Hot waters - India and Pakistan flex their muscles in the Arabian Sea

At sea, the guns stayed quiet, but not the ships. Satellite images showed India’s carrier INS Vikrant edging closer to Pakistan’s coastline. Pakistan hit back with a display of its own, mobilising its fleet and rolling out the red carpet for a visiting Turkish warship in Karachi.

The Indian Navy maintained a steady presence along the Makran coast throughout Operation Sindoor: Carrier Battle Group, destroyers, frigates, and submarines were among the approximately 36 vessels that cruised the seas. Drones and aeroplanes circled above, monitoring the waterways. Anti-air and anti-drone systems neutralised incoming threats, confining the Pakistan Navy to its harbours, a manoeuvre that came close to a de facto blockade.

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The Arabian Sea, long treated as a commercial highway, is no longer just that. It has turned into a frontline for strategic messaging. Analysts warn the next flare-up may not stay limited to land and air. Naval forces are fast becoming central to South Asia’s security balance, with both India and Pakistan rewriting their doctrines accordingly.

Admiral Karambir Singh (retired), former Chief of Naval Staff, put it bluntly: “The biggest capability gap between India and Pakistan lies in the maritime domain, making the Navy a decisive instrument, to be used at the time and place of our choosing.”

For Pakistan, that “decisive” quality also carries a glaring vulnerability. Khurram Abbas, a Pakistan-based defence analyst, told the Blueprint: “If a city like Karachi were ever targeted, Pakistan’s quid pro quo plus strategy could extend retaliation beyond the sea. To avoid such risks, both sides need stronger hotlines and incidents-at-sea mechanisms.”

The takeaway from Operation Sindoor was hard to miss: India can push power deep into Pakistan’s littoral waters, but escalation at sea comes with a heavier price tag than skirmishes on land. Along the LoC, clashes can be contained. At sea, one wrong move could spiral well past South Asia.

China’s expanding shadow

The maritime balance is further complicated by China’s steadily lengthening reach in the Arabian Sea. Its presence, anchored around Pakistan’s Gwadar port, is no longer just symbolic.

Admiral Singh said, “So far, the Arabian Sea has been calm. But China has steadily expanded its presence by arming Pakistan, which now sources 81 per cent of its defence needs from Beijing. As new submarines and systems arrive, what was once a peaceful north-western Arabian Sea could turn turbulent.”

This did not happen overnight. For decades, Pakistan relied on cast-off British and American warships. The last of its Tariq-class destroyers and retired Royal Navy frigates was only decommissioned in 2023.

Things changed in the mid-2000s, when Chinese-built Zulfiquar-class frigates entered service, the first modern, purpose-built combatants for Pakistan’s fleet. A bigger leap came a decade later: a deal for eight Yuan-class submarines (Pakistan’s Hangor class), each fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP). AIP lets a submarine stay under longer, dodge detection, and strike from concealment — an asymmetric upgrade Pakistan badly wanted.

Abbas said, “In terms of Pakistan’s strategic thinking, the acquisition of China’s submarines with AIP marks a turning point. Given Pakistan’s economic constraints, these submarines offer an effective, cost-efficient substitute for a larger conventional fleet.”

Today, Pakistan’s navy sails with Tughril-class frigates (Type 054A/P), its French-designed Agosta-class submarines are now mid-upgrade under Turkish guidance, and a MILGEM deal with Türkiye is in place to co-build new Jinnah-class warships. In contrast, India shops widely for submarines from France, helicopters from the US, and nuclear know-how from Russia.

But China’s stake is not just about hard kit. Its “research vessels” have been busy in the Arabian Sea, mapping seabeds, listening in, probing submarine routes, activities dressed up as marine surveys but suspiciously military in flavour.

The Yuan Wang fleet, usually spotted near Chinese missile ranges, has made appearances near India’s exclusive economic zones. Survey ships like Lan Hai 101 and Lan Hai 201 patrol uncomfortably close to India’s western coast. China insists they are oceanographic platforms. India calls them spy ships.

“Civilian platforms with military purposes. This is how China expands, quietly, incrementally, and in ways that blur commerce and combat. The line is always ambiguous until the advantage is entrenched,” Sayantan Haldar of the Observer Research Foundation said.

