'This is the need of the hour'

The Pakistan side was completely blind, not only during those days when they lost this offensive on the 10th (May 10, 2025, when the ceasefire was declared), but even after three-four days. They were not sure as to what they’ve been able to do. Because of this, we were able to control the escalation -- that is one important thing. Had we not known what we hit, we would have continued with that same speed and ferocity, which would have led to an escalation beyond some limits. 

We were able to choose the timing of ceasing hostilities when we were on top. I knew when they (Pakistan) first spoke (via military hotline) at 9:30 am (on May 10) that okay they wanted to talk, but we continued so that the margin of victory was absolute, and it also helped us to terminate the conflict when we wanted.

There is a huge propensity to use force when getting into conflict, if you look at (some other) nations, but they don’t know how to exit. Operation Sindoor was unique in that. We were able to quit. That is because of better situational awareness at basically every level.

It took about 15 days for India’s military reprisal against Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack (April 22, 2025). Did the time you got help?

Those 15 days were utilised for a number of activities, not one, right from coordination at the very apex level to inter-service coordination and mobilization. We couldn’t have just started a war without preparing. Then we didn’t know that it would end in four days. We had to be prepared for longer. To prepare for that kind of a conflict you require some time. You’ve got to move people, air-defence resources and understand what capabilities exist with each service, as per the situation. Say, we were able to use even naval capabilities in mountains. 

All these require time. Understanding targets. It’s like I throw a chalk that will pass through that knob (gestures). That is the kind of accuracy we displayed (with precision weapons). 

How does it happen? What is the weather (in an operational situation)? What are the speeds of the winds? What time of the day? What is the target? What is the height of the target? 

And things keep changing. Today, if there are some people here, tomorrow they may not be there. Then you shift to something else. This was going on, on the one side, coordination at the national level on the other side, (and) coordination among services on another side.

Is India better equipped to handle asymmetric warfare with Pakistan?

Pakistan’s philosophy of using proxy war or asymmetric war — I think they don’t understand it — but it’s a strategy of diminishing returns. When I say this, it is because with every act of terrorism, major act of terrorism, new space for conventional operations is created (for India): Uri (2016), Balakot (2019), Sindoor (2025). When I say more space for conventional operations, I am not talking about more spatial distances, that of course, and (the) depth is there, it is force levels, it is domains. 

You talk about preparations, that’s the operative part of the question. There are two things. One, is to deter, so that people are deterred and do not use this as a policy. And second is to prevent. The armed forces are more towards building deterrence than prevention. The armed forces are part of it (prevention), but it is the intelligence agencies, the state governments. All of us have to work together to see that such incidents don’t occur. 

Has overall deterrence improved? 

Preparation is basically prevention and then being able to act, as we have demonstrated. We are well-prepared now to handle. The Prime Minister (Narendra Modi) has said there’s a new normal. What’s the new normal? He said talks and terror will not go together. India will reply to cross-border terrorism, and perpetrators and their handlers will be treated as one, but that means a higher level of preparedness.

How are things along the border with China, including India’s operational readiness and infrastructure development? Is disengagement total and what about de-escalation (since the 2020 Galwan River valley clash)?

In October 2024, India had an agreement with China, and based on that, both sides have been able to restore their respective patrolling rights. The disengagement in Depsang and Demchok (eastern Ladakh) is complete. Having said that, de-escalation, formal de-escalation through talks hasn’t taken place. But yes, unilateral de-escalation has taken place. At least we see it on the Chinese side. I would say the situation on the border currently is peaceful, both sides are following the agreed protocols for maintaining peace and tranquillity.

As far as our preparation levels are concerned, what one can say is that we had rebalanced our forces from the western border to the north. By now, they have spent about four or five winters, so they’re well-settled. Well-settled in the sense, when they (had) moved in, probably they didn’t have the place to stay. You’re moving, say, 50,000-60,000 troops. Now, the infrastructure for them is there, billeting is there, their equipment is there, maintaining that equipment is there. We just moved in like that (after June 15, 2020). You have to maintain that equipment, you have to live there, your supplies, your rations, your stocks for fighting. So, all are in place. That way this preparedness level is high. 

Regarding infrastructure, you are aware that we are working on the Shinku La Tunnel (a strategically located twin-tube highway tunnel built by the Border Roads Organisation) for alternate access. We are working on two-three access (points) across Rohtang (a mountain pass in Himachal Pradesh). We got the Nyoma airfield (of the Indian Air Force in Ladakh) done. We are also working on Zoji La Tunnel (connects Jammu and Kashmir to Ladakh). We are working on multiple access and all-weather connectivity to Ladakh, so that will increase our operational preparedness (further). We won’t have to stock for winters if it (the routes) is open throughout.

You said de-escalation through talks hasn’t happened. Did you mean military-to-military talks?

