'For the IAF, jointness has never been a new idea'

The first strand of that approach is the timely induction of modern combat platforms. The LCA (light combat aircraft) Mk-1A (4.5-generation) will be central to rebuilding numbers. The IAF has signed two contracts with HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited), for 83 and 97 aircraft. Deliveries are yet to commence, and we are working in close coordination with all stakeholders to ensure that they proceed expeditiously. Indigenous programmes, particularly the Tejas ecosystem, matter because they build sustainable combat aircraft capacity at home and reduce our dependence on external sources. Alongside this, the multirole fighter aircraft (MRFA) will bring a contemporary fighter into service in an early timeframe. The Defence Acquisition Council accorded acceptance of necessity (a technical process term) for the MRFA in February, with the majority of the aircraft to be manufactured in India. A contract for 12 additional Su-30MKI aircraft, signed in December 2024, is also under execution. Looking further ahead, the LCA Mk-II and the advanced medium combat aircraft (Amca), both under development by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with the IAF actively involved, will boost our capability significantly in the 2030s.

The second strand is getting more from the fleet we already operate. The upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet, a design and development project with significant indigenous equipment, is being progressed. We are also focused on improving the availability and effectiveness of every aircraft we fly, because a squadron’s real worth lies in the aircraft it can put in the air when needed.

The third strand recognises that combat power is not measured by the number of fighter aircraft alone. Airborne early warning and control, aerial refuelling, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) precision weapons, electronic warfare, air defence and unmanned systems are all critical force multipliers. As I have often said, the IAF has moved from a platform-centric approach to a capability-centric one, in which the combined effect of these elements is far greater than the sum of the individual parts.

We are also conscious that building squadron strength is a process, not a single event. It must be accompanied by trained manpower, infrastructure, weapons stocks, maintenance capacity and a strong domestic industrial base. That is why our efforts extend well beyond aircraft procurement.

Numbers remain important, and we will restore them progressively. But our objective is broader: an IAF with adequate combat mass, high availability, modern technology and the ability to sustain high-intensity operations. With the LCA, the Su-30MKI, the MRFA and the Amca forming the core of our combat potential, a majority of them indigenous in design, the IAF will continue to justify the confidence the nation, and the world, places in it.

Let me state this clearly, the IAF remains fully committed to the Tejas programme. The LCA is the centrepiece of India’s quest for self-reliance in combat aviation. As I said a moment ago, the Tejas ecosystem is essential to building sustainable combat aircraft capacity at home. We are not walking away from it. At the same time, I will not pretend that the delays have not mattered. They have, and we are addressing them with urgency.

Deliveries of the LCA Mk-1A have not yet commenced. We are working in close coordination with all stakeholders to ensure that they proceed expeditiously, and the structural causes of delay are being tackled. Foreign dependence for aeroengines has been one of the most significant of these. HAL’s agreement in November 2025 for the supply of engines and a support package for the 97-aircraft programme is an important step towards putting engine supply on a firmer footing. We are equally clear that the defence-industrial ecosystem must invest in production capacity, so that commitments translate into aircraft on the flight line on schedule.

As for the timeframe, our aim is to build up the number of combat squadrons required by our operational needs in a progressive manner. The pace of LCA Mk-1A deliveries will be a key part of that, and we will keep pressing for it to be as fast as possible. 

On alternative options, I would put it differently. We are not looking for alternatives to the Tejas. We are pursuing complementary capabilities alongside it, so that the nation’s deterrence is never compromised while indigenous programmes mature. These are the steps I outlined in answer to your first question: The Su-30MKI upgrade and the 12 additional aircraft; the MRFA in an early timeframe, with an emphasis on technology transfer and indigenous weapons; (and) in the 2030s, the LCA Mk-II and the Amca.

The Tejas sits at the heart of the IAF’s future combat fleet. The IAF will continue to stand firmly behind it and to hold the entire ecosystem to delivering it, because a strong, self-reliant air force depends on its success.

Operation Sindoor reaffirmed the decisive role of air power, both as the nation’s primary responder and as its strategic deterrent. Every operation carries lessons, however, and the IAF has studied this one closely. Its lessons are already shaping how we plan, train and build the force.

The foremost lesson is the value of calibrated air power that controls escalation. Intelligent, precise and calibrated employment of air power allowed us to respond decisively to provocation, achieve the objectives set by the national leadership swiftly, and do so without triggering uncontrolled escalation. Throughout, we upheld our commitment to zero collateral damage. With precision, reach and restraint working together, the operation ended on our terms.

