A nuclear arms race is already raging, with or without testing

It startled the US security establishment that the Russian president needed no time to showcase a range of next-generation capabilities that the US intelligence community had long suspected as a work in progress and least expected to be unveiled as a force-in-being. Adding to their chagrin was the fact that Putin’s arsenal entailed what was then a futuristic integration of nuclear ramjet with a range of delivery systems, including cruise missiles, hypersonic vehicles, and torpedoes, which not only endowed them with unlimited range, but also the capability to evade and overwhelm the operational US missile defence systems. Furthermore, the inventory evidently aimed at force superiority with its wide variety and strike range, which clearly put the US strategic deterrence to test.    

It was evident that the US security planners had to return to the design table and rework a new strategy. The only visible outcome in the subsequent months was the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) of 2019, through which the first Trump administration postured the intent for offence-defence integration. The highlight of the BMDR was the envisioned deployment of comprehensive missile defence capabilities alongside offensive forces, which entailed capabilities to “identify and exploit every practical opportunity to detect, disrupt and destroy a threatening missile, prior to and after its launch, and to maximise the combined missile defence effort”. 

This concept went beyond the multilayered architecture and entailed an expanded collaboration of defensive and offensive capabilities operationalised from the moment a missile threat originates. In effect, it sought “integration of active missile defences with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities”, which was termed as attack operations. In the words of then US Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan, “missile defence necessarily includes missile offence”. 

No wonder Putin emphasised the capability of his new delivery platforms to evade and overwhelm the US missile defences. Consequently, while the 2019 BMDR did not find much traction, as Trump was voted out of power a year later, his return to the White House early this year came with the promise of “Golden Dome” — American missile defences in a new avatar, or a 

“next-generation missile defence shield”, as described in a presidential order. 

From NMD to Golden Dome 

  The existing, multilayered US national missile defence (NMD) system is a model that has been adapted by almost all other nations that are developing missile defence capabilities and platforms. The NMD earmarks systems for three tiers or phases of interception, which include terminal (to intercept incoming missiles minutes before impact), midcourse (interception in outer space or during the midcourse phase of the incoming missile’s flight), and boost-phase (intercepting a missile seconds or minutes into the launch). 

While the terminal interceptors are largely designated for short-range and extended air defence missions that will provide point and area defence, the strategic dimension of missile defence is its ability to intercept long-range systems like ICBMs in outer space or during its boost phase. 

The highlight of the US Ballistic Missile Defense Program is its gigantic ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) system, which is assigned to undertake midcourse interception of nuclear-armed ICBMs, be it of Russia, China, or even North Korea. In April 2024, Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract of $17 billion to develop the Next Generation Interceptor, which is slated to replace the Ground-Based Interceptor of the GMD system, 40 of which are currently deployed in Fort Greely, Alaska, and four in Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

While most of these systems discussed above have been under development since the 1990s, they were conceived as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or the Star Wars of former US President Ronald Reagan's years, which was the final leg in the US-Soviet arms race until the Soviet Union’s collapse. The land-based concepts and technologies conceived as part of the SDI ended up as elements of the NMD, which is in operation not only for homeland defence for the US, but also deployed by its allies across the world, be it in Europe (such as Ukraine), East Asia, or West Asia. 

The actual stimulus for the Golden Dome, which Trump announced in January 2025 soon after his second inauguration, is the advances made by the US' key adversaries Russia and China in areas like hypersonic systems and nuclear-powered platforms, including cruise missiles and torpedoes. Besides the kind of weaponry unveiled by Putin, China too had put on show at the 80th anniversary parade systems like the DF-17, which majestically showcased a hypersonic glide vehicle integrated on a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). 

The goalposts in Trump’s announcement indicate that the planned “next-generation” architecture for the US missile defence programme will include capabilities to defend against “ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries”. The Golden Dome plan also talks about accelerating “the deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer”, developing and deploying “proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept”, deploying “underlayer and terminal-phase intercept capabilities postured to defeat a countervalue attack”, and so on. 

While the “attack operations” and “offence-defence integration” of the 2019 BMDR did not find a reference in the Presidential Action of January 2025, it talked of developing and deploying capabilities “to defeat missile attacks prior to launch and in the boost phase”.  

The Golden Dome only forms the technological mission plan that addresses the “defensive” shield against the formidable delivery platforms that Russia and China have showcased, besides the fact that capabilities like platforms to intercept hypersonic and cruise missiles, along with their tracking systems, will take years to be deployed, notwithstanding their ongoing development. The actual space to be filled is for developing matching capabilities in hypersonic systems that could be nuclear-delivery platforms, and possibly imitate the integration of reactors that Russia has demonstrated through its array of systems.

