A neighbour's perspective of the recent Modi-Putin summit talks
China continues to see India-Russia relations as a double-edged sword
Share
)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose before their meeting in Beijing, on September 2, 2025 (Photo: Reuters)
Amid the frenzy over the “bonhomie” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Indian media did not fail to highlight how the Western countries were closely watching the Russian leader’s visit to New Delhi (December 4 and 5). Surprisingly, not much was reported on how China had been watching the Putin-Modi summit — far more closely. Equally intriguing is the little attention the international media has given to how China is evaluating the “Russian warmth” Putin’s visit has brought to the Indian “diplomatic winter”.
In the few Indian media posts, there were two highlights: One, China reacting positively to Putin’s visit and two, China viewing the visit as exposing the limits of the United States’ (US’) pressure on India. Citing a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, the PTI reported from Beijing: “China… reacted positively to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India, framing the three countries as an important part of the Global South.”
In the West, the BBC viewed the visit as a crucial test for Prime Minister Modi, saying “it will test India’s geopolitical autonomy”. It cited two reasons why Putin’s presence in New Delhi meant a diplomatic tightrope walk for Modi. One, India must ensure that closer ties with Russia are not at the cost of trade talks with the US and Europe. Second, Modi must show people at home that he still counts “my friend” Putin as his ally and has not given into pressure from once-“true friend” Trump. But the BBC’s long analysis failed to mention China’s reaction to the visit.
Likewise, in the US, the focus of attention on Putin visiting New Delhi was on India looking to balance ties with Russia and the US. The CNN’s detailed report from New Delhi described Russia as India’s “most steadfast” partner and the airport welcome ceremony by Modi as “pomp”. The report highlighted how “PM Modi was simultaneously attempting to maintain a deep strategic partnership with a key global rival: the United States”. But the report did not talk about the China factor in Putin's visit to New Delhi amid “politically treacherous times”.
The closest connection experts in the US drew between China and Putin’s visit to India was India’s rising concern about Russia moving closer to China, especially in the context of India-China competition, as reported by the US-based think-tank Atlantic Council recently. Echoing similar views, an analysis attributed to the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) under the National University of Singapore explained the visit as “important for its symbolism and not for concrete outcomes”. Ivan Lidarev, an author, at the ISAS said that “both sides used Putin’s visit to signal to their most important partners, Washington and Beijing respectively, that they have foreign policy options and should be treated accordingly”.
China’s close watch
In China, the mainstream media commentaries — as also the official discourse — have indeed referred to the looming US factor behind the growing Putin-Modi “bromance”. The loud but not-so-profound WeChat bloggers’ comments, generally found exciting by foreign observers like the Chinese tabloid Global Times, which viewed the boost in ties between Russia and India as being compelled by the current turbulence in the geopolitical landscape. On Chinese digital media platforms such as the Guancha.cn, India, more than Russia, has been described as needing to break out of the “diplomatic winter” it is faced with.
Thus, their need to jointly fight attempts by “external forces” (the US) to isolate them. On the other hand, a closer look at the more serious debate among China’s strategic affairs experts and scholars reveals India is increasingly viewed as an important player on the world stage. The increasing importance of India for Russia, in particular, is becoming an indispensable part of Russia’s strategic confrontation with the West. Interestingly, similar views have also been expressed in the West. “Putin is on his first visit to India after four years, at a time when New Delhi is engaged in talks with the US for a trade deal to cut punitive tariffs imposed by the US,” Reuters reported on the day Putin arrived in New Delhi.
While scholars in China point out that new developments in Russia-India relations signify a temporary setback for the US and the West’s attempt to vie for “control” of India, they also see the visit as part of Russia’s strategic calculations, in other words, to inject new progress in relations with India. A recent analysis in the Chinese digital portal wyzxwk.com observed that the US attempts, especially since the Biden administration, have been rather successful in “pulling” India towards the US and the West by relying on a “woo India strategy offering various benefits and incentives. In recent years, India’s diplomatic direction and strategic inclination have increasingly tilted towards the US.”
However, after Trump returned to power, the White House was no longer satisfied with India continuing to refuse to join ranks with those sanctioning Russia. Instead, the US made further demands on India, requiring it to follow the US lead and stand completely with the US, which, the Chinese analysts say, was not at all acceptable to India. “This hegemonic demand by the US met with clear resistance and non-compliance from the Modi administration,” the analysis noted. Explaining India’s reason, the commentary further said: “India refused to be treated cheaply, like a freebie. At least not at this stage.”
The well-known Chinese political analyst Zhang Zhikun, in wyzxwk.com, listed three reasons behind India thwarting the US attempts to “pull” itself away from Russia. First, a significant portion of its armed forces’ equipment and defence industry still relies on Russian support, and it also needs cheap Russian oil. Second, India lacks sufficient strategic trust in the US and the West and remains wary of their attempts to exploit and manipulate India. Third, the benefits offered by the US and the West are insufficient to satisfy India’s greater ambitions. The analyst gave the following reasons why Russia needed India: One, to break the alleged encirclement by the West and two, to reap benefits for Russia’s war-torn economy.
