draft DAP…” Sayantan Haldar, an associate fellow with the strategic studies programme at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, noted that the MoD had introduced procurement reforms in 2025 itself, even before the draft DAP 2026 was unveiled, to reduce delays in defence acquisition. “These measures shortened deadlines for key stages, including Request for Proposal (RFP) preparation, field evaluation trials and contract negotiations. They also encouraged concurrent activities and greater accountability, with the aim of reducing the overall procurement timeline by approximately 69 weeks.”

In a defence purchase, the armed forces first send vendors a request for information (RFI) to find out what equipment is available. The answers help them set their qualitative requirements — the basic requirements the equipment must meet. An RFP is the formal tender inviting vendors’ bids, and field evaluation trials are the tests the forces then run on the equipment of bidders that clear technical evaluation.

Turning to the draft DAP 2026, Haldar said, “While it remains a proposal, it seeks to go further by reforming trial procedures.” He explained that it proposes a two-stage trial system, a bigger role for subject experts in finalising qualitative requirements and overseeing trials, and more flexibility for the services in choosing quality-assurance trial methods. It also proposes compensation for vendors successful in trial evaluations, and monitoring of timelines from the RFI stage onwards. “These changes could help eliminate unsuitable systems earlier, reduce repetitive testing, improve technical evaluation and encourage industry participation.”

The draft keeps the FTP from DAP 2020 for urgent purchases of operationally critical equipment “when standard timelines risk compromising operational readiness”, in war or peace, or during crises that demand an immediate military response. It also covers emerging and fast-changing technologies, including equipment with short development or technology cycles on a list to be issued by the MoD's acquisition wing.

The route covers outright purchases, leases and government-to-government agreements, from Indian or foreign sources. It is limited to equipment available within set timeframes, preferably already in service, trial-evaluated, in service with foreign forces or widely available in the market. Long-lead items such as major weapon systems are to be avoided.

Cases need in-principle approval from the service chiefs, after which the services may share their plans with vendors so that they can prepare for faster production. The acceptance of necessity — the formal in-principle approval of the armed forces’ requirement that sets procurement in motion — is valid for two months and lapses if the tender is not issued by then.

Vendors get up to four weeks to bid. There are no field evaluation trials or staff evaluation, although a limited validation trial may be held if approved. Deliveries must be completed within the period set in the tender, up to 24 months from the contract taking effect, and extensions will normally not be granted.

The draft also introduces a new route, Low Cost Capital Acquisition (LCCA), for buying limited quantities of Indian equipment, which the armed forces can evaluate and induct before making

large-scale purchases. Each case is capped at ~75 crore, with an annual ceiling of ~2,000 crore across the services and the coast guard. Only equipment in the ‘Buy (Indian-Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’ and ‘Buy (Indian) and Manufacture in India’ acquisition categories qualifies. An empowered committee headed by a two-star officer picks the equipment, including from proposals that vendors submit on their own.

Once the services back such a proposal, it is posted online for rival vendors to challenge within 30 days. The route skips the request for information, the setting of qualitative requirements and trials, relying instead on a technical evaluation that includes a limited validation trial or demonstration. The tender is to be issued within six weeks of the acceptance of necessity, and deliveries completed within nine months, with a two-month extension allowed in unavoidable conditions.

After use in the field, the services draw up qualitative requirements within a year of delivery. If the equipment is found suitable, they then seek approval for a bulk purchase through the regular procedure, without trials or evaluation, provided more than one vendor is in contention.

Imports of major systems bring their own delays: Shifting technical requirements, negotiations over cost and technology transfer that can take years, and geopolitics.

The French Rafale is a case in point. In the August 2007 tender for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft, Dassault Aviation, with the Rafale, was the lowest bidder. Under the plan, 18 jets were to come in fly-away condition and 108 were to be built in India by the defence public sector undertaking (DPSU) Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), with technology transferred from Dassault. A new deal followed: An inter-governmental agreement between India and France, signed in September 2016, for only 36 fly-away jets. The first five arrived in July 2020, almost 13 years after the tender.