While the long-term plans for the US military are to convert all missile delivery platforms into hypersonic systems (Mach 5 and above), recent reports suggest that many of the projects are just emerging out of the conceptual stage towards actual development. Many reports in recent months suggest that much of the American hypersonic development caters to the three services and is based on three capabilities: conventional prompt strike, long-range hypersonic weapon, and the hypersonic attack cruise missile.   

What emerges from these developments is the abysmal way in which the US has fallen behind in the development of hypersonic capabilities vis-à-vis its primary adversaries. In early October, a group of former Pentagon officials urged the Department to expand investment in advanced hypersonic weapons and manufacturing capacity, warning that China and Russia are outpacing the US in developing high-speed, manoeuvrable missiles that could erode its deterrence.

Trump’s announcement about resuming nuclear tests only reveals a graver picture of where the American conventional and nuclear deterrence edifice stands today, as relying on redundant systems from a bygone era.   

Tit-for-tat in progress 

The timing of Putin’s decision to test the Burevestnik and the Poseidon, in quick succession, could be more related to the stalemate over the Ukraine war than as a response to the Golden Dome. Yet, the demonstration of the range of these systems, to reach US shores with ease, and the ability to transcend the challenge from US missile defences, could imply that Washington, DC, remains the main target of Putin’s posturing. This could be both a deterrence posture as well as a warning to the US and its European allies on their continuing military assistance to Ukraine. 

While the Russian tests of its advanced weaponry did not startle the Ukrainians, the drastic fallout is Trump’s recent announcement to resume nuclear tests in the US. There is much debate about whether he is serious about the declaration, whether the US will indeed opt for underground explosions of its nuclear devices or will confine to subcritical tests, and if any US action on this front would create a domino effect, propelling others to follow suit. 

Probably realising that his tests had triggered Trump’s action, Putin attempted damage control by claiming that his tests of the advanced systems were not of nuclear weapons, but only nuclear-powered platforms. With Trump doubling down with claims that many countries, including Russia, China, North Korea, and even Pakistan, are undertaking subcritical tests, secretly, Putin reportedly instructed his officials to prepare for tit-for-tat tests if the Americans resume testing. The Russian foreign ministry, meanwhile, asked the US to clarify its “contradictory stands” on resuming nuclear tests.  

Upgrading archaic arsenals 

At the core of this ongoing strategic seesaw is the struggle of both the Cold War rivals to upgrade their archaic arsenals and delivery systems, which are relics of that era of superpower rivalry. Equally worrisome for them is the feverish expansion of China’s strategic forces, including its missile inventory, which, going by the systems on display during the 80th anniversary parade, seems to have stolen a march over the US, and also matches the Russians in baseline technologies. 

International obligations pertaining to non-proliferation and disarmament, in particular the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), had so far inhibited both the US and Russia from shattering the glass shield against testing, having been norm entrepreneurs for the treaty at the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the 1990s. (It is another matter that the US subsequently refused to ratify the treaty, on account of Republican Party opposition, while Russia withdrew its ratification in 2023.) Similarly, the arms control agreements from SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty) to START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and New START had not just put limits on their strategic offensive forces but also, eventually, led to their incremental reductions. 

Both sides have, over the past few decades, been struggling in their strategic modernisation efforts. The Russian RS-28 Sarmat, for instance, was supposed to replace the Soviet-era Voevoda (SS-18 “Satan”) which has been in operation since the 1970s and upgraded to new variants. The war with Ukraine resulted in Ukrainian contractors being removed from the maintenance of this system. The Sarmat itself has gone through multiple developments and failures, with the explosion during the 2024 test being reported by open source intelligence (OSINT) platforms. Amid conflicting reports about Sarmat’s deployment, Putin had come on record in late October confirming that the “heavy” ICBM is “not yet on combat duty, but will be deployed soon”. 

Things are no different across the Pacific. The US strategic forces have long been struggling with the Sentinel programme that was intended to replace the aging Minuteman missiles. A Congressional review, called the Nunn-McCurdy statute, found in January 2024 that the Sentinel programme substantially exceeded its baseline cost projections. Initiated in 2014, with Northrop Grumman as the contractor, the original plan was for the US Air Force (USAF) to procure a total of over 634 Sentinel missiles and modernise over 450 silos of Minuteman-III to be used for the phased deployment of the Sentinel. However, USAF assessments found many of these silos are aging and “too decrepit” to be used, implying the Sentinel might need over 400 new silos, going by the Congress-mandated number of “no fewer than 400 on-alert ICBMs.” 

Considering that the Pentagon review on the Sentinel is still ongoing, reports indicate an overlap of the Sentinel deployment with the Minuteman-III’s decommissioning, implying that the latter will be in operation till around 2050, as opposed to the anticipated end of service by 2036. In fact, a Minuteman-III was test-fired on November 5 as a probable display of intent, days after Trump ordered the Pentagon to prepare for the resumption of nuclear testing. 