The second lesson is that success comes from integration, not from any single weapon or platform. It came from the combined effect of ISR, combat aircraft, precision weapons, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, air defence and networked command and control. It also came from jointness. Under a joint architecture established by the chief of defence staff (CDS) and the three service chiefs, the centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive.

The third lesson is the importance of a strong, networked air defence. The adversary launched a large number of drones and stand-off weapons against us. They were defeated by our

home-grown air defence, in which IAF surface-to-air missile and counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft system) units, supported by the Indian Army’s air defence units, operated under the control of IACCS (integrated air command and control system) nodes. Because our own skies were secure, the nation could act with confidence. The operation also reinforced how the economics of air defence are changing: low-cost drones must be met by layered, cost-effective responses.

The fourth lesson is the value of self-reliance. Some of our indigenously developed weapons performed exceptionally, delivering precise blows deep into enemy territory. Indigenous systems give us operational independence and the flexibility to adapt rapidly as threats evolve.

We have already translated these lessons into action. They are visible in our emphasis on long-range precision and stand-off weapons, layered and cost-effective counter-UAS capability, resilient networks, unmanned systems and continued indigenisation.

On the threat picture, we continuously assess the capabilities developing in our neighbourhood, and our force planning is based on those assessments. China has undertaken significant modernisation of its air and aerospace capabilities. While its air force has a larger overall inventory, its operations against India are constrained by the geography of the Tibetan plateau, where high-altitude airfields reduce payload, range and turnaround times. The IAF, by contrast, operates from lower-altitude, all-weather forward airbases with full payload and shorter response times.

Pakistan, too, is continuously upgrading its air force. We take both developments seriously.

The close collaboration between Pakistan and China, and the assistance Pakistan receives, is a factor in our planning, and the IAF is building its capacity to counter precisely such collusive threats.

As for reports of new fifth-generation inductions in our neighbourhood, we need to understand that the arrival of an aircraft is not the arrival of a capability. Turning it into combat power takes pilot conversion, maintenance, weapon integration, doctrine and years of hard flying, and we watch every marker of that process closely. More broadly, I would not judge the military balance by numerical symmetry. What matters is the capability, capacity and operational concepts needed to achieve the desired effect, and the IAF’s strengths lie in its training, operational experience, integrated air defence and networked force.

Our task is to be ready for the full spectrum of challenges the nation may face, wherever they may arise. That is the standard against which we prepare every day. Operation Sindoor showed what the IAF can deliver. Building on its lessons, we will continue to strengthen our capabilities, so that whatever the challenge and from wherever it comes, the IAF remains ready to respond swiftly, decisively and on the nation’s terms.

Let me answer plainly: There is no anxiety within the IAF on this matter. We are fully committed to jointness and integration. For the IAF, jointness has never been a new idea. It is an inherent part of our doctrine, and coordinated air operations with the army and the navy have always been integral to how we plan and fight. Future conflicts will be multidomain by their very nature, and the three services will plan and operate together far more closely than ever before. The IAF welcomes that, and we are contributing wholeheartedly to the effort.

Operation Sindoor, as I described earlier, shows what integration can achieve. Under the joint architecture established by the CDS and the three service chiefs, the centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources proved decisive. I have also mentioned the tri-service air picture created by the IACCS, Akashteer (the army’s) and Trigun (the navy’s). These are strong foundations, and future structures should build on them.

As we shape those structures, we can anticipate what the next conflict will likely be like. It will be faster. It will be more autonomous, yet more network-dependent; more transparent, yet more deceptive; more precise in some respects, yet characterised by mass in others. The structures we create must be able to absorb that shift. They should be evaluated against India’s specific security requirements rather than built by replicating models from other countries. Each nation operates within its own strategic, geographical, technological and operational environment, and our approach to theatreisation must reflect ours.

Within such structures, the inherent strengths of air power, namely its speed, reach, flexibility and ability to concentrate combat power rapidly, will be employed to the nation’s greatest advantage. Implementing a transformation of this scale in phases, with each step validated before the next, will also ensure that operational readiness is never compromised along the way.

The IAF’s position is clear and confident. We are a committed partner in this transformation, and we will continue to work hand in hand with our sister services to build integrated structures that are distinctly Indian, adaptable to the future and designed to ensure that India fights its wars as one.

Over the last two years, the IAF has made a deliberate effort to integrate new technologies and new-age warfare tools into both its structure and its operational approach. I want to emphasise that this transformation has not been only about acquiring new equipment. It has also meant evolving our doctrine, training, command and control and operational concepts. Our aim is to build a networked, multidomain and artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled force that can operate at the speed and complexity of future warfare. The framework for this effort is long-term.

