Tarnishing Aadhaar

Govt should not overuse the Unique ID

The use of the Unique ID programme, or Aadhaar, has yet again raised tempers. Issues are being raised about the lack of privacy of an individual’s biometric information if they are part of the Aadhaar database. These concerns are certainly valid. Much evidence has emerged of government agencies being lax with such data. In some cases, users’ Aadhaar numbers and associated data have been discovered to be freely available on the internet — from official government websites, among other sources. The numbers of such leaks being claimed by activists are mind-boggling. By some estimates, as many as 130 million Aadhaar numbers and related information have been leaked. Certainly, this is a matter the government should have addressed and must urgently do so without delay. As the Unique ID project’s original head, Nandan Nilekani, argued recently on the pages of this newspaper, there needs to be a comprehensive privacy law to ensure that greater care is taken with users’ confidential data.

But, at least, questions of privacy could begin to be addressed through a national discussion on what sort of privacy legislation is required. However, there is a more fundamental issue relating Aadhaar that needs to be resolved. The most worrying aspect of recent developments related to Aadhaar is the evident desire of the government to make its possession and use mandatory. An increasing number of interactions between the individual and the state are being mediated through Aadhaar. In the first instance, this is a violation of the original plan for Aadhaar, and of the basis on which it was sold to the Indian public. The Unique ID was always supposed to be an addition to the existing requirement, an opt-in add-on for those struggling to find other ways of proving their existence to the Indian state. It was meant to empower, and not disempower, Indians. But transforming Aadhaar into something that is required across the board for a growing range of government schemes reduces Indians’ choices.

The Unique ID was more than just a method of ensuring that there was no duplication in the receipt of government services. It was an attempt to revolutionise the delivery of services and make all government actions more beneficiary-focused. However, that promise is being belied, with the government looking only at how Aadhaar-based de-duplication may save money. Naturally, efficiency is an important goal of policy. And Aadhaar is certainly useful in order to plug leakage in welfare schemes. But it is not Aadhaar’s primary purpose. Linking everything to Aadhaar, from provident funds to tax returns, is hardly advisable. The government has to take greater care about what is and is not linked to Aadhaar. Only when it adds to citizens’ utility and has the potential of saving a great deal for the exchequer will an Aadhaar linkage make sense. The Aadhaar programme continues to be one of the most transformative policy ideas around. If implemented well, it will completely change the relationship between citizens and the state, and allow them to demand their rights and entitlements without going through middlemen. But the government must be careful not to overuse it — for that will, in this case, be the same as misuse. It would tarnish the entire Aadhaar project.