Yes.

Would that happen sometime?

I’m not sure, but on the other hand, the WMCC (the Working Mechanism for Consultations and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs) talks to improve the situation on the border are being held. The SR-level (special representatives, a high India-China government channel) talks are on. All this  will create a better atmosphere.

Do you have any comment on China’s support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor? Recently, Chinese state TV aired a show on which an engineer said he was present at a support base in Pakistan during the May conflict.

Three things: One is fact, one is reasonable assumption, and one would be fiction or speculation. We know that Pakistan is dependent on China for 80 percent of its equipment (defence). That’s a fact. When you buy an equipment from a foreign original equipment manufacturer (FOEM), it is the responsibility of that FOEM to maintain the equipment. After all, it’s bought for war. It’s not that they’re helping them in targeting, but they are maintaining their equipment. Chinese weapons would obviously be working on the Beidou (navigation satellite system). So, that is also a given.

Our systems will work on, say, maybe Navic (the Navigation with Indian Constellation system) or GPS, but they also may have a third option of working on Glonass (Russia’s space-based radio navigation system). That’s globally known. 

You can’t really say that’s help unless, of course, in that system, the classified part is being used. 

The third thing is ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) -- that’s your satellite imagery and all. Today, you can buy it from Planet X, Maxar, you can buy it from Chinese companies. They’re also commercially available. They (Pakistan) probably didn’t rely much on American companies, they relied more on Chinese companies, but that’s a commercial transaction.

Although when the Pakistani ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations, the communications arm of the Pakistan military) briefed (the media) on Indian ships’ deployment (the Indian Navy’s forward deployment), especially the carrier battle group, during the conflict, between May 7 and 10, they regularly said that the Indian carrier battle group was here or there – they were way off the mark. Either they were faking it or they might have got it from somewhere else. It was highly inaccurate. Because they didn’t have the capability to fly this long-range maritime aircraft. They were all close to their airspace, whereas the ships were operating here.  

But no classified information was out?

If Pakistanis and Chinese were sharing, how would we know? But if they were passing classified information on our ships, it was inaccurate.

The United States has 11 commands, based on geography and function. China has five commands within the country. How will India organise the integrated theatre commands and what will their mandates be?

America’s concept of theatre command is absolutely different because they’ve got an expeditionary role for the forces. They have assumed global responsibilities. They have an Indo-Pacific command, a European command, an Africa command, a Central Command, etc. 

If you look at the Chinese model, it’s not so. What they’ve done is they’ve divided the geography of their country into the five commands. And, especially, Tibet and Xinjiang remain not only an operational part but also administrative.

For us, our system is unique in itself. We are not insular or inward-looking. We would rather look outside our borders and beyond, or the LC (the Line of Control, the de facto border with Pakistan) and beyond. And, the entire country’s geography would be taken as one entity. 

Our regional commands had divided the country’s geography into various parts: Western Command, Southwestern Command, Southern Command, etc. That evolved from British times when they wanted to control India, not look at outside challenges. We’ve reversed that. The rest of the country could be one (entity), and we are looking outside. It’s different from the Chinese model, it’s absolutely different from the American model.

Would there be two broad categories?

That’s the geography of India is taken as one entity and we look beyond that. 

There are two adversaries. There will be something. There’ll be something in the maritime domain (too). These are as per our challenges and threats.

When do you think the Cabinet Committee on Security clearance might come through?

I’ve said this on occasion (before) that it should have come during my time. But I was late by about six or eight months because of Operation Sindoor. We just did not get the time to carry forward with the deliberations. Otherwise, I would have the time to finish my deliberations and present it to the government. I was only able to submit my report recently.

Is the document complete?

Yes.

If the announcement is made, would the new integrated theatre commands function from next year?

No. From the day the government decides that they’re okay with theatre commands, between our recommendations and whatever they accept, from then it should take one-and-a-half to two years to implement. This is a process -- getting the required man power, vehicles, everything will take some finite time. There will be a lot of churning between the three service headquarters. So this whole process, I assume, will take somewhere around 18 to 24 months for operationalisation.

You are hopeful it will move in that direction?

Yes.

The US projects power globally. China has been projecting power beyond the South China Sea. Does India consider itself a regional power and is the theatre command tied to ambition?

Rather than saying regional power or superpower, we should consider that India has responsibilities both on the continental and in the maritime domains. Whatever we create should balance out the threats, the challenges and the opportunities we have in these two domains. Maybe we have more opportunities in the maritime domain than threats and challenges right now and more threats and challenges on the continental domain. In the future, there could be opportunity there also if we settled borders.

Will the 17 existing commands in India be dismantled to create the new structure?

It can’t all be done together. We’ll do some restructuring but they’ll exist, (as mentioned) in the report which I have submitted. Some restructuring of these (will happen), but they are fundamental for warfighting right now. You can’t change everything together.

