China calling

India should view Beijing's latest overtures with caution

Beijing’s overtures to India to revive bilateral dialogue ahead of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) summit in China later this year should be welcomed after two years of military confrontation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The proposals include reciprocal visits by Chinese and Indian foreign ministers to each other’s countries, India-China Civilization Dialogues in both countries, a trade and investment forum, and even a film forum. Taken together with a reported improvement in the atmospherics at the commanders’ meeting on the LAC (though little actual progress), this outreach indicates a significant shift in China’s position vis-à-vis India. The immediate objective appears to be to secure Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence at the BRICS summit, which Russian President Vladimir Putin will attend, and a trilateral leaders’ meeting on the sidelines of the Russia-India-China dialogue, which China currently chairs. An opportunity for dialogue to resolve issues of mutual interest is always desirable but it is important that India’s response is embedded with a cautious sense of realism.

It is no coincidence that China’s outreach comes just as it faces an unanticipated reckoning of sorts for its headline-catching February 4 “no limits” strategic partnership with Russia. The pact, intended to signal a robust united alternative to the US-led rules-based democratic international order, acquired a different dimension with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine three weeks later. The swift and unprecedented level of economic sanctions on Moscow and the united diplomatic response and military aid from the Western powers in support of Ukraine have left Russia isolated in the international community. These developments have ended up narrowing China’s options as well. In the absence of an alternative financial system based on its own currency, it faces the threat of secondary sanctions if it attempts to help Russia evade sanctions. This could cause China extensive economic damage just as another Covid-19 wave has hit that country.
 

Against this backdrop, improved ties with India could provide useful optics for Beijing. Like China, India abstained from voting for the United Nations resolutions condemning the Russian actions in Ukraine. Closer Indo-Chinese ties at this juncture could have the effect of sending a strong signal to the West that another significant Asian power — and a US strategic partner — has opposed Russia’s international isolation. The Indian diplomatic establishment would be well aware of this context but the tonality of the political response will matter. India should not make the mistake of rolling out the kind of red carpet treatment that was accorded to Chinese President Xi Jinping in Mahabalipuram in 2019, just a year before the Chinese encroached on Indian territory across the LAC and two years after the 73-day standoff at Doklam on the Bhutan border. It is worth remembering that talks resolving the 2017 Doklam controversy were held just months ahead of a BRICS summit in China that year. So it would be worthwhile for India to explore what China has to offer in terms of military de-escalation on the LAC and a permanent resolution to the vexed border issue. At the same time, New Delhi should best view these moves as tactical rather than a long-term strategic realignment of the relationship. With the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th congress due later this year, such a radical change of posture would be an unrealistic expectation on India’s part.