Shekhar Gupta: Risk it like Rajiv

That's what Narendra Modi has to do and launch defence modernisation like Rajiv Gandhi in 1985-89, but with lessons learnt. There are political risks, but isn't that holding public office is all about

Bofors is the only gun in history to have won an election all by itself. Since we also like to say it is the man behind the machine that matters, V P Singh was also no mean performer at the gunsights.

He launched his challenge to destroy Rajiv Gandhi with the Allahabad by-election in 1988. Singh campaigned on a motorcycle across the burnt-out plains of rural Allahabad, stopping at villages, making a short point, and carrying on. It was true shoot-and-scoot campaigning.

His message was simple: Your homes have been burgled. How? When you buy a packet of bidis or a matchbox, a part of the few annas you pay goes to the government as tax. It’s from that tax that the government runs your hospitals and schools, and buys weapons for your army. So, if somebody steals a part of that money of yours, what do you call it but burglary in your home?

It was brilliant that far, except, he added two more things. One is the usual political hyperbole: The names of the Bofors “chors” (thieves) are on this slip of paper in my (kurta) pocket, so wait till I come to power.

And second, soldiers are shocked they’ve been given a gun which fires backwards, killing them instead of the enemy. Now, nobody was fooled by this. But the crowds were greatly amused.

It’s been 30 years. Nobody has been caught or punished for Bofors kickbacks. Everybody then charged, either in inquiries or folklore, is dead. The gun has performed brilliantly. It saved the day in Kargil and not because it fired backwards. It remains the mainstay of the Artillery.

In the 30 years since, not one more Bofors has been ordered, not one manufactured although lately some prototypes called ‘Dhanush’ have been attempted. Such is the stigma that we got no more Bofors since then, no spares, no ammunition, nor any other guns, recovered no illegal commissions, sent nobody to jail.

Illustration: Binay Sinha

India’s defence purchase record is like the story of the village idiot caught stealing onions. The panchayat asked him to choose his punishment: A hundred shoe-beating, or eat a hundred onions. The idiot chose the latter, gave up after 10 onions, switched to shoe-beatings, couldn’t endure after 10, and so switched back to onions. This went on and he ended up having most of both. This is a fairer description of how India has managed its defence acquisitions after 1977. We take that year as a cut-off because India elected its first non-Congress government then and it also saw a departure from buying only Soviet equipment.

The first system the Janata government explored was the Anglo-French Jaguar. There were immediate noises of kickbacks as rival agents thrived planting stories on journalists. This launched the phenomenon of “greenhouse” journalism in reporting defence buys.

The Jaguar too became controversial, and never reached its initially imagined force levels. As to how good and capable the aircraft is, this piece of information is instructive: Even today, 40 years later, the IAF employs 100-plus Jaguars.

Following this, Indira Gandhi returned to the Soviets, until Rajiv changed the equation radically. It isn’t the most popular thing to say these days, and I risk the wrath of the Bofors generation, but the only real, determined tri-service modernisation in our history was during the Indira-Rajiv era. The defence budget was taken above four per cent of GDP against the norm of two or below.

He bought the Mirage-2000s from France, Bofors from Sweden, Milan and Matra (French) missiles, and Type-209 submarines from Germany. Each one became (or was made out to be) some kind of a scam. So each system remained at the initial purchase level. There was no real transfer of technology, no co-production, no realisation of optimal force levels.

Rajiv also bought large volumes of Soviet equipment, from BMP-armoured fighting vehicles, and new Kilo submarines, and took a nuclear sub (the first Chakra) on lease. He paid for all this with the loss of power. I bet there were kickbacks and scams, but the cruel fact is even if India goes to war now, a lot of the equipment it fields would be those ordered by Indira-Rajiv or, later, followed up by Narasimha Rao.

It is a tough point to make, and it will hurt. But the (two) BJP governments’ record in making defence acquisitions is dismal. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hit by the so-called coffin-gate (it was a purely imaginary scam), bought little except war-time top-ups. Much was expected of the Modi government. So far its only order of any size is a mere 36 Rafales, slashed from the 126 negotiated by the UPA. The rest is just a continuation of the few orders the previous government made, treading cautiously just as A K Antony would — I had described his approach to defence purchases as “wrapped-in-latex” then. And there is much talk, Make in India and what not. So much talk, and all hot air. Funnily, it’s the BJP that carries the Bofors phobia on arms purchases.

An uncompromising posture on defence and filling the acquisition gaps were among Narendra Modi’s most forceful campaign propositions. The balance sheet after three and a half years is empty. The fear, indecision, and lack of focus are evident in the fact that the Modi government has had four defence ministers already: Manohar Parrikar, Nirmala Sitharaman, and Arun Jaitley for extended spells twice.

The one deal it signed, Rafale, is now under attack. It will test Modi’s nerve. Would he have the courage to say “my government and I” (unlike Rajiv saying neither any member of my family nor I) have done nothing wrong, persist with the purchase, and, in fact, enlarge it? The IAF, otherwise, will be reduced to an insignificant force. Even the Su-30s are now almost 20 years old. He has to move on the rest too — for all three forces — or history will judge him poorly and his promises as campaign-bluster. The debate on Rafale has now brought all the old jargon and mantras, the most ridiculous of which is that catch-all nonsense: Transfer of technology (ToT).

For six decades, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd and other defence public sector undertakings have assembled imported systems with plenty of ToT. Yet, barring a helicopter they’re incapable of using any of this brilliant, transferred technology to produce anything of use. We are still ordering, cancelling, re-ordering, and cancelling purchases of infantry rifles, shoulder-fired or Man-Pad missiles, flak-jackets and other basic equipment. ToT, over the decades, has been nothing short of all boll****. I refrain from using the remaining four letters as we do not use it in conventional journalism. Does Mr Modi have it in him to ensure that India buys what it needs, and stop the “banana republic” (humko yeh bhi banana hai) charade?

Either he takes the risks Rajiv took, and launches a defence modernisation to rival the 1980s, or, given the dwindling force levels, he should call Xi Jinping and General Qamar Bajwa, settle Kashmir and Arunachal, sign a treaty with the Americans/NATO to protect what remains of India, and, like the Japanese after World War-II, commit to limiting India’s defence budget to 1 per cent of GDP.

Why even 1 per cent then? Because you might need some to fight the Maoists in our underbelly, and some for Republic Day parades and for the ministers to have their weekend photo-ops at military bases.

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