Carrot-and-stick policy
Both lawmakers and the media in the US and elsewhere in the West are voicing deep concerns over Trump’s erratic foreign policy and punitive tariffs pushing allies and friendly countries — especially India — closer to Russia and China. However, in China, experts feel the targeting of India by the US is primarily due to the US’ failure to punish Russia for continuing to sell cheap oil to India. In spite of all kinds of sanctions, the US and the West are now largely out of options, and taking further action against Russia on the issue of Russia-India energy, and defence cooperation is generally seen as no longer feasible or even possible.
So, Chinese experts argue, for the US and the West, the only remaining option is to target India instead. Therefore, the US and the West will continue to implement a dual approach vis-à-vis India. That is,“youdayoula” or a “carrot-and-stick” policy. First, the stick. The US and the West have numerous means to deal with India, such as restricting the transfer of urgently needed science and technology and military equipment, and limiting Indian exports to the West. These are the standard US tactics to undermine its opponents, and India will be no exception.
On the carrot side, the West will continue to offer India certain benefits, trying to entice India to side with them on specific issues. A good example of how the US is both “enticing” and “striking” India is the US simultaneously calling for India to contribute more in the Indo-Pacific to counter China and maintain defence ties, while Trump refuses to budge on trade concessions. It is significant to note, the Chinese scholars emphatically highlight three reasons why the US and the West will continue to cooperate with India in confronting China. These are: to harm China, to gradually draw India closer, and to put Russia in a difficult position.
Contrary to the worrying and alarming headlines in the West, the Chinese media reflected a friendly and far more accommodating understanding of the Modi-Putin “bear hug” in New Delhi. “America will pay for pushing India away”, “India’s elaborate welcome of Putin strains Western ties”, and “The Modi-Putin summit is a message to Trump”, are just a few Western media headlines showing Trump looming large over Putin’s visit to India. Contrast these with the “objective” and “detached” reporting in China. The English-language China Daily (Hong Kong edition) headlined its story “Putin and Modi meet in New Delhi”, and highlighted peace, trade, and defence talks in its editorial.
China’s official Xinhua News Agency, known for advocating the ruling Communist Party’s official view, in an op-ed under the section “World Insights” published two days after Putin left New Delhi, underscored the importance of the summit talks for being held amid geopolitical pressure. Endorsing the government view, Zhang Hong, an expert in the Sino-Russian relations at the prestigious China Academy of Social Sciences, observed in the Global Times: “Amid the current turbulent geopolitical landscape, engagement between India and Russia, especially strengthening of their bilateral energy cooperation and advancing military-industrial collaboration are strategic measures which serve as leverage to counter restrictive measures imposed by
the United States.”
Additionally, a crucial dimension that has gone unnoticed in both Western and Indian media reports and scholarly analyses is that despite declining Russian arms sales to China over the years — primarily because China has been manufacturing its own arms and military equipment — the Chinese and Russian militaries have pledged to deepen cooperation in sensitive areas, including missile defence, following high-level talks in Moscow involving China’s top general just a couple of weeks before Putin landed in New Delhi. During the talks, the two countries with “no limit” friendship agreed to work together on a defence plan to “develop a new cooperation blueprint” , as reported by the South China Morning Post.
A Chinese warship sails during the joint naval exercise of China, Russia, and Iran in the Gulf of Oman on March 12, 2025 (Photo: Reuters)
Russia-China bonhomie
It is pertinent to remember, in the 15th five-year plan the Chinese Communist Party released in October 2025, China especially committed itself to “strengthening strategic deterrence forces to ensure global strategic balance and stability”. In this context, the joint declaration in Moscow in November 2025, by the Russian defence minister and the vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, pledging deeper military ties acquires greater significance. It should be recalled, the recent China-Russia talks on missile defence in Moscow come amid worries about Trump’s plans to build a Golden Dome missile shield and his stated intention to resume nuclear weapons testing after a break of more than 30 years.
Moreover, it will be a gross misunderstanding to limit, as many in the West do, the beginning of the deepening of Sino-Russian
defence-industrial ties to early 2022 when Russian forces invaded Ukraine, according to the US-based think-tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The truth is, the two countries renewed a pledge to commit themselves to deepening military exchanges and advancing military ties in May 2015 during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia to take part in celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) in Moscow. The Chinese state-affiliated media had extensively reported that Xi and Putin agreed during their talks to strengthen military exchanges between the two countries.