The Project 75 India contract for six advanced conventional submarines remains unsigned more than five years after the July 2021 tender. The submarines are to be built by another DPSU, Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, with technology transferred from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. Meanwhile, the navy faces the prospect of a reinvigorated Pakistani submarine arm and a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Beyond the forces’ immediate requirements, indigenous procurement has its own hurdles: Slow technology development, persistent gaps, above all in propulsion, and the long road from prototype to induction-ready platform.

The Tejas Mark-1A, an updated variant of India’s first indigenous fighter, shows this. HAL was due to begin delivering the first tranche of the 180 on order in February 2024. Held up partly by the late arrival of the jet’s American-made engines, it had delivered none at the time of writing. The Indian Air Force, with 29 active fighter squadrons against a sanctioned 42, is at its lowest strength in 60 years.

Many of these factors lie beyond the direct reach of the defence acquisition procedure, the 2026 draft included. But the procedure governs capital procurement, and its rules and processes set much of the pace at which equipment is inducted into the armed forces. Broadly, capital acquisitions are classified under three schemes: ‘Buy’, ‘Development’ and ‘Additional Procedures’.

The Buy scheme covers the procurement of materiel available for purchase from indigenous or foreign sources, and comprises four acquisition categories: Buy (Indian-IDDM), Buy (Indian) and Manufacture in India, Buy (Global) and Manufacture in India, and Buy (Global).

The Development scheme covers acquisition categories that require materiel to be designed and developed by indigenous design agencies or industry before it is procured, and procurement under all its categories is to be carried out under Buy (Indian-IDDM). The Development scheme comprises the three ‘Make’ categories. It also includes the ‘Innovation’ categories, which cover materiel developed by start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through the Innovation in Defence Excellence (iDEX) scheme, materiel developed by Indian vendors, especially MSMEs and start-ups, through the DRDO’s Technology Development Fund (TDF) scheme, and materiel developed by the services themselves through their internal organisations. The last is the ‘Design & Development (D&D)’ category, for material that originates with the DRDO, DPSUs and central research agencies and is to be designed, developed and manufactured by an Indian design agency or vendor.

 The ‘Additional Procedures’ comprise six acquisition categories, including the FTP and LCCA routes. Finally, inter-government agreements (IGAs) are treated separately.

In choosing the acquisition category, Buy (Indian-IDDM) is to be given first preference, provided the stipulated conditions are met.

 For acquisitions in the Buy categories, the handbook accompanying the draft DAP 2026 sets a time-frame of 134 weeks, or about two-and-a-half years, from the issue of the RFI to the signing of the contract. Delays are reviewed by senior officials: The vice chiefs review those of more than 12 weeks, the director general of more than 24 weeks, and the defence secretary of more than a year.

 The draft DAP 2026 is being assessed at the highest levels of government and could come into force fairly soon, a defence source told Blueprint on condition of anonymity.

Rules on paper are only half the battle. The other half is making sure that routes, procedures and timelines deliver what they were designed for — faster procurement. 

“The draft DAP 2026 is the right step towards compressing procurement timelines, but an effective monitoring mechanism must be established to ensure that the benefits are realised,” said Commander Gautam Nanda (retired), Partner, Business Consulting, Aerospace and Defence Sector, EY India. The mechanism he envisages would track whether timelines are being kept, how often the standards are met and how often they are missed. This data would be presented to policymakers through a dedicated dashboard.

 “The dashboard need not be public facing, but the mechanism must be shaped by global standards, under which periodic progress reviews would be an essential element of this process, supported, where required, by independent professional judgement,” Nanda said.

Defence acquisitions often span several years, during which responsibilities may transition

across individuals and teams. An independent oversight mechanism could complement the existing process by providing additional continuity and an objective perspective across different stages of procurement.

