Pin-point power

These projectiles can travel long and short distances, strike targets with pinpoint accuracy and overwhelm air defences. Iranian missile barrages tend to arrive in salvos and are often complemented with swarms of Shahed drones.

Russia, too, has employed short-range precision-guided ballistic missiles such as the Iskander-M that damaged the United States’ Patriot air defence system in Ukraine. It has also used Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles against Ukrainian infrastructure from standoff ranges.

India, during  Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, used its own precision-guided missiles such as the advanced supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles, alongside foreign-sourced SCALP and HAMMER missiles. 

“In today’s world, particularly since we (India) are seeing wars in two theatres, what matters is not whether a weapon is called a rocket or a missile but whether it can find its target and survive modern air defences,” said Group Captain Ajey Lele (retired), deputy director general at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. 

“If you do a saturation raid, then definitely there is a possibility that a certain amount of penetration can happen.”

India’s missile arsenal has become more diverse over the past two decades. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, which can be launched from land, sea or air, is perhaps India’s most successful missile, which has secured export orders from the Philippines and Indonesia. BrahMos’s speed falls between Mach 2.8 and 3.0 (approx. 3,400–3,700 km/h) and its operational range has been extended from the original 290 km to over 450–800 km.

The Agni missiles, particularly the Agni 5 missile with a strike range of more than 5,000 km, represent India’s strategic precision weapons system. This missile marks the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) for India and can be fitted with nuclear warheads.

The high-level guidance systems, along with the manoeuvrability of the re-entry vehicle, ensure the precision needed to launch conventional attacks against an enemy.

For tactical operations, India has designed the Pralay quasi-ballistic missile, which has a strike range of 150-500 km and can be used for tactical purposes because it is harder to intercept than a conventional ballistic missile.

India also possesses the Astra Mark-1 BVRAAM, or beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, which is based on an indigenous design by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). It can be launched from a fighter aircraft with the ability to engage enemy aircraft from distances exceeding 100 km. Its active radar seeker provides “fire-and-forget” capability, meaning the launching aircraft can manoeuvre away immediately after launch. 

The Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system, also called the Baby Brahmos, offers high-precision and low-cost area saturation strikes. It was developed by the DRDO and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) and marks India’s first public-private partnership in missile manufacturing.

“India has built a comprehensive missile arsenal; the range extends from short-range tactical weapons to intercontinental ballistic missiles, all supported by indigenous solid propellant technology,” Rajaram Nagappa, visiting professor at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, said.

Despite these capabilities, India’s precision warfare capabilities remain fragmented, with serious gaps in the whole architecture.  

“Right now, there is a little bit of a mess. Many of the atomic clocks on the system are not working. We are dependent on only three navigation satellites, (whereas) you need a minimum of four to give you targeting,” Nagappa said. 

Precision-guidance requires a reliable satellite network. Iran had access to China’s Beidou-3 for its strikes. India has the Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC) system, which proved crucial during Operation Sindoor, providing high-precision positioning data for missile guidance and drone navigation. 

Unlike the global positioning system or Beidou, which are global systems, NavIC is regional. It’s a seven-satellite constellation which was intended to ensure that India would not be dependent on foreign services during a conflict.

But NavIc has its own problems, as it has a limited range of around 1,500 km around India and relies on ageing satellites. On March 10, the last atomic clock on board the Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System-1F (IRNSS-1F) stopped functioning. It is a strategic vulnerability, as most long-range missiles carry inertial navigation systems, and they need periodic correction from a satellite navigation system. 

Scale vs time 

Precision-guidance is not just about technology; it is also about production. A missile that takes two years to make cannot be used in a war that lasts only two months. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown this clearly. Both sides have burned up missiles rapidly, forcing them to grab new missiles wherever they can, foraging parts from old missiles and, in some cases, buying from other countries.

Iran’s stockpile of missiles is also limited. Its way out is to use swarm drones and cheap missiles to try and overwhelm air defences, while keeping precision-guided missiles for striking major targets. Its major production centres and launchpads are underground. 