Asymmetry at sea

For all of Pakistan’s upgrades, the gap with India is still yawning. India’s navy counts over 150 warships, two carriers, nuclear submarines, and stealth destroyers, while Pakistan’s roster hovers below 50.

At the heart of India’s posture sits the Western Naval Command in Mumbai. From there, it tracks Pakistan’s fleet, guards Gulf shipping lanes, and readies fast-reaction deployments. When INS Vikrant moved forward during the last standoff, the message was loud: India can drop an overwhelming carrier group off Karachi in hours.

And with two carriers, INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant, India can run dual strike groups, each flanked by destroyers, frigates, submarines, and supply ships: floating fortresses on demand.

Below the waves, India’s INS Arihant launched the country’s sea-based nuclear leg in 2016, carrying K-15 ballistic missiles. In 2024, INS Arighaat followed, with a capacity for both K-15s and longer-range K-4s reaching 3,500 km. Another boat, INS Aridhaman, is in the pipeline.

India’s Kalvari-class submarines are based on the French Scorpène design and are built domestically by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited in Mumbai. The first unit, INS Kalvari, was commissioned in 2017. As of 2025, six submarines are operational: Kalvari, Khanderi, Karanj, Vela, Vagir, and Vaghsheer.

These are diesel-electric submarines with AIP modules under development. They are equipped with Exocet SM39 anti-ship missiles and advanced sonar systems. All operations are led by trained naval personnel, with manual targeting, sonar interpretation, and command decisions.

Pakistan has no nuclear submarines, relying instead on conventional diesel-electric boats armed with cruise missiles.

Add to this India’s surveillance web: P-8I Poseidons scanning oceans, MH-60Rs hunting submarines, drones buzzing above. Soon, Rafale-M fighters will fly off Indian decks. And ashore, bases like INS Varsha provide secure links through very low frequency systems to keep the fleet connected.

Geography tips the scale further. India’s western seaboard, stretching from Gujarat to Kerala, is lined with shipyards and naval air stations. Outposts in Lakshadweep are being hardened into watch towers, while the Andaman and Nicobar Islands keep a grip on the Malacca Strait, China’s energy lifeline.

All of this now wraps into Mahasagar (“Mutual and holistic advancement for security and growth across regions”), Modi’s 2025 vision unveiled in Mauritius, a step up from Sagar (“Security and growth for all in the region”), pitched at binding the Global South through trade, security, and sustainable oceans.

Abbas linked it to Pakistan’s counter: “India’s deployment of nuclear submarines and its Mahasagar strategy has prompted Pakistan to bolster maritime deterrence through the AMAN Initiative, involving over 60 countries.”

Economics of escalation

Beyond military posturing, naval standoffs carry immediate economic repercussions. The Arabian Sea is a superhighway for global energy, connecting the Gulf to Asia. Roughly 20.5 million barrels of oil a day pass through the nearby Strait of Hormuz, one-fifth of world consumption. With most nations holding only weeks of reserves, even a brief shock jolts markets.

At the same time, India faces fresh uncertainty over its westward maritime push. In September 2025, the US scrapped the sanctions waiver for Iran’s Chabahar port, placing India’s $370 million stake in jeopardy and leaving it at a strategic cross-road.

The Red Sea attacks by Houthis in 2023 were proof: a few drones and mines forced shipping to reroute, freight costs shot up, and insurers panicked. Now magnify that for the Arabian Sea, through which 80 per cent of the world's maritime trade moves.

Every day, tankers carry oil, LNG, and critical cargo. A partial blockade would send premiums soaring and markets into a tailspin.

Undersea internet cables also run right through this corridor, carrying 95 per cent of international data, finance, trade, and communications. A cut or sabotage could black out economies.

Admiral Singh said, “Undersea cables carry over vast majority of our communication and financial transactions. Protecting them will be as critical as countering submarines.”

India’s west coast is being wired accordingly. Gujarat’s Kutch, especially Mandvi, is being scoped as a major cable landing hub to plug India directly to Europe, West Asia, and Southeast Asia.