The IAF has formulated a Capability Perspective Plan 2047, which sets priorities based on emerging technologies and feeds into ten-year plans that are updated periodically. Within that framework, we have accelerated the integration of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, precision weapons, space-based capabilities and advanced ISR into our operational framework. Networking and sensor fusion have been a central focus, because faster situational awareness and decision-making across domains is the foundation of everything else. The IACCS, connected with Akashteer and Trigun, provides a common, real-time air picture, and we are steadily integrating more sensors into it. We have also put greater emphasis on integrating data from multiple sources and building common digital platforms, so that both operational and support functions can make faster, better-informed decisions.

In AI, our focus has moved from isolated technology demonstrations to mission-oriented applications. These include AI-enabled decision support, predictive maintenance, intelligent image and video analysis, data fusion, operational planning and the automation of routine processes. We are developing indigenous AI capability through our AI Centre of Excellence, Udaan, and strengthening dedicated AI manpower and infrastructure. We are also building AI into training, simulation, surveillance, logistics and combat management, while exploring the opportunities that quantum technologies offer. Throughout, we treat these technologies as secure decision-support tools for commanders, with human command and judgement firmly at the core.

We have strengthened our emphasis on counter-UAS, autonomous systems and manned–unmanned teaming, recognising how important they will be in future conflicts. A Drone Coordination Centres at IACCS nodes now act as nodal centres for drone and counter-UAS operations. At the IAF’s first Dronathon in September, we assessed unmanned systems from Indian industry under realistic operational conditions, demonstrated our indigenous unmanned traffic management system, Vayu Uttam, and released the IAF unmanned and autonomous roadmap. Our training and exercises now increasingly reflect the realities of contested electromagnetic and cyber environments, degraded communications and sophisticated air defence threats.

The aeroengine is among the most demanding technologies in the world, and only a handful of nations have truly mastered it. It brings together advanced materials, metallurgy, precision manufacturing, thermodynamics and decades of accumulated knowledge. India’s challenges in this domain arise from a combination of factors and understanding them honestly is the first step to overcoming them.

The Kaveri programme illustrates this well. The Gas Turbine Research Establishment (the DRDO’s) began developing the Kaveri for the LCA programme in 1986, almost four decades ago, with the aim of meeting the LCA’s thrust requirements. During design and development, it became clear that the engine’s thrust could not meet the technical specifications for the LCA. After a joint review conducted in a collegiate manner, it was agreed that the Kaveri could instead be considered for the indigenous unmanned combat aerial vehicle programme. The knowledge and experience gained through the programme remain valuable national assets.

So, to your question: it is both, and more. The delays in India’s indigenous aeroengine development can be attributed to several factors working together. There has been a prolonged gap in technology development, compounded by a limited industrial base and the lack of a sustained research and development ecosystem. In my assessment, these are structural challenges, and they apply across niche aerospace technologies. Inadequate core research and development (R&D) capability lengthens design and development timelines, and limited exposure to airworthiness, quality assurance and certification requirements slows progress further.

The resulting dependence on foreign engines has, as I noted in the context of the Tejas, had a direct impact on the timelines of our platforms. Addressing these challenges requires sustained, long-term commitment on several fronts. It requires significantly enhanced R&D funding in critical technology domains, and investment in infrastructure and a skilled workforce. It requires deeper collaboration with academia, including international collaboration wherever suitable. And it requires a whole-of-government approach, with focused funding, time-bound outcomes and innovative policy provisions.

In the near term, advanced propulsion is among the critical areas being pursued through collaboration with strategic partners, alongside ongoing indigenous efforts.

Co-development of this kind can give us not just the know-how but the know-why of a system. In the long term, however, high-performance aeroengines are a capability India must own end-to-end. They lie at the heart of every combat aircraft, and without sovereign capability here, operational independence will remain incomplete. The road is long, but the nation’s resolve is clear. The IAF will continue to work closely with the DRDO, Indian industry and academia to support this effort, so that the combat aircraft of the future are powered by engines designed and built in India.

If I had to choose the most memorable, it would undoubtedly be Operation Sindoor. I have already spoken of what the IAF achieved and learned in that operation. What I will carry with me is more personal. It is seeing every element of the air force, together with our sister services, function as one, delivering with precision and restraint exactly what the nation asked of us.

As for the most challenging moments, I would answer differently from what you might expect. There were, of course, demanding times. Leading a force through operations while transforming it for the future, at the pace modern warfare demands, is never easy. But I was blessed with an extraordinary team.