Iran after Khamenei

At the same time, the succession marks a decisive transformation within the Islamic Republic. Power is now shifting away from a clerically balanced revolutionary order toward a more centralised security state in which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is increasingly playing the dominant role. Understanding this emerging configuration will be critical for assessing Iran’s domestic trajectory, its regional behaviour, and the future of its confrontation with the United States (US) and Israel as the ongoing war reshapes the strategic landscape of West Asia.

At first glance, the assassination of a sitting Supreme Leader during wartime might have been expected to trigger institutional breakdown inside the Islamic Republic. In many political systems, the sudden removal of the central authority figure at such a moment could produce elite fragmentation, paralysis within the chain of command, or even the rapid unravelling of the state. Yet, Iran’s political order has long anticipated precisely such scenarios.

Since the Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s, the leadership of the Islamic Republic has built a layered structure designed to preserve continuity under extreme pressure. The constitution provides a mechanism for interim leadership and succession through the Assembly of Experts, while parallel chains of authority exist within the security establishment.

Over the past decades, contingency planning for leadership decapitation — whether through assassination or war — has been embedded in the regime’s institutional architecture.

The speed with which Iran’s political elite moved to appoint Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader reflects this logic of institutional survival.

Even under the pressure of an ongoing war with Israel and the US, the regime’s priority was to demonstrate continuity of authority and maintain the appearance of political cohesion. The rapid succession process should therefore not be interpreted as proof of stability in itself, but rather as evidence of how deeply the Islamic Republic has prepared for moments of systemic shock.

While the Islamic Republic has preserved institutional continuity after Khamenei’s death, the balance of power within the system is now shifting in a decisive direction. The circumstances of the transition — wartime conditions, external military pressure, and the need for rapid succession — have strengthened the position of the IRGC, which already occupied a central role in Iran’s political order.

Since the early years of the revolution, the IRGC has evolved from an ideological militia into a powerful military, economic, and intelligence network embedded across nearly every sector of the Iranian state. It plays a central role in Iran’s nuclear programme, oversees the country’s drone and missile programmes, and directs Iran’s network of regional proxy forces. Beyond the security sphere, the Guards oversee key strategic industries and major segments of Iran’s economy while maintaining deep influence over regional security policy. In moments of crisis, this institutional reach makes the IRGC the regime’s most reliable instrument of control.

The assassination of Khamenei has accelerated this long-term trend. Without a figure of comparable authority to arbitrate among factions, the system is increasingly likely to rely on the security establishment to preserve cohesion and manage wartime decision-making. In effect, Iran is entering a phase in which the survival of the Islamic Republic rests more heavily than ever on its security institutions.

The elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei to the position of Supreme Leader represents one of the most unusual moments in the history of the Islamic Republic. Although the Assembly of Experts formally selected him, the transition effectively marks the first time the country’s highest authority has passed from father to son. This development carries particular symbolic weight in a system born out of the 1979 revolution, whose central grievances included the hereditary nature of the Pahlavi monarchy and its perceived lack of meritocratic legitimacy.

Unlike his father, who spent decades building religious credentials and political authority within Iran’s clerical establishment, Mojtaba has largely operated behind the scenes. His influence over the past two decades has been exercised informally through networks within the security apparatus, political elites, and segments of the clerical hierarchy.

This background gives Mojtaba both advantages and limitations as Iran’s new leader. On one hand, his long-standing connections to the IRGC and other power centres may help secure elite support during a moment of extraordinary pressure. In wartime conditions, these institutional relationships can provide the political backing necessary to maintain continuity in command and decision-making.

On the other hand, the perception of dynastic succession may complicate the regime’s ideological narrative and deepen questions about political legitimacy among segments of Iranian society that already challenge the system. For this reason, Mojtaba’s leadership should be understood less as the emergence of a new personal authority than as the product of a broader realignment within the Islamic Republic under wartime conditions, especially as the security establishment now underpins the regime’s survival.

Taken together, the assassination of Ali Khamenei and the elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei are reshaping the internal architecture of the Islamic Republic. For decades, Iran’s political system functioned as a carefully balanced structure in which clerical authority, revolutionary institutions, and elected bodies operated within a hierarchy ultimately overseen by the Supreme Leader. Khamenei’s long tenure allowed him to mediate disputes among competing centres of power while preserving the ideological coherence of the regime.