So, you’re saying phase them out?

No, not exactly. There’ll be better people than me after four or five years of running this, how they want to see it in future (is up to them). The theatre command, what we have proposed, is not the panacea, that it will be for 20 years or 30 years. We are experimenting. We create an organisation, we run it, we see the efficiency and improve upon it. In our final report, we also said this is not an end in itself.

Some say India has fought wars without theatre commands over almost 80 years. Why now?

Wars are different today, the durations are different, (and) the force application is different. We are using force from multiple domains to achieve those objective -- political objectives. It’s a complex process today. We also hear that when nations fight war, a whole-of-government approach is required. How will you have a whole-of-government approach when the three services are separated out? The whole of government means the three services have to integrate first, so that there is a common point for others to interact, like the intelligence agencies. This is the need of the hour.

You’re asking why now? We should have thought about this 10 years back. We are already behind. Right now, geopolitically, this is a most turbulent time, when there is an increasing propensity to use force. And who’s using force against whom is also not clear. You never know who will fight whom tomorrow or the day after. In this condition you require an integrated approach of threat assessment and force application. We can’t have the air force doing force application separately, the intelligence agencies working separately, the navy doing its job separately. We all have to do it together.

Are there any service-specific issues left unresolved? 

I don’t think so.

Self-reliance supports “strategic autonomy” but there is a shortage of fighter jets, for instance, partly owing to long delivery timelines. What should be done to hasten production? 

We have to have a very innovative mindset, and keep discussing how force will be applied in the future. All armed forces are suppose to learn lessons from previous wars and apply them. But now people are thinking of fighting today’s war with tomorrow’s technology, tomorrow’s methods and tomorrow’s weapon systems. This is an ideal situation, but when it comes to ground (realities) you find that there’s a finite amount of time to translate an idea into a system and get it into a weapon. New platforms are difficult to make. It takes years. What is faster now is the integration business. You can integrate multiple radars to have a common operating picture for new kinds of challenges. New things are coming in. We must focus on them. On that, we would be able to deliver faster than an aeroengine or a platform. Today, your capability to apply force has increased many folds because of this. I’m not saying that you don’t require modern warfighting platforms -- they are needed -- but we also require a different way of using artificial intelligence, using data analytics to fight better. We have sufficient strength there. We should follow that. In defence production, we have found different models, the government has undertaken many reforms, got the private industry rolling in, and the ordinance factories have been corporatised. 

Is India’s defence budget at less than 2 per cent of the GDP sufficient for modernising the armed forces?

You can’t predict prices after about 10 years -- what technology or weapons systems would be used. But with our existing plans for acquisition, suppose we continue to grow at 8 per cent (economic growth) with 10 per cent increase year-on-year in the defence budget, whatever we require for the armed forces, as we foresee now, we should be able to manage within 2 per cent of the GDP.

I have assumed that we’ll look at platforms, tanks, etc. It may not take into account a sudden disruptive technology. In this budgeting, one of the thought processes is that you should set aside at least some percent of your capital budget every year for disruptive technologies. Who knew that we would be introducing drones in such large numbers? When something like this happens, you should be able to meet the requirement, otherwise, we’ll only go for planned procurement. Procedurally, you’ll have to change things, your mindset will have to change. Both those things will have to happen together. Ultimately, whether it is about strategic autonomy or the forces not getting the best equipment, there’ll always be a debate, but now there’s a great realisation within the services that there is no alternate way. We have to do this -- make it in India. It gives you major advantage. If I have the Astra (an indigenous beyond visual-range air-to-air missile), you don’t know at what range I am firing. But if I buy a similar kind of missile from somewhere else, the world will know what capabilities it has. At the same time, when it comes to critical technology such as aeroengine, if we can’t make it ourselves, we have to get into a JV (joint venture). That’s the practical thing to do. Traditional platforms will assume lower importance. Whereas air defence, missile defence are new things -- we should be able to re-prioritise within that. This is a very dynamic process. 

Doesn’t India need a strong defence-industrial base? 

We are trying to build. The basic building blocks are there. (But) we could have done better. Today, every company is competing for every kind of product. Companies should specialise in what is niche to them (gives examples: vehicles, guns or aircraft).

Is policy going to help?

I have spoken to the SIDM (Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers) and others many times, they know that they (companies) should specialise, but they’re not able to get their house in order. It will level out after a few years. 

What about spending on defence research in India?

At present, everything is happening only from the government side. We should utilise the scale we have and involve congruence. We have 22 IITs (Indian Institute of Technology). Why can’t we use that (the world’s second-largest base of STEM graduates)? Money alone is not the question. Scale is also important. 

You retire on May 30. What would you like your legacy to be?

I leave behind a legacy of trust among the three services.