Further measures could build on the draft’s proposals to cut acquisition timelines. Rajinder Singh Bhatia, Chairman of Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited, the defence subsidiary of the Kalyani Group’s Bharat Forge Limited, noted that steps have already been taken to shorten procurement timelines and that the draft DAP 2026 is set to take those reforms forward. Field evaluation trials, however, could remain a sticking point, he said. As things stand, the trials alone can take up most of the five to seven years that an acquisition requires even in the best case. “Trials need urgent attention. With upgraded infrastructure and modern technology, trials that replicate a range of temperature and altitude conditions could be conducted at the same time, possibly at one site, which would sharply reduce how long they take,” he said.

The draft DAP 2026 says field evaluation trials should be completed within a “standard time period of 24 weeks” from the date the equipment under trial is submitted, with an extra 12 weeks allowed for winter trials.

The draft also proposes that, “wherever feasible”, all field evaluation trials should be conducted simultaneously. If approved in the acceptance of necessity, trials may also be held in two stages, with some categories of trial conducted after the contract is signed. The draft also says the services headquarters will “strive to undertake maximum tests through simulation/ certification/ lab test”. To ensure a level playing field, the need for simulation-based trials is to be stated when the acceptance of necessity is sought, and their scope set out in the RFP. For user trials, which form part of the field evaluation trials, the handbook accompanying the draft says testing will be confined to the conditions in which the equipment is most likely to be deployed. In other conditions, where “the probability of deployment is not high”, the forces may instead rely on the vendor’s certification that the equipment works in those conditions, and “simulations based testing may be resorted to wherever applicable”.

Haldar said environmental test facilities could speed up procurement by recreating extreme temperatures, altitude, humidity, dust, rain and vibration under controlled conditions, reducing the need to transport equipment repeatedly to remote testing locations. But for the armed forces to accept laboratory results, he said, the facilities must demonstrate accreditation, calibration, repeatability and compliance with recognised standards. Procurement documents must also specify which tests can be substituted, and trials should establish that laboratory results reliably predict how the equipment performs in operation. “The objective should be to replace repetitive environmental tests, not eliminate essential operational field trials,” he added.

Haldar noted that other countries offered a precedent. “The United States and the United Kingdom already use modelling, simulation and synthetic test environments in defence development and evaluation.” The key lesson for India, he said, is that simulation can reduce the amount of live testing, but it earns acceptance through validation and evidence, not simply because a test takes place in a laboratory.

To build the required infrastructure, Haldar suggested a public-private partnership framework for defence testing facilities, combining the DRDO’s technical expertise with private-sector investment and operational efficiency. “The DRDO and the armed forces should establish testing standards, validate simulation methods and determine whether results meet procurement requirements.” The bottom line, however, is that field trials, in which the users actually fire and deploy the equipment in real terrain and weather, cannot be wished away, though they can be shortened. Ultimately, Haldar cautioned that the draft’s proposals on simulation-based trials or exemptions from field trials should not be treated as confirmed provisions without explicit support in the final rules.

Sanjana Shrivastav, a lawyer and member of the technology and defence teams at Nishith Desai Associates, an international law firm, said, “What stands out in the draft DAP is the limits it sets on how long the MoD’s own internal processes can take.”

Whether these changes to the rulebook hold up on the ground remains to be seen. Any real cut in the time it takes the buyer to procure new weapons will depend just as much on those on the other side of the table: The companies that make the equipment, and how well they manage their end of the bargain.

At the October industry gathering, the defence secretary called for a change in attitude. Industry partners, he noted, frequently ask for more time at multiple stages of the acquisition process, from responding to the RFP to being ready for trials. In one case, a company sought an extra seven months after the deadline for responding to the RFP had passed.

“If you think in (terms of) these luxurious timelines, then we are probably not approaching these things very seriously,” he said. “All of us have to pull up our bootstraps… I apply that principle to myself (too). Once the contract is awarded, its fulfilment should be your religious duty.”