Why air power continues to dominate modern warfare

  The Feb 26, 2019, ‘Op Bandar’, popularly known as the Balakot strike, when Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft crossed the international border for the first time to carry out an attack on terror infrastructure in Pakistan, marked a significant shift in India’s response to state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan. Viewed in hindsight, India’s strategy of coercive diplomacy by resorting to deterrence by punishment had its effect, albeit limited in time and space. The unprecedented heinous terror attack on innocent tourists in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, called for an unprecedented response from India. Expectations had grown since the Balakot strike of 2019, as also the capability of the IAF with the induction and operationalisation of 4.5 generation Rafale fighter aircraft.  

The IAF, meanwhile, had also upgraded its Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), acquired the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia, operationalised the indigenous Akash system and integrated precision weapons with the Rafale. While actions across the diplomatic, political and economic domains were taken immediately after the Pahalgam massacre, military action took some time. 

  ‘Operation Sindoor’ launched on the intervening night of May 6-7, 2025, witnessed India carrying out a punitive strike on nine terror camps and infrastructure across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, including the headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed at Bahawalpur and the Lashkar-e-Taiba at Muridke. These attacks were measured, non-escalatory and focused only on the terror infrastructure in Pakistan, avoiding any military or civilian targets. The response from Pakistan targeted Indian military installations, cities and places of worship with drones and missiles all along the international border.  The Indian retaliation, subsequently on the night of May 9-10, 2025, was targeted at Pakistan Air Force (PAF) airfields, air defence radars and command and control structures across the Pakistani heartland, inflicting substantial damage to PAF capability. Pakistan requested a ceasefire that came into effect less than four days after the conflict had started. Indian air power had achieved the political objective of deterrence by punishment in a short timespan while controlling the escalation ladder. 

    The combat effectiveness of air power needs to be measured against strategic outcomes and political objectives. The role of air power is ideally suited for the strategies of risk, punishment, denial and decapitation. Deterrence by punishment through air power is carried out to convince the enemy that the cost of continuing conflict would outweigh any potential gain. This is carried out by inflicting deliberate damage on enemy assets, as was done by carrying out the strikes by the IAF on Pakistani terror infrastructure on May 6-7, 2025. Risk, on the other hand, is gradually increasing the threat or use of force to actual damage by signalling resolve to use force and inducing policy change before escalation to an all-out war. India has attempted to do this as well with the attack on Jabba Top during ‘Op Bandar’ in February 2019 to induce policy change by Pakistan in their tacit support to terrorist organisations.  Air power can also be used for coercion by compelling the enemy to do something or refrain from doing something by using force or threatening the use of force. This could be done by targeting enemy leadership or other targets, as was done by Israel on Iranian military leadership and nuclear sites in ‘Operation Rising Lion’ as a strategy to ensure counter proliferation of nuclear weapons. Finally, air power could be used to decapitate enemy leadership and command and control centres by paralysing the enemy’s decision-making capability, leading to operational collapse. 

  Operation Sindoor clearly demonstrated the ability of the IAF to respond with alacrity and precision in a no war, no peace situation, to deliver while controlling the escalation ladder. This operation in some ways was also a test of the higher defence organisation comprising the intelligence agencies, bureaucracy and the military, after the defence reforms of 2019, wherein the CDS and Secretary DMA were appointed. The synergy and integration between the armed forces towards joint planning and decentralised execution worked perfectly to deliver within the existing structures. Future integration towards operationalisation of theatre commands, however, would have to factor in the lessons learnt from Operation Sindoor. 

  The IAF delivered in a short and intense skirmish that lasted for less than four days; however, the capacity of the IAF to engage in a conventional conflict over a prolonged period of time is stymied by the lack of resources. The IAF as on date may have the capability to deliver, but the capacity in terms of platforms, fighter aircraft and combat enablers like airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) and flight refuelling aircraft (FRA) needs to be augmented post haste, as quantity has a quality of its own. Development of indigenous weapon systems, software-designed radios and operational data links for secure communication needs to be fast-tracked.  

The active collusion between People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PAF in real time, as also between Pakistan and Turkiye towards the supply of drones, is another factor that India needs to be wary and cognisant of. Aatmanirbharta is the way forward, and the push towards research & development, indigenous design development and manufacturing in the aerospace sector needs to be pursued in mission mode. The effort towards this has to be top-driven, facilitating the private sector in collaboration with public-sector undertakings and strategic collaboration with foreign original equipment manufacturers to not only ‘Make in India’ for domestic consumption but also for export to make for the world.  

A dispassionate assessment of recent conflicts that have employed air power provides lessons that are contextual and cannot be universally applied. Israel-Iran and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflicts have both witnessed the employment of air power in situations that have had an asymmetric force ratio with respect to the respective adversaries. Ukraine, without a credible air force consisting of manned aircraft, has used drones, missiles and asymmetric unconventional tactics to carry out offensive action and ensure air denial to the Russian Air Force (VKS).   VKS, doctrinally employed in support of the surface forces, being vastly superior to the Ukrainian Air Force, has not been able to achieve military objectives. Similarly, Iran, without significant manned aircraft capability, has used drones, but with limited effect. Israel and the United States have both used their air forces with telling effect to inflict damage on Iranian nuclear infrastructure and military leadership. The jury is out on whether this would deter Iran from pursuing its nuclear weapons programme. These operations, therefore, though tactically brilliant in execution, may prove to be futile in the use of air power to achieve political objectives.  

The asymmetry between the IAF and PAF over the years has continued to decrease in favour of Pakistan, while that between the IAF and PLAAF has continued to increase in favour of China. The technological gap between India and China continues to increase, and this would indirectly affect the IAF during a face-off with Pakistan as well, due to the latter’s ‘higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans’ relationship with China. The IAF has repeatedly vindicated the faith reposed in its capability by the political leadership; however, much needs to be done to enhance its capacity and keep its cutting edge sharpened. With the IAF and air power as the instrument of choice for military action, the nation would do well to ensure that the ‘utility of force’ should not turn into ‘futility of force’.