The Nato's dilemma deepens

What do these developments mean for Europe’s strategic position and for its security? At present, there is no reason to question the solidity of the security guarantees that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) alliance provides to the European continent. Nevertheless, the ongoing intra-Western bickering does have an impact on the way Europe is looking at the future of its own defence. More than ever before, European leaders and their public realise that they can no longer take US support for granted and that they will have to achieve some degree of strategic autonomy without alienating the US.

Prodded by Trump, and realising this would be in their own interest, the allies, at the Nato summit of 2025, decided to increase their national defence-budgets to 5 per cent of gross domestic product by 2035. An increase in defence spending had been long overdue for many of the European members of Nato, whose militaries had undergone years of budget cuts. The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the first serious wake-up call in this regard.

Furthermore, it soon became clear that the Trump-II administration wants to disengage to a certain degree from the European security scene. The NSS 25 lists as one of the administration’s goals: “burden sharing and burden shifting”. It states that “wealthy, sophisticated nations must assume primary responsibility for their regions”, thereby clearly referring to the European members of Nato. 

The strategic reality is that Europe faces a hostile neighbour with revisionist ideas about its own territory and place in the world while, since 2025, being confronted with an unfriendly US administration. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, combined with the anti-Western rhetoric coming out of  Russia, has made it clear that the present leadership in Russia has not come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine war is part of Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s former geography, whereby the Baltic states could potentially be next in line. As these three countries — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — are member-states of the Nato defence alliance, the Treaty provisions would be immediately applicable in case of a Russian aggression.

This Russian threat is no longer fully recognised as such by the US under Trump. Rather than facing it, the US talks about reestablishing strategic balance in Europe, and it leans upon Ukraine to give in to Russian demands. Furthermore, Trump has made very critical statements about Nato, at times questioning its usefulness. The European Nato members are therefore rightfully wondering whether the US would still come to their aid if Russia were to attack one of the allies.

The Nato was created in 1949 as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe, mindful of their historical experience with Russia, were eager to join this defensive alliance. Being a member of the Nato gave them the assurance that they would no longer be in danger of becoming a part of a Russian empire. The security guarantees for them were underwritten by the US nuclear umbrella and by an allied system of command and control, of capacity-sharing, which ensured credible conventional deterrence against possible threats from Russia.

The credibility of Nato as a defensive alliance rests on its solid military capabilities and on the certainty that the member-states will act in accordance with Article 5, when any one ally is attacked. The solidity of both of these factors is to a large degree dependent upon the US. The US nuclear umbrella and the strength of the US military are a strong guarantee that Nato will be capable of protecting its member-states. Doubts about the US’ willingness to adhere to Article 5 would certainly undermine the credibility of the alliance.

The start of the Ukraine war in 2022 shook Europe out of a dream of permanent peace. At the time, together with the US, it was decided to help Ukraine in its battle for survival. Public opinion in Western Europe started realising that more would have to be done to strengthen their national military defences. 

President Trump’s lukewarm feelings about Nato and negative views on Europe strengthened the already growing sense in the capitals of the continent that more — much more — had to be done to ensure Europe’s defence. They must step up their own defence capabilities to compensate for the potential withdrawal of US security guarantees from the continent.

One of the main challenges confronting the European Nato allies is the lack of a certain number of critical capacities, such as an adequate integrated air and missile defence; long-range strike capabilities; strategic enablers such as satellite communications; cyber warfare and electronic warfare capabilities; logistics and mobility capacities; and ammunition and firepower. 

In all of these domains, the US is indispensable and will remain so for several years. Furthermore, an integrated and operationally coherent force structure will have to be set up.

In an effort to present a framework for tackling these challenges, European politicians and commentators now talk about the need to develop a European pillar within Nato. 

For the moment, it is essentially a general concept whereby the European allies would acquire the necessary military capabilities while gradually assuming greater responsibilities in financial and operational terms within Nato. It would give the Europeans a certain degree of strategic autonomy within Nato. As yet, however, such a pillar is no more than an 

intellectual exercise. 

The other meaningful security-actor on the continent is the EU. The EU and its member states have traditionally outsourced the defence of their territories to Nato. The Ukraine war, however, made the EU for the first time aware of its role as a geopolitical player. As the Trump-administration decided to drop direct help to Ukraine, the EU took on a more direct role in supporting Ukraine — thereby becoming more engaged in defence-related matters. 

The EU-treaties do provide for a ‘Mutual Defence Clause’, Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union: If a member-state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member- states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member-states. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the Nato, which, for those states which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. This provision was invoked once, by France after the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. As a result of recent geopolitical events, discussions have been held to try to operationalise this clause.

For now, however, EU-efforts have been directed in the first place to the need for more cooperation between the national defence-industries of the member-states, and to increase the production of military hardware within the Union. The EU has furthermore, since 2024, concluded 12 Security and Defence Partnerships with different countries — recently with India. These agreements indicate that the EU is increasingly aware of its geopolitical role. But defence is not covered by the EU treaties.

Although the transatlantic quarrels of the last year have certainly inspired many in Europe to look at the EU as a possible alternative for Nato, it would not be realistic to expect much that is concrete to come out of this in the near future: Europe’s security is firmly in the hands of Nato, and thus dependent upon the US for its credibility. The recent increases in defence-spending by European nations might eventually lead to a situation whereby the dependence upon the US can be reduced. This process will however take several years.

The Nato is in the process of changing as a result of the disengagement of the US from Europe. The European allies are now preparing to absorb the consequences of this evolution. There is a need for more military hardware — as already indicated. Europe has big gaps in several areas, and there is a need for stronger military coordination between European nations, while not losing US support. The main question is how much time it will take to achieve this transformation, and whether President Trump will allow for this transformation to take the time it needs to be completed.

Recently, the commander-in-chief of the Latvian Armed Forces declared that if the war in Ukraine comes to a halt, Russia may have a window of opportunity to attack Nato countries in 2027-2029 (interview with Deutsche Welle). After 2030, Europe and Nato would become stronger.

Notwithstanding the present tensions between the US and Europe, Nato’s role is far from over. Work continues within the alliance between the allies on strengthening military and command and control capacities. And as much as President Trump is sceptical about Nato, or about his European allies, the US will still need its bases and presence on European soil to be able to continue to play its global role. The next Nato summit, in Ankara, Turkey, will possibly give more answers as to the future of the alliance.