It is a well-recognised fact that whenever the government does not want to do something in a hurry, it sets up a commission. Depending on the predilections of the chairman of the commission, a set of recommendations eventually emerges. So it was that, having promised administrative reforms, the UPA government set up the second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) under the chairmanship of a politician whose credentials are less than pristine. But that has not prevented Veerappa Moily from coming up trumps. True, he has slipped up on the issue of bringing the Prime Minister under the watchful eye of the yet-to-be-set-up national ombudsman. "The Prime Minister is accountable to Parliament, and on his survival depends the survival of the government. If the PM's conduct is open to formal scrutiny by extra-parliamentary authorities, the government's viability is eroded and Parliament's supremacy is in jeopardy." This is spectacular nonsense, of course, because such logic would demand that the Prime Minister be above the courts as well. | |
| Other than this, the report provides an excellent starting point for further discussion and action. One must hope that the government will do something to give effect to its major recommendations, which are concerned with corruption amongst politicians, judges and bureaucrats. It is of course true that politicians are unlikely to accept the recommendation that they can be disqualified by the President or governors if they defect, on the recommendation of the Election Commission. The report also wants a party which joins a coalition on the basis of a common programme, to seek a fresh mandate if it breaks away to join another coalition. In other words, the anti-defection law as it applies to individual legislators should be extended to parties as well""an eminently sensible proposal. |
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| As for the bureaucracy, despite its ability to present a united front, it is still the weakest of the three elements mentioned above. For them, the report has suggested that Article 311 be deleted from the Constitution. This says that no civil servant can be dismissed except after an enquiry. It sounds fair, except that such enquiries rarely lead to dismissal. The net effect is that once you join a government, state or central, you are there for life, never mind whether you work or not and are corrupt to the bone. No other country is so obliging to its civil servants. The origin of this provision lies in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, when, under dyarchy, Indians were given a minor share in power. The British wanted to protect the Indian Civil Service from the natives, and hence this protection. The sweeping protection given under the Constitution needs to be replaced with something that's less one-sided, and yet gives protection against whimsical politicians. |
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| The judiciary is not going to like the idea of a National Judicial Council (NJC) which will oversee the appointment and removal of judges. It comes when the government is seeing to pass the Judges (Inquiry) Bill. The NJC, should it be set up, will have representatives from the executive, legislature and judiciary. This will be seen widely as an attempt to bring the judiciary to heel. While there are doubtless corrupt judges, the motives of the politicians also need to be questioned very closely. |
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