India’s defence industrial base has made significant strides in producing precision-guided munitions (PGMs). In the past, production was primarily carried out by the Ordnance Factory Board; it is now being carried out by the private sector and government entities like the DRDO and Bharat Dynamics Ltd. Recently, there has been increased participation of private sector firms such as Larsen & Toubro, TASL and Solar Industries in the production process.

“Somewhere in the planning of producing in numbers, we take a back seat,” Nagappa said.

The issue is not whether India can produce PGMs — it is whether it can produce enough of them, and quickly enough to sustain a prolonged conflict. 

The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence has flagged this issue, urging the government to “manufacture precision weapons in large numbers and at low cost”.

“Why should you produce in numbers if only for yourself? If you have an export market, you can think in various ways. Don’t put shackles on industry by saying you can make it only for India. Tell them to make it for the world. BrahMos is a prime example,” Nagappa added.

Precision is transforming the very structure of armed conflict. The term “no-contact warfare” is sometimes used to describe conflicts where adversaries strike each other without direct troop engagements, ground invasions, or drawing conventional battle lines. 

While no conflict is truly “no-contact” (there are always sensors, missiles, and drones involved), the phrase captures the changing nature of warfare where precise strikes allow nations to project power and achieve strategic effects without committing large ground forces.

The implications for India are profound. “India has got a very capable and well-established missile system which is battle-tested as well,” Lele said. 

But capability is not the same as readiness. A precision-guided arsenal is only useful if it is integrated into a coherent doctrine that accounts for India’s unique geography and threat environment.

India faces two distinct theatres, Pakistan and China — each with different geography and capabilities. The western theatre (Pakistan) is relatively compact, with most targets within a 500-km range. The northern theatre (China) is vast, with critical targets spread across mountainous territory thousands of kilometres from Indian launch points. A doctrine that works for one theatre doesn’t necessarily work for the other.

“A blind comparison that a country has some type of missile, so I also should have a similar type of missile, may not be correct. It all will depend on India’s doctrines, made based on geography, our capabilities and adversaries’ capabilities,” Lele said. 

It means India cannot simply copy the US approach of relying on air-launched cruise missiles from stand-off ranges. It just doesn’t have the same kind of air superiority or a network of bases around the world.  

“We have got multiple types of launcher systems, rail launch systems, truck launch systems, mobile launch systems and all that. So it will depend on the theatre, on the type of threat which we are addressing, and on which type of missile system needs to be used.”

Neither can India simply replicate the Russian approach of massed ballistic missile strikes, because Russia’s inventory is larger and its tolerance for collateral damage is different. 

Rocket force needed

India’s missile arsenal will remain fragmented until there is a dedicated missile force that can bring all missiles under one roof. Post-Operation-Sindoor, Pakistan announced its own rocket force, the Army Rocket Force Command.

It is broadly modelled on China’s People's Liberation Army Rocket Force and includes the Fatah-I, Fatah-II, and Fatah-4 projectiles, with ranges extending to 750 km. 

Currently, India’s missile and rocket inventory is scattered across different branches. The Corps of Army Air Defence handles some, the artillery regiments others. The Air Force and Navy maintain their own separate inventories. Neither is there a unified command.

“A dedicated rocket force gives you certain advantages in terms of planning. Some short-range missiles are essentially artillery-variety weapons. 

As far as logistics go, there are certain advantages to a rocket force,” Nagappa said. 

“Also, in that case, you introduce a certain level of ambiguity — all missiles perhaps need not be strategic missiles. Some may be carrying conventional warheads. Externally, they look the same.”

Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, speaking on Army Day in January, made the position unambiguous. “We are looking towards a rocket-missile force because Pakistan has established a rocket force, and China has also created such a force. It is the need of the hour,” he said.

The debate over a rocket force cannot be separated from the larger theatre command reorganisation exercise that India is currently undertaking. Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has indicated that the theaterisation plan is in its final stages and may soon be sent to the defence ministry.

Under the proposed structure, India would establish three theatre commands — Western, Northern, and Maritime — each with cross-service deputy commanders. Strategic assets like the airborne warning and control system, air-to-air refuellers and electronic warfare aircraft would remain under central control for allocation to theatres as required.

So where does a rocket force fit into this structure? The answer is not yet clear. That’s because the systems are there, the structure is not. General Chauhan’s efforts may change that state of affairs.