The emerging configuration is likely to look different. With Mojtaba assuming leadership during wartime and under intense external pressure, the political centre of gravity is shifting toward institutions capable of exercising immediate coercive power. This naturally favours the security establishment — particularly the IRGC — which already controls substantial military, intelligence, and economic resources.

Iran’s post-Khamenei system may therefore function less as a clerically mediated revolutionary state and more as a security-dominated political order in which religious authority provides legitimacy while strategic decision-making increasingly reflects the priorities of the security elite. Such systems can prove remarkably resilient during periods of conflict, even as they alter the internal balance of political authority.

Even if the Islamic Republic navigates the immediate succession crisis, the pressures surrounding Iran are unlikely to diminish once the current war subsides. A scenario in which the regime survives the conflict may shift the strategic focus of its adversaries toward longer-term methods of weakening the Iranian state from within. An important distinction may emerge between the strategic preferences of the US and those of Israel.

The US has historically shown caution toward scenarios that could lead to the fragmentation of large regional states. A sudden breakdown of Iran’s central authority could produce severe consequences, including disruptions to global energy markets, nuclear security risks, refugee flows, and instability across the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. For these reasons, US policy has generally favoured containment and pressure rather than the collapse of the Iranian state.

Israel’s strategic calculus may differ somewhat. From Israel’s perspective, the long-term weakening of Iran’s capacity to project power across the region could significantly reduce the threat posed by Iran and its allied networks. Continued pressure that exacerbates Iran’s internal vulnerabilities may therefore be viewed by Israeli strategists as advantageous. This dynamic may become one of the defining strategic tensions of the post-Khamenei era in Iran.

At the same time, Iran’s immediate neighbours are likely to approach the post-war environment with a strong preference for cautious stability rather than regime change. Gulf Arab states in particular have experienced firsthand the economic and security consequences of the conflict — from disruptions to energy infrastructure and maritime trade to missile and drone attacks on regional targets. While many of these governments remain deeply wary of Iran’s regional ambitions, they are equally concerned about the risks associated with the collapse of a large and strategically located state.

Moreover, some regional actors may quietly fear that strategies aimed at destabilising Iran could eventually establish precedents that threaten other governments in the region. For these reasons, Iran’s neighbours are likely to favour a difficult but pragmatic balance,  containing Iran’s diminishing influence while avoiding the far greater uncertainties that could arise from the shifting of regional hegemony to an aggressive Israel.

The assassination of Ali Khamenei and the elevation of Mojtaba have opened a new and uncertain chapter in the history of the Islamic Republic. For the first time since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s political system is undergoing a leadership transition under conditions of open interstate conflict and intense external pressure. Such moments inevitably carry risks of instability, but they also illuminate the deeper structure of power within a state.

So far, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated a notable capacity to absorb shock. The rapid succession process and the continued functioning of key institutions suggest that the regime’s survival mechanisms remain intact. At the same time, the internal balance of authority is evolving. The post-Khamenei era is likely to be defined by a stronger role for the security establishment — particularly the IRGC — and a leadership structure that depends less on personal religious authority and more on institutional cohesion.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership, however, will begin under extraordinarily difficult conditions. The new Supreme Leader is likely to face persistent Israeli efforts to target him personally, ensuring that the threat of assassination remains a constant shadow over his rule. Yet the challenges before him extend far beyond questions of physical security. He must govern a country already under the strain of war and sustained military pressure from the US and Israel, while confronting a web of deep political, economic, social, and environmental crises.

Equally significant is the widening gap between the state and Iranian society. In recent years, large segments of the population have openly challenged the legitimacy of the political system, leading to waves of protest and growing distrust between rulers and ruled. Against this backdrop, the central question facing the Islamic Republic is whether a leadership transition that places the son of the previous Supreme Leader at the helm can restore political cohesion, or whether the structural tensions within Iranian society will continue to deepen.

The answers will depend on the course of the ongoing war, the ability of Iran’s elite to maintain unity and respond to public demands, and the strategic choices of external powers. What is already clear, however, is that Iran is entering a new phase in which the character of the Islamic Republic and the role of Iran in the regional order will be reshaped for years to come.