More significantly, Xi’s Russia tour brought the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination to a new stage. From the mid-2010s onwards, especially since Xi came to power, joint military exercises and operations saw a significant uptick. A paper published by the Washington, DC-based Centre for European Policy Analysis in June 2025 noted: “The increased frequency in the past decade of Russia-China joint military exercises was intended to demonstrate Moscow and Beijing’s willingness to improve interoperability between the two militaries and served to demonstrate their growing cooperation to the world.”
Scholars in China dismiss Western theories that India has been rattled by China trying the “reverse Nixon-Kissinger” doctrine, a term used by analysts to describe a US foreign policy strategy focused on improving ties with Russia in order to isolate China, and claims of growing Russian dependence on China. These are rejected as attempts to sow discord between China and Russia. A report in China’s Global Times named the British newspaper The Guardian as claiming the “no-limits partnership” between Russia and China has rattled India. “India hopes to find a way to prevent Russia from ever getting too close to China and ensure it can count on Moscow to put some pressure on the Chinese,” The Guardian commented on the day Putin arrived in New Delhi.
A day after Putin concluded the two-day state visit to India, China’s Guancha.cn website noted that the West is generally dissatisfied with the enthusiastic interaction between India and Russia, while Indian media celebrated Putin’s visit, portraying it as a meeting between “allies”. Although the issue of arms sales to India is among the greatest concerns to the outside world, the commentary pointed out that under mounting US pressure, since 2009, the proportion of weapons and equipment purchased by India from Russia has been declining: from 76 per cent during 2009–2013 to 36 per cent during 2019-2023, and even less in 2024. However, it is true, India was particularly interested in discussing the supply of Su-57 fighter jets during Putin’s visit.
As mentioned, deflecting from the official Chinese stance, some Chinese experts have described further warming of ties between Russia and India as both good and bad for China. These analysts, while rejecting Western claims of India making a last-ditch attempt to create a wedge between Russia and China, reckon new developments in India-Russia relations are indeed “closely linked to China”. A signed Chinese commentary on wyzwk.com maintained that historically, Russia’s closer ties with India have been a double-edged sword for China. Currently, given Russia’s situation, it will undoubtedly take steps to
promote relations with India, the commentary observed.
International political relations are extremely complex, and strategic issues are never simple. This is true not only in the relations between China and the US and between China and Russia, but also in the specific relationship between Russia and India. In all these cases, a single move can have far-reaching consequences.
Regarding the Putin visit, the commentary cited reports indicating Russia was preparing to sell Su-57 fighter jets and S-500 air defence and anti-missile systems to India. These highly modernised weapons will undoubtedly significantly enhance India’s military strength and put pressure on China and Pakistan. However, China must use a two-pronged approach to balance and resolve this issue: first, strengthen the countermeasures by exporting fifth-generation fighter jets to Pakistan to prevent India from gaining an overwhelming advantage; second, strengthen cooperation with Russia to gain a thorough understanding of Russia's corresponding weapon systems and be fully prepared.
Diplomatic tightrope
In addition to the aforementioned disadvantages, there are also advantages, namely, Russia-India ties can temporarily slow down India’s tendency to align with the US and the West. Second, at the same time, for China, it is much better to allow Russian weapons to occupy their proper place in India than for US and Western weapons systems to dominate India. Third, India is playing a “double-game” aimed at purchasing Su-57 jets from Russia and advanced fighter jets from the US.
However, China is not unaware of this. China knows Russia wants to use the Su-57 fighter jets as bait to increase the market share of Russian-made weapons in India. China is also aware that India purchasing the S-500 is a distant prospect. That explains why India is also ambitiously trying to secure the acquisition of the US’ advanced fighter jets. But the Chinese analysts believe India should have a more realistic approach and look to buy additional S-400 air defense systems. The Chinese strategic affairs community has widely noted besides the potential deal for Su-57 fighter jets, Putin’s agenda included a rather tempting offer for India, a “technology transfer package” allowing India to mass-produce the Su-57 domestically.
Overall, a dominant view among China’s security experts is that India’s diplomatic tightrope walk is necessitated by the escalating tariff friction with the US. India is also making its own calculations. On the one hand, the Modi government wants to leverage Russian technology and low-priced energy to pave the way for its “Make in India” strategy; on the other hand, it is using Russia-India cooperation as a bargaining chip in its competition with the US.
However, notwithstanding Indian claims of “strategic autonomy”, experts in China reckon this balancing act of “not offending either side and gaining benefits from both sides” has come to be seen as the core logic of India’s current diplomacy. In the short term, India’s advantage lies in the fact that both the US and Russia need it. The US relies on it to counterbalance China, and Russia relies on it to support its economy. However, while India's balancing act is currently reaping huge profits, walking a tightrope is always risky. How long this good fortune can last will depend on how the international landscape changes and whether India itself can effectively tuiqiao (think over) — or maintain its composure.
Written By
Hemant Adlakha
The author is the vice chairperson and an honorary fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi
First Published: Jan 10 2026 | 3:00 AM IST
In this article :