On the question of whether underground explosions are needed or whether subcritical tests will do, in order to test nuclear warheads in deployment, it is worth remembering that the US nuclear arsenal has long been undergoing modernisation through two flagship initiatives — the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program. Both were an outcome of the CTBT, which limited the possibility of testing new warheads, other than in subcritical conditions. 

Run by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the Sandia National Laboratories, the SSP’s mandate is to maintain “the continued safety, security and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear explosive testing”. A 2024 report by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the US Department of Energy, which presides over the stockpile, lists mission objectives for financial year (FY) 2025 as including: delivering the B61-12 gravity bomb, achieving the first production unit of the W80-4 warhead Life Extension Program and alignment with the USAF’s Long Range Standoff cruise missile replacement programme, supporting initial fielding of W87-0 on Sentinel, and the W78 Replacement Warhead Modification Program, and develop the W93 warhead, deployed on the Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines, among others. 

Earlier, in 2022, Lawrence Livermore had delivered “the first newly manufactured nuclear warhead in three decades”, which implied the modification of the W87-1 for the Minuteman-III, which continued to use the aging W78 that was a legacy of the Peacekeeper ICBMs. Similarly, in April 2024, the Sandia National Laboratories announced the production of a Mark 21 Replacement Fuze for the W87-0 warhead to be deployed on the Minuteman IIIs and, eventually, the Sentinel. In October 2024, the NNSA announced the completion of the “first weapon-ready” component for the W87-1 warhead — a “plutonium pit” that acts as a first-stage trigger of the thermonuclear device. 

These developments, when read with the 2024 NNSA report, clearly indicate ongoing work on both life extension of existing warheads as well as new warhead development, possibly employing subcritical testing. In fact, the W87-1 Modification Program is stated to be the first time since the end of the Cold War that the US will be “putting a 100 per cent newly manufactured nuclear warhead into the stockpile”.  

On the other hand, the RRW Program of the NNSA is stated to have the mandate of “modernising the nuclear weapons complex” without nuclear testing, and warhead replacement with “lower cost and improved use control”. The Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2006 had defined the RRW objectives to include the following: “Increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce likelihood of resumption of underground nuclear testing, ensure that the nuclear weapons infrastructure can respond to unforeseen problems, including the ability to produce replacement warheads, achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile based on increased reliability of the reliable replacement warheads,” and so on. 

However, the US Congress reportedly denied funding for the RRW in 2008, with the Obama administration discontinuing it in 2009, thus putting to rest warhead replacement plans until 2035. The last update on the RRW was in January 2015, which talked of life extension of the W76-1, used by the US Navy, from 20 years to 60 years with production to be completed by 2019. 

It is evident that the SSP has subsumed the agenda of the RRW as well, with ongoing programmes that not just entail life extension but also developing new warheads for both the Minuteman-III and the Sentinel. Nonetheless, these two programmes were testament to the fact that the US nuclear weapon stockpile has been consistently on a modernising and development course, without the need for underground testing. If this is the ground reality of the US strategic deterrent, then Trump’s decision to resume nuclear weapons testing, if materialising, will be more of postural value, though with imminent global consequences that will not be reversible. 

Inevitable nuclear dawn 

The first outcome of a US nuclear weapon test will be Russia following suit, as already declared by Putin. Unlike the global fame attained by Russia’s newly unveiled weapons, along with its much-feted air defence systems, not much is known about the Russian warhead development programmes. As per the Sipri (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook, as of early 2025, Russia had a stockpile of around 4,309 nuclear warheads assigned for its long-range strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. Of the stockpiled warheads, according to Sipri, 1,718 strategic warheads are deployed — with 870 on land-based ballistic missiles, 640 on SLBMs, and over 200 at heavy bomber bases. In addition, there are around 1,114 strategic warheads in storage. 

Other than a riposte to the US tests, there could be tangible gains for Russia from renewed underground testing, notwithstanding the fact that its new generation ICBMs — be it the RS-12 Topol, RS-24 Yars, or the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM — are known to have integrated their multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) warheads. However, there is much scope for testing of the warhead miniaturisation, which could be the payload in the new-generation platforms, be it the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, the Burevestnik cruise missiles or even the Poseidon, declared as a nuclear-armed submersible.

The Sipri report also talks about the Yars systems being equipped with “light” and “medium-yield” warheads, which confirms that miniaturisation is steadily progressing. Similarly, the Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, numbering about 16, are also deploying over 992 SLBMs with MIRVs. The report also talks about Russia modernising the payloads on its bombers, including the possible integration of a lighter-weight, nuclear-armed cruise missile, the Kh-BD, with a 6,500-km range on the 

Tu-160 bomber. 

