A post-poll re-emergence of Japan

The much-debated Article 9 of the Constitution is noteworthy here, reading: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”

To accomplish this objective, land, sea and air forces, and other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the country will not be acknowledged, it added.

But a series of major developments in Asia soon after the end of the Second World War created opportunities for Japan’s economic revival and limited rearmament. The advent of the Cold War and the victory of communist forces in China in 1949, the Korean War of 1950-53, and the fear of communism sweeping across Asia transformed Japan’s role in the emerging US-Pacific strategy. A peace treaty between the US and Japan was signed in 1951 in San Francisco, and, in parallel, a bilateral security treaty was concluded. This made Japan a treaty ally of the US. In 1954, the US occupation of Japan formally ended, and Japan was permitted to rebuild its military forces. The Constitution was reinterpreted to allow the establishment of so-called land, maritime and air Self-Defence Forces (SDF), solely for defending the homeland. However, Japan declared its three non-nuclear principles: Prohibiting the introduction, storage, and use of nuclear weapons in Japanese territory. While this reflects the popular aversion to nuclear weapons in a country traumatised by the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan has remained under a US nuclear umbrella since it became a treaty ally of the US.

Political opinion in Japan has been divided between those who seek a revision of the Constitution, particularly Article 9, and those who still cling to the pacific orientation of the country. There are shades of opinion between these two ends of the spectrum. As Japan has emerged as a substantial economic power, it has sought to graduate towards a concomitant role as a military power. This has been inhibited due to its remaining a junior ally of the US and its fear of igniting negative sentiment in countries of Asia, particularly China, which were victims of Japanese imperialism during the first half of the 20th century. Some notable developments have occurred in recent years. For example, under the nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006-07 and 2012-20), the efforts to amend the Constitution gathered momentum. Article 9 was reinterpreted in 2015 to allow the SDF “to exercise collective self-defense and engage in overseas missions”. The SDF could henceforth defend allies under attack and provide logistical support in “existential situations”.

While Abe was unable to achieve his aim of amending Article 9 altogether, this reinterpretation was a major step towards transforming Japan into a “normal” military power commensurate with its economic power.

The election of Sanae Takaichi, a well-known acolyte of Abe, as Japan’s Prime Minister in the recent elections sets the stage for a renewed push towards the amendment of Article 9 as envisioned by Abe. Takaichi is Japan’s first woman PM and, more importantly, has led her party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to a super-majority in the lower house of the Japanese Parliament, winning 316 of the 465 seats. Her coalition partner, Ishin No Kai, or the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) won 36 seats, making the total ruling bloc 352 seats.

This is unprecedented in Japan’s post-World War II history and marks many firsts. Takaichi enjoys enormous popularity, particularly among the Japanese youth. The victory of her party has been almost entirely due to her personal appeal among the voters across generations. While she will be focused on Japan’s economic revival, her tenure is likely to transform the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. This will have major implications for India’s security posture in its extended neighbourhood.

While Takaichi has more than the constitutional amendment, a two-thirds majority in the lower house, but another requirement is to secure a two-thirds majority in the upper house, too. Thereafter, the amendment has to be passed through a national referendum. However, expectedly, given the overall popular sentiment for such an amendment, the opposition parties, now considerably weakened politically, may not be against the initiative. In any event, Takaichi is committed to enhanced defence expenditure, already at 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) but likely to go up to 3 per cent. Currently at $58 billion, Japan’s defence expenditure is ranked among the top 10 military spenders in the world. What should one expect during Takaichi’s tenure regarding Japan’s security profile and role in the Indo-Pacific?

Contextually, it is instructive to examine the 10-point consensus reached between the LDP and the JIP before the elections. Among these is an explicit commitment to seek an early revision of the three basic security documents: The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Program, originally adopted in December 2022. These documents represented a more proactive approach to Japanese defence, going beyond its own sovereign territory and emphasising “counterstrike” capabilities against potential adversaries rather than the passive defence of the homeland. The NSS stated that “there is a need for a strategic approach to build defense capabilities that can deter, prevent and eliminate aggression by other countries by focusing on capabilities that pose concrete threats and anticipate ways of fighting 5 or 10 years hence”.

The NDS added that “in the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War 2, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals”.

One may see this as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the growing assertiveness of China, and the emerging Russia-China alliance. It was also a reflection of growing doubts about the credibility of US security assurances in view of the relative decline in its power, especially vis-à-vis China.

