How India's 'strategic autonomy' can navigate the Trump presidency

A distinctive feature of the Trump years was the prominence accorded to leader-level diplomacy. Trump’s personal chemistry with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, showcased through highly choreographed events such as “Howdy, Modi!” in Houston and “Namaste Trump” in Ahmedabad, reinforced the growing political comfort between the two sides. These spectacles were not merely symbolic; they reflected a conscious effort to mobilise diaspora politics, reinforce nationalist narratives, and lend political ballast to an evolving strategic alignment. Yet, beneath the optics, the relationship remained driven more by strategic necessity than by deep institutional convergence.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the domain of security and defence cooperation. The Trump administration increasingly viewed India as a pivotal pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly as the US abandoned ambiguity about China and embraced great-power competition. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), alongside the signing of foundational defence agreements such as the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, marked a significant expansion of military interoperability and intelligence sharing. Defence trade flourished, reinforcing India’s gradual shift toward the US as a key security partner.

At the same time, economic relations remained the weakest link. Trump’s transactional “America First” approach clashed with India’s preference for policy autonomy and protectionism. The withdrawal of India’s benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences and persistent disagreements over tariffs and market access highlighted the absence of a shared economic vision. Despite prolonged negotiations, the inability to conclude even a limited trade agreement underscored the structural constraints shaping the partnership.

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On issues such as immigration and domestic politics, the US adopted a largely instrumental approach. Restrictions on H-1B visas generated unease in India, even as the Trump administration refrained from public criticism of contentious domestic developments, including the abrogation of Article 370. Strategic imperatives clearly trumped normative concerns.

Trump’s China policy, meanwhile, provided the broader context within which US-India ties acquired renewed salience. By redefining it as a strategic competitor, launching a tariff-driven trade war, confronting it on issues ranging from the South China Sea to human rights, and targeting Chinese technology firms, the administration fundamentally altered the regional balance. This hardening posture, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, reinforced India’s value as a countervailing power in Asia.

His first-term India policy strengthened the partnership’s strategic and defence dimensions while leaving its economic foundations fragile. The relationship advanced less through institutional depth than through converging interests and geopolitical compulsions, laying the groundwork for continuity under subsequent administrations.

Under Joe Biden, the US’ India policy largely unfolded as an extension of the strategic logic that crystallised during the Trump years, albeit with some adjustments in tone, process, and diplomatic framing. The Biden administration internalised the bipartisan consensus in the US that India is central to the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, particularly as US-China competition sharpens and the regional order comes under sustained pressure.

In substantive terms, there was significant continuity. The Indo-Pacific remained the organising principle of US strategy, and India continued to be viewed as a critical partner within this framework. The Quad, revitalised under Trump, was further institutionalised during Biden’s tenure, with regular leaders’ meetings and an expanded agenda encompassing maritime security, critical technologies, supply chains, and climate cooperation. Defence ties continued to deepen, building on the foundational agreements concluded earlier, with an emphasis on interoperability, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises. This reflected a shared recognition that India’s strategic weight is indispensable to any credible regional balancing strategy vis-à-vis China.

Where the Biden administration departed from its predecessor was primarily in its diplomatic style and policy execution. Trump’s personalised and transactional approach gave way to a more predictable, process-driven engagement that privileged alliances, multilateralism, and institutional mechanisms. The India policy too was no longer an outlier shaped by leader-level chemistry but was embedded within a broader US strategy of coalition-building in Asia. The rhetorical emphasis on democratic values and a rules-based order was more pronounced, even if such concerns were carefully calibrated so as not to disrupt strategic cooperation.

Economic engagement continued to reveal the limits of the partnership. While Biden avoided the overt trade antagonism that characterised the Trump era, there has been little appetite on either side for ambitious trade liberalisation. Instead, cooperation shifted towards targeted initiatives such as the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (later renamed as Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology), reflecting a convergence driven more by geopolitical and technological imperatives than by a shared economic vision. While Biden’s India policy consolidated and institutionalised Trump-era strategic gains, it was a more restrained and less mercurial approach to partnership management.

Trump’s second-term foreign policy has combined elements of continuity with a more pronounced expression of the instincts that defined his first presidency. The animating logic remains firmly rooted in an uncompromising “America First” worldview, marked by strategic unilateralism, an overtly transactional approach to diplomacy, and deep scepticism towards multilateral institutions perceived to dilute US strategic autonomy. If anything, these impulses have become more clearly articulated, reflecting a presidency less encumbered by internal restraint and more willing to privilege freedom of action over institutional consensus.

Alliances have been approached instrumentally with Trump demanding greater burden-sharing from allies in Europe and Asia even while treating security commitments as contingent rather than automatic. Diplomacy in West Asia has prioritised deterrence, energy security, and selective disengagement, while immigration, trade, and border control remain closely linked to foreign policy objectives.