Meanwhile, reports suggest that Russia has started preparing its former test site in Novaya Zemlya after withdrawing its CTBT ratification. However, it is not just the US tests that will be a catalyst for a resumption of underground testing by Russia. It is evident from the Sipri report that Russia is also keenly awaiting the expiry of the New START in February 2026. The end of this arms control agreement, which placed constraints on many of Russian and US strategic weapons, is likely to provide both with the breathing space needed to feverishly augment the inventory, with underground testing providing the opportunity to test many of these systems. 

The case of China will be no different from the Russians, in terms of using the resumption of nuclear testing to verify many of the new systems and baseline technologies that have been developed over the past few decades. However, China has not shown any inclination for test resumption. Instead, the Chinese foreign ministry vociferously denied Trump’s naming of China as among the countries doing “secret” testing, and, in the same vein, asked the US to uphold the moratorium on testing. On the other hand, most surveys confirm that the Chinese nuclear arsenal is growing at the fastest pace. 

China’s ICBM range has expanded exponentially over the last decade to include DF-5, DF-27, DF-31, and DF-41, adding to the MRBMs like the DF-21, DF-26, and DF-17. While most of the Chinese ICBMs have a 10,000-13,000 km range, it is the DF-17, with a hypersonic glide vehicle atop, that has sent shockwaves to its adversaries. A 2024 Pentagon report indicated that the 

DF-17’s HGV might be armed with nuclear warheads, though possibly not integrated yet with a nuclear ramjet like the Avangard. While various reports vary in estimates of 300-400 “operational” warheads in the Chinese arsenal currently, this number could go up to 1,000-1,500 in a decade. 

While China has developed its ICBM payloads with testing data from the 1990s, the impulse for fresh testing will be the need to test a wide variety of warhead designs, especially the imperative of arming the HGVs, cruise missiles, and torpedoes, as done by Russia. The Pentagon report indicated that China seeks “low-yield” warheads, possibly for miniaturisation. Yet, with its declared adherence to the moratorium, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists infers, China could potentially opt for “simpler designs that use previously tested nuclear explosive package, advanced computer simulations, and subcritical (or very 

low-yield) underground explosive experiments”. However, Trump’s citing of China in the list of “testing” nations is supposedly based on activities noticed at its Lop Nur testing site in recent years. 

Will India need to test? 

This question was largely put to rest during the negotiations around the India-US nuclear deal of 2005-08, with India resisting the pressure from the US to agree to a test-ban in the nuclear cooperation agreement. The only reference to nuclear testing in the 123 Agreement of 2007 was in Article 9 (peaceful use), which prohibits diversion of material from US-provided facilities for military purposes or nuclear explosions. While questions were raised on whether the US will withdraw from the 123 Agreement if India conducts nuclear weapon tests in the future, Article 14 (termination and cessation) of the agreement talks about “circumstances” that will lead to the termination and whether they “resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security” — an articulation many had then assumed to be about nuclear testing. 

Despite such interpretative spaces, many from India’s strategic and scientific community had then opposed any commitment by the Indian government against nuclear testing. An outcome of this clamour and debate was the claims by some sections of the scientific community that the thermonuclear device tested in May 1998 was a failure. 

In a seminar that I and a senior colleague at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) organised at the India International Centre in August 2009, K Santhanam, who was mission director of Operation Shakti, answered in the affirmative to a question on whether the thermonuclear test was a “dud”, and, subsequently, confirmed the same to the media.   

Subsequently, leading figures of the nuclear scientific establishment, including R Chidambaram and S K Sikka, who were both part of the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” and the 1998 test teams, sought to counter this claim through their detailed study of yield reports and international parameters to confirm that the yields of the 1998 tests, including the thermonuclear device, were “satisfactory”. Anil Kakodkar, the former head of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Atomic Energy confirmed to me, in an interview at his home in Mumbai in October 2011, that the thermonuclear payload is already integrated with India’s strategic deterrent, implying its deployment, though not detailing about the extant missile platform(s).   

Most international surveys place India’s warhead count at 90-110, along with the development of new delivery systems, including their canisterising and mating of warheads. Among the key initiatives are miniaturisation of warheads, especially for tactical delivery systems like Prahaar, besides their possible integration with cruise missiles and hypersonic platforms like other global peers. Like others, India will also gain by fresh nuclear tests to improvise its warheads to fulfil these projects, which, though, could also be attained by simulations and subcritical methods. 

Ultimately, any future Indian decision to undertake nuclear explosive testing will be political, to address “a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”, as mentioned in the 123 Agreement.