The LDP-JIP coalition is determined to go beyond the three security documents in expanding Japan’s capabilities on this count and its role in Asia. These include the early implementation of the target of 2 per cent of GDP in military expenditure, removing restrictions on defence exports, enhancing capabilities to enable counterstrikes against enemy bases, and strengthening intelligence capabilities through the establishment of a “National Intelligence Bureau” and an external intelligence agency. There would be early legislation on anti-espionage laws. Of particular interest to India is the commitment to enhance defence capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

Noteworthy is a commitment to discuss a possible review of the “three non-nuclear principles”, that is, Japan’s longstanding policy of prohibiting the entry, storage, or use of nuclear weapons in its territory. In view of recent reports that the country may rethink its policy on abjuring a nuclear-weapons capability, this proposed review deserves careful attention.

These measures would transform Japan into a formidable economic and military power.

Takaichi is committed to the US-Japan military alliance and has established a good relationship with the US President Donald Trump. He has welcomed her landslide election victory and will host her in Washington in March. However, Takaichi is aware of the growing doubts about the efficacy of the US security guarantee of Japanese defence, and the acquisition of enhanced capabilities would also boost Japanese agency in assuring self-defence. Japan’s security is closely linked to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, through which much of Japan's overseas trade is done, and energy supplies are carried. A Chinese military takeover of Taiwan would be what the Japanese call an “existential situation”, which would trigger a military response in collaboration with allies. This was already declared in the 2015 reinterpretation of Article 9 referred to earlier. During a meeting of the lower house of Japan’s Parliament on November 7, 2025, Takaichi said that if China conducted a naval blockade of Taiwan, it would constitute a “survival-threatening situation”, which could prompt Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence. There was a fierce reaction from China, which demanded that she retract her statement. Takaichi has stood her ground, and this may have enhanced her stature going into the elections. However, what would be more worrying for Japan is the reported counsel of restraint conveyed by Trump in a subsequent phone call to Takaichi. This may have followed an earlier call to Trump by Chinese President Xi Jinping, complaining about Takaichi’s statement. It would have been noted in Japan that instead of supporting its ally on this issue, Trump chose to act as a mediator instead. Though Takaichi’s visit to Washington this month may see a reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance, it is already clear that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy is no longer a stable anchor of regional security. Japan is responding by building its own deterrence. It will also seek to strengthen its security partnership with other major powers in the region, such as South Korea, Australia, and India.

The Quadrilateral-Quad, including India, Japan, Australia, and the US, may survive as a consultative forum but may no longer serve as a fulcrum of Indo-Pacific strategy. The US National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, released recently, reiterate that the US strategic focus has now shifted to its own Western Hemisphere and that it sees its competition with China more in economic and technological terms rather than as an existential geopolitical confrontation. If an understanding with China entails a downgrading of alliance relationships, such as with Japan and South Korea and of security partnerships, such as with India, the regional security landscape in Asia will be altered fundamentally. Essentially, India must engage swiftly and intensively with Japan, Australia, and South Korea to assess the changed situation and uphold shared security interests.

India and the US have reached a framework agreement that will serve as the basis of an interim trade agreement, which then should lead to a bilateral trade agreement. The framework has resulted in the removal of the 25 per cent penalty tariff imposed on India due to its continued import of oil from Russia. This is upon what the US claims are assurances from India that it (India) would cease any further oil imports from Russia. This has not been confirmed by India. The 25 per cent reciprocal tariff has now been reduced to 18 per cent, which will undoubtedly relieve the Indian exporters. One should not overinterpret the significance of what is, only a framework. We are unaware of the nature of the interim agreement, when it will conclude, and when and how it will lead to a bilateral trade agreement. This should not be celebrated as a major diplomatic achievement. It is at best a successful holding operation that may relieve our exporters, but it remains vulnerable to the whims and fancies of a mercurial and unpredictable leader. Claims of having brought the US around on the tariff issue are best avoided.

This only reinforces the urgency for India to not only diversify its external relations but to fortify itself against the US action that undermines its security, including economic security. Strengthening relations with Japan must be a priority. The trade deal concluded with the European Union should be implemented expeditiously. The BRICS summit, to be hosted by India in July, must become a timely platform for building partnerships with other major, middle-level powers of the Global South. One would hope India continues to maintain its strong relationship with Russia, and this includes the energy partnership. Relations with China should be improved, including in the economic and commercial fields, but overdependence in any domain must be avoided. In the current geopolitical context, economic security has become inextricably intertwined with national security. This new reality must inform all aspects of our foreign relations.