Released in December 2025, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a significant departure from the previous framework of “great power competition” towards a doctrine centred on what the administration terms “civilizational realism” and “hard sovereignty”. This strategic pivot emphasises the primacy of national sovereignty, cultural cohesion, and economic self-reliance, while recalibrating US global priorities with a pronounced focus on the Western hemisphere.

A notable feature of this strategy is the introduction of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which elevates the Western hemisphere to the top of the US’ security concerns. The document emphasises the imperative of consolidating the US’ preeminence in the Americas by aggressively countering Chinese and Russian influence, dismantling narcotics cartels, and curtailing mass migration. This marks a marked shift from the 2017 NSS, which had prioritised the Indo-Pacific region as the foremost arena of geopolitical contestation, relegating the Western hemisphere to a lower tier of strategic importance.

Economically, the 2025 NSS abandons the rhetoric of promoting democracy in favour of “transactional realism”. Economic security is reframed as integral to national security, with policies aimed at reshoring manufacturing, securing critical mineral supply chains, and employing aggressive tariffs to safeguard US industrial dominance. This reflects a broader move toward protectionism and economic nationalism, consistent with the “America First” ethos.

The strategy also articulates a hardline approach to alliances, demanding increased burden-sharing, particularly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, with defence spending required to reach 5 per cent of gross domestic product. Technological superiority remains a cornerstone, with ambitious investments in missile defence systems, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors framed as essential to achieving “peace through strength”. However, the NSS extends national security concerns beyond conventional domains, uniquely linking them to “cultural health”. It emphasises domestic “spiritual health”, traditional family structures, and meritocratic values, explicitly denouncing “woke” ideologies as threats to national cohesion and stability.

This strategic repositioning fundamentally alters US perceptions of global competitors. China is reframed primarily as an economic rival rather than a military adversary, with the administration eschewing the previous emphasis on “great power competition” in favour of accepting “spheres of influence” and seeking strategic stability, including a “grand bargain” on trade with China. Russia, similarly, is approached with a pragmatic lens aimed at avoiding renewed conflict.

For India, the 2025 NSS signals a transformation in the US’ expectations. India is no longer framed as a partner bound by shared democratic values but as a “strategic necessity” in counterbalancing China. The burden-sharing paradigm now clearly positions India as the principal security provider in the Indian Ocean, enabling the US to pivot its focus to the Western hemisphere. This shift complicates Indian diplomacy, requiring India to balance alignment with the US’ “America First” agenda alongside its own strategic autonomy.

Moreover, while the administration’s rejection of “woke” liberalism may resonate with India’s civilisational assertions, renewed transactional tensions — evident in a more confrontational Pakistan policy and contentious trade disputes such as the “Mission 500” tariff frictions — highlight a complex, high-stakes bargaining environment. The Quad, institutionalised as an “action platform”, reflects an operationalised framework for cooperation but also highlights the dual nature of the US–India relationship as both indispensable and unpredictable.

Ultimately, the 2025 NSS underscores that strategic autonomy is no longer a discretionary posture for India but a requisite condition in navigating the complexities of Trump-era geopolitics, where partnership and rivalry coexist within a fundamentally transactional framework, something which has been reflected in the yearlong diplomatic back and forth between the US and India and their inability to conclude a trade pact.

As Trump’s frustration grew over India’s reluctance to accept US demands, the pressure on India also intensified significantly. Issues ranging from Iran and Russia to Pakistan have been bundled together, creating a cumulative force aimed at compelling India to acquiesce. Yet, this public, high-profile tactic has backfired. Instead of yielding results, it has constrained India’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre. No democratically elected leader can afford to appear as if they are succumbing to pressure openly imposed by a US president, especially when the demands themselves are perceived as excessive or unreasonable.

The nature of Trump’s demands — both in style and substance — is such that India finds them difficult to accept without domestic political costs. Nonetheless, the most promising path forward remains the pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes through dialogue and compromise. The underlying geopolitical alignment between India and the US has, in the past, enabled both countries to withstand turbulent moments in their relationship. This foundation of convergence still holds true.

Historically, structural commonalities between the two helped transcend individual leadership quirks, smoothing over disagreements. But Trump’s strong personality and unconventional style now threaten to overshadow the deeper strategic logic that has made the bilateral relationship potent.

Despite its resistance to some of the US’ more extreme demands, India is unlikely to engage in another Cold War-style confrontation. Instead, it seeks to maintain strategic autonomy while navigating this evolving and sometimes fraught partnership’s complexities. Trump cannot limit India’s rise. It is for India to use this moment to push through reforms so as to ensure that India’s economic growth trajectory continues to shine. That will be enough to ensure that the US — for all the personal predilections of Trump and other presidents — will not be able to ignore India’s ascent.