Small country, big play

  That lesson has not aged. More than two centuries later, India and China compete for influence in the Indian Ocean region, a place which has traditionally been seen as an area of Indian influence. In this setting, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Maldives carry weight that far exceeds their size. 

  India shifted from a passive role to a muscular one in the 1980s, spurred by its Operation Cactus to thwart a coup attempt against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in the Maldives in 1988. It has engaged in similar engagements in Seychelles and Mauritius over the years to enforce its role as the “net security provider” in the region. 

  However, that has changed in recent years. Long subservient to the big powers, these island states are now asserting themselves over port access, defence cooperation and overall maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean region.

  These areas contain some of the world’s most vital sea lines of communication as links between Europe, Africa, and Asia. Access to or control of these exclusive economic zones (EEZs) contributes to world trade patterns, including energy resources necessary to sustain South and East Asia.

  And with the rise of China, they have shown a willingness to diversify their security partners. “The biggest mistake would be assuming that India has a sphere of influence over these countries,” David Brewster, senior research fellow at the Australian National University’s Security College, said. 

“They do not want to be within anyone’s sphere of influence; they want to pursue their own destiny and development objectives.” 

  This became evident in late 2023 when Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu openly declared that he would reduce India’s military presence on the island. The build-up followed an “India out” campaign — something that surfaces sporadically in Maldivian politics. Dattesh Parulekar, assistant professor at the School of International Studies, University of Goa, cited the Maldives campaign as “a good example” of how island-states are behaving.  

“Muizzu's disparaging remarks against India’s regional leadership, for instance, were twinned with a visible outreach to China, prompting speculation about deeper Chinese involvement in the Maldives’ maritime infrastructure,” Parulekar said.

  India responded calmly to the incident. By signalling a stronger maritime posture in the Indian Ocean, including enhanced activity and importance around Lakshadweep, India made it clear that excessive Chinese alignment would have strategic consequences.

  At the same time, India avoided coercion. Instead of exploiting the Maldives’ financial vulnerabilities, India rescheduled loans and provided a soft landing. 

  This approach has paid dividends: The rhetoric of Maldivian leaders softened, Indian investment resumed, and even a limited Indian defence presence was accepted. 

  “These island states are acutely aware that they are small players in a much larger geopolitical contest. None of them wants to be caught between India and China,” Parulekar added.  

  China wades in

  Although China is considered a new player in the region, its traces actually go back centuries. It is the only country that has embassies in all the major island states like the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Comoros, and Seychelles. 

  Beyond diplomatic engagement, China offers economic and infrastructure support to these countries through its Belt and Road Initiative. In the Maldives, China has built the Sinamale bridge, also known as the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge.

  It is also building housing, airports and providing water schemes for the residents of the island. 

  Maldivian leaders, particularly Muizzu, have reached out to China by expanding their cooperation, including elevating ties to a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership”, and increasing economic cooperation and tourism.

  In March 2024, the Maldives signed a military assistance agreement with China that provided it with gratis military aid. It is the first such agreement in Maldivian history. 

  In Mauritius, China has invested in the capital, Port Louis and is upgrading container and logistics facilities to promote Mauritius as a maritime logistics hub. It has supported smart city projects that house integrated housing and commercial IT infrastructure. 

China has also provided financial cooperation agreements and credit lines, which have positioned Mauritius as a gateway for Africa-Asia trade. It has helped Mauritius by providing patrol boats and surveillance equipment to monitor its EEZs.

  Seychelles has also seen its share of Chinese investment. China has helped in modernising Port Victoria, increasing its capacity to handle large vessels. It has invested heavily in renewable projects in the islands. Chinese investment has also helped develop fisheries and tourism, both of which are crucial to the Seychellian economy. 

  In short, China has massively increased its presence around the region, and these island states need all the development and defence support they can get. At the same time, they are aware of the pitfalls of relying on Chinese loans and investment. They risk losing their strategic autonomy and leverage in the region if they rely too much on a single global superpower like China.

The infamous “debt trap diplomacy”, where China provides excessive loans to financially vulnerable countries to extract financial and political leverage in case of failure of payment, has already gripped many states in the region.

  In 2017, Sri Lanka had to give its strategic Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned company for a 99-year lease because it could not pay the debt it took to build the port.

  “There is more awareness now of the potential pitfalls of Chinese engagement, but smaller states need as many development options as possible; by necessity, this includes China,” Nlalathi Samaranayake, adjunct fellow at the Washington, DC-based think-tank East-West Center, said.  

Two visions 

  As China’s footprint expands in the region, India's approach, by contrast, has been more incremental and relationship-driven.

While India has also invested in infrastructure, the emphasis has been more on capacity building, maritime domain awareness, disaster relief management and governance cooperation. In March 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Mahasagar (Mutual and holistic advancement for security and growth across regions) doctrine, which expands on the previous Sagar (Security and growth for all in the region) doctrine but places increased emphasis on regional cooperation and sustainable growth.  