“The Arabian Sea connects us to the Western world in many ways. And given the new inventors we are seeing towards seaborne globalisation, maritime connectivity, and new trade emerging between India and the Middle East. As a geography, the Arabian Sea is very important,” Sayantan Haldar said.

A new theatre

Naval drills here are no longer routine — they are theatre. India and Pakistan both use them to telegraph power, recruit allies, and sketch the security map of one of the world’s busiest seas.

India conducts around 17 multilateral and 20 bilateral naval exercises each year. These include Malabar with the United States and Australia, Varuna with France, Australia India Exercise with Australia, and Japan India Maritime Exercise with Japan. India also carries out joint patrols with countries like Singapore and Indonesia. These focus on aircraft carrier operations, anti-submarine warfare, and coordinated patrols.

Pakistan, on the other hand, casts a wider net. Its AMAN series, held biennially, draws over 40 countries, from NATO to China, Russia, and Gulf navies. The themes are counter-piracy, humanitarian ops, and maritime security. Alongside, it drills bilaterally with China (Sea Guardian 2020, 2022) and Russia (Arabian Monsoon).

Abbas pointed out: “Pakistan’s deterrent is strengthened through joint naval exercises with China, like the Sea Guardians, which increase maritime domain awareness, interoperability, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Additionally, they indicate a strategic signal of being strategically aligned with Beijing, which strengthens Pakistan’s defence posture against Indian naval build-up.”

The Gulf countries have joined in, too. In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia inked a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, pledging that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on both. No one spells it out, but the subtext is nuclear: Saudi Arabia now has indirect access to Pakistan’s deterrent.

A month before that, both navies had staged live-fire drills barely 60 nautical miles apart in the Arabian Sea. 

Maritime diplomacy

In 2025, maritime diplomacy has become a theatre of hard statecraft. India’s decision in May to ban imports from Pakistan and bar Pakistani ships from Indian ports showed how economic levers are now being wielded through the sea lanes. India’s signal was blunt: maritime commerce is no longer neutral, but a tool of pressure.

Diplomatic outreach like India’s new defence memorandum of understanding with Morocco, signed in September, explicitly highlights maritime security and capacity building, extending India’s naval diplomacy beyond the Indian Ocean basin.

Yet, sensitivities remain sharp: India publicly urged Saudi Arabia to “mind sensitivities” after the latter inked its defence pact with Pakistan. The message is clear: maritime alignments ripple far into the geopolitical calculus.

Amid these larger power plays, local issues persist. Fishermen on both sides of the India-Pakistan maritime boundary frequently face arrests and harassment while crossing disputed waters near Sir Creek, a long-contested tidal estuary in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat.

The creek’s strategic and economic relevance, especially for fishing and offshore resources, keeps it in focus during negotiations and adds another layer of tension to bilateral maritime diplomacy.

On the broader maritime domain awareness (MDA) front, India has made important strides. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region in Gurgaon is a key pillar of the Indo-Pacific’s MDA architecture, alongside centres in Singapore and the Pacific islands. India hosts liaison officers from about 14–15 partner countries, enabling direct cooperation.

Beneath the surface, the undersea domain is increasingly contested. China has stepped up submarine patrols and “research” voyages to map the seabed. India, in turn, is strengthening undersea surveillance in partnership with Australia and others, deploying gliders, unmanned systems, and seabed sensors.

Still, structural weaknesses loom, an eight-year delay in the Defence Research Development Organisation’s AIP project has slowed upgrades to India’s Scorpene-class submarines, even as Pakistan edges ahead with Chinese support.

Admiral Karambir Singh underlined the stakes: “Undersea warfare is the most opaque and complex domain. Pakistan is exploiting this by inducting submarines. India will need to work hard to build awareness of the underwater domain using towed array sonars, low-frequency sensors, seabed systems, and integrating data from multiple sources to detect anomalies.”

“The Arabian Sea is vast. No single nation can manage it alone. Effective security requires coordinated, collaborative efforts with regional and global partners,” he added.

For now, the uneasy balance holds: muscle is flexed, restraint is observed, and the water stays calm, barely.