Wrong call by the EC

A law against buying votes will be impossible to implement

Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Nasim Zaidi has repeated the commission’s hope that the government will accord it the power to countermand an entire election if it detects an attempt to “bribe” voters. Mr Zaidi has said that seizures of cash and liquor during the ongoing Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Goa, Uttarakhand and Manipur are three times as much as was seized in the 2012 iterations of the polls. This is a signifier of the magnitude of the problem, even after the demonetisation of 86 per cent of outstanding currency in November 2016 was supposed to have crimped the ability of political parties to curry favour with voters in this manner. Nobody can thus doubt the extent of this behaviour and that it has become unfortunately integral to the process of electoral politics in India. While the CEC’s frustration is thus understandable, it is nevertheless the case that his demand for extended powers to check this phenomenon must be denied.

This is not the first time that Mr Zaidi has sought these powers for the Election Commission. Although the CEC has only a few months left to run in his term, he clearly is convinced of the importance of this electoral reform. Last year, too, Mr Zaidi reportedly suggested that Representation of the People Act be amended to specifically grant the EC the power to cancel elections where credible information existed that voters had been “bribed”. The government resisted the pressure to introduce such an amendment then, and it should continue to do so. The problem is that “voter bribery” is too slippery a concept to be enshrined in law. What is the difference, in strict ethical terms, between handing out money before or after an election? Between promising direct state transfers targeted at possible voters and paying them out of party coffers? Why is one bribery and the other legitimate policy? In other words, voters can be “bribed” in different ways at different times. Furthermore, is it not disrespect to the wisdom of the electorate to suppose that they are only likely to vote for the person who is “bribing” them? For many poor Indians, their vote is a crucial and large part of their worldly wealth. They treat it with respect and deploy it to their greatest advantage. This has long been understood as a facet of Indian democracy, which took root even in a newly free India that was largely uneducated. To suppose that voters are easily bribed into giving away their only lever of power is essentially disrespectful of Indians’ ability to make rational decisions. 

In any case, if voters can be “bribed” in different ways at different times, a law against such bribery will become prohibitively difficult to implement. Proof of bribery will be difficult to find; at best, even if such proof is forthcoming, linking it directly to a candidate will require lengthy investigation when set against the compressed time-scale of election campaigns. And surely, elections cannot be countermanded on the basis of mere accusations. Altogether, while Mr Zaidi’s concerns are well taken, the solution to the problem of money in politics lies elsewhere, and not through poorly conceived law-making.