However, India’s biggest advantage in the region is not infrastructure or finance — it is people. Nearly two-thirds of the population in Mauritius, for instance, is of Indian origin.  

In Seychelles, too, there is a strong business and professional community of people of Indian origin, while the Maldives, despite not having a large settled diaspora, has longstanding people-to-people links through tourism, trade, education, and medical travel.

  India has developed joint EEZ surveillance arrangements, conducted hydrographic cooperation with Seychelles, and trained  personnel from island states in coastal security and maritime operations.

  It also has some strategic assets in the region. In Seychelles, India operates a naval facility and a network of radar systems across islands like Mahe, Alphonso, and Assumption Island to combat piracy and maritime traffic. 

  On Mauritius’s Agalega Island, India has developed a 3,000 metre airstrip and surveillance facilities. In the Maldives, India operates a chain of coastal surveillance radar stations along the archipelago. After a brief period of unrest in 2024, Indian military personnel were replaced by civilian ones, but the infrastructure remains integral to the regional security grid. 

  India’s Minicoy island near the Maldives remains crucial for maintaining surveillance in the Arabian Sea. “India’s attention to environmental security in the Indian Ocean is more comprehensive than what China currently offers,” Samaranayake said.

  But it also faces internal capacity limits and industrial bottlenecks, as highlighted in a recent Financial Times report showing India’s naval modernisation to be lagging behind China’s rapidly expanding maritime capabilities. The result is a subtle but significant difference in engagement style. China’s model leans on large-scale economic inducements and infrastructure access, while India emphasises sustained cooperation and mutual capacity enhancement. 

  “Under Modi 3.0, there has been a clear recognition that projects must be completed on time. In regions where China is known for speed, delays can damage goodwill; timely execution is India’s strongest currency,” Parulekar said. “India’s initiatives must be need-based, environmentally conscious, and financially viable. This approach reassures island states and helps dilute, though not eliminate, China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.” 

  For island states, this offers options rather than binaries, but it also means they can extract greater leverage from their relationships with both powers.

  The powerplay in the Indian Ocean cannot be solely viewed through the lens of India-China rivalry. The United States remains a key player in the region. It operates one of its most strategic bases, Diego Garcia, jointly with the United Kingdom. This maintains strategic reach from the Middle East to East Asia.

  However, the ousted islanders of Diego Garcia (Chagos Islands) have waged a long-running court battle to reclaim their strategically significant island, which currently serves as an important Western airbase. 

  This campaign is not only supported by Mauritius, which used to have sovereignty over the island until the British evicted native islanders, but by India as well, which has long backed Mauritian sovereignty. 

  India’s role was acknowledged by the Mauritian Prime Minister in March 2025 when he publicly thanked Modi and awarded him The Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, Mauritius’ highest civilian honour.  In April 2025, reports emerged of the deployment of B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia.

  Russia, an unlikely player, will also gain access to the Indian Ocean with a planned base in Port Sudan. In addition, Russian ships can use Indian bases for refuelling, repair, and logistical services through the RELOS (Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support) pact, signed in February 2025.

  Leverage and challenges

  For India, this new multipolarity presents both opportunities and disadvantages. One of the best examples of this is the Maldives. 

  Thanks in part to economic aid, as well as currency exchange agreements, India has managed to calm the Maldivian storm.

Mauritius is another case where an island state is leveraging its strategic location to enter into defence partnerships with big powers.

  In March 2025, India upgraded its partnership with Mauritius to a more comprehensive strategic partnership, which primarily focused on military partnerships, combined maritime observation, and capacity building according to Mauritius’ specifications. 

  This included support for the development of a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre as well as increasing cooperation on hydrography and emergency operations.

  Seychelles, too, has tried to maintain various partners and ensure its own sovereignty. Indian assistance includes the transfer of coastguard boats and the provision of coastal radar and training services aimed at helping the Seychelles government monitor its enormous EEZ. 

  Communal hydrographic activity and improved nautical charts of the Seychelles EEZ reflect an engagement that extends beyond political influence to technical cooperation.

  Island states’ leverage in the Indian Ocean is not only about geopolitics; it is also rooted in non-traditional security challenges that shape national priorities. 

  Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and the vulnerability of economic infrastructure make climate resilience a central concern for the Maldives, Seychelles, and others.

  India’s attention to these issues, from disaster relief to coastal surveillance and capacity building, is widely appreciated by the Indian Ocean partners. Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam hailed India as a "first responder" for its rapid humanitarian aid following Cyclone Chido in Agaléga in early 2025. Analysts point out that this emphasis on environmental and human security matters greatly to littoral states, perhaps more than abstract great-power competition.  “Island states are on the frontlines of dealing with environmental challenges. India’s attention to non-traditional security threats like cyclones and flooding is greatly appreciated by smaller Indian Ocean countries,” Samaranayake said. Two centuries after the Battle of Grand Port, the lesson endures. In the Indian Ocean, it is not only fleets and firepower that matter but the ability to maintain a strategic vision. The islands still hold the key.