The return of maritime centrality

India is import-dependent for energy to fuel its fast-growing economy. While oil often gets highlighted, the dependency on imported gas and fertiliser is critical and of bigger concern. On crude oil, India has undertaken some diversification, now importing from around 40 countries. As a result, about 70 per cent of crude imports are now coming from routes outside the Strait of Hormuz compared with about 55 per cent earlier, according to the government.

However, India imports about 60 per cent of its liquified petroleum gas (LPG) requirement. Of this, 90 per cent comes through the Strait of Hormuz. This is not just an economic but also a domestic issue as it impacts most households. So is the dependency for fertilisers. The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — accounted for 75 per cent of the total urea imports of 6.9 million tonnes in 2024-25. Similarly, 63 per cent of its nitrogen fertiliser comes from Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Red Sea route compounds the picture rather than offering an alternative. The Houthis’ July 2026 blockade and declaration against Saudi Arabia marked an expansion of their maritime campaign, reviving fears that Iran could use Yemen as a proxy to shut Bab-el-Mandeb as well — and for a period in 2026 both of West Asia’s major maritime corridors were effectively closed simultaneously, leaving the Cape of Good Hope as the only durable fallback route for two of the busiest trade arteries on the planet. Rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope added 10-20 days to transit times and pushed freight rates up by as much as 50 per cent.

The ongoing conflict is a real-world validation of why maritime chokepoints remain the fulcrum of global trade — and why naval power, not just deterrence, decides outcomes at sea. The core takeaway for naval planners is unambiguous, even if the war’s endpoint isn’t: Sea control at a single strait — sustained by mines, small boats, and shore-based missiles rather than a blue-water fleet — was sufficient to disrupt global trade at a scale conventional deterrence had not anticipated. Whether this becomes the new normal depends on the outcome of talks between the US and Iran. However, this is a strategic vulnerability that navies must prepare for.

The conflict also holds several doctrinal outcomes for military planners. The development of mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles and cheap drones is revolutionising naval warfare much as carrier aviation did last century — surface combatants, including carriers, can no longer claim uncontested command of the sea and must now watch out for shore-based weapons accessible even to non-state actors.

This has driven a shift in how navies think about cost-exchange ratios. Relatively simple ordnance-and-delivery combinations — missiles and armed drones — are being countered with expensive interceptor missiles and aircraft, and even when defensive systems succeed, the mere threat of attack achieves second-order effects by disrupting trade and pushing navies to operate farther out or avoid the area entirely. The economics favour the attacker, and that asymmetry is now a live doctrinal problem rather than a theoretical one.

Another dimension is the advent of autonomous unmanned surface vessels (USV) and subsurface vessels. They have inverted the sea-control equation: Expendable, low-cost platforms operating in coordinated swarms can now deny access and threaten ships without a single crewed vessel engaging in combat. This shifts the advantage from platform mass and armour toward networking, numbers, and attritable design — forcing even superior conventional fleets into defensive postures, coastal withdrawal, and costly interceptor expenditure.

For navies, doctrine, force structure, and basing must now assume persistent threat from unmanned systems, not just peer warships. For instance, in February 2024 Ukraine’s Magura V5 USVs became the first naval drones to sink an enemy warship in combat. The Magura V5 — an 18-foot, plastic-hulled, 300-kg-payload kamikaze USV costing roughly $250,000-300,000 — destroyed the Russian Tarantul-III-class corvette Ivanovets and the Ropucha-class landing ship Tsezar Kunikov. They have reportedly destroyed eight Russian warships and damaged six more within a year, causing over $500 million in damage.

The Indian context On June 21, the Indian Navy inducted three ships of different vessels into service at the same time — INS Dunagiri, the fifth warship of the Project 17A Frigate programme; INS Sanshodhak large survey vessel; and Anti-Submarine Warfare shallow watercraft INS Agray.

In 2025, the Indian Navy inducted 12 warships and is set to induct 15 this year, setting a new benchmark in its modernisation.

The navy is on-track to become a 200-plus ship force by 2035, then Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi said in February this year, noting that there are 50 vessels currently on order, all being built in Indian shipyards. As we look to become a 200-plus ship navy by 2035, our aim is to take self-sufficiency to component level and build a fully atma nirbhar force by 2047, he said articulating the long-term vision. Indian Navy has seen a quiet all-round transformation in the last few decades with sustained efforts — in numbers, technology absorption, indigenisation and building long-term partnerships.

With over 140 ships and submarines, the current line up looks impressive, showcasing India’s maritime focus and industrial strength. However, they are dwarfed by the scale and pace of our northern neighbour and the changed geopolitical realities, both near and far, causing a metamorphosis of warfare itself.

There has been a growing recognition of these new age threats drawing on lessons from recent conflicts. The Indian Navy’s maritime doctrine 2025 notes that India’s growth and security are inseparable from safe, secure seas, and that the navy is the principal instrument of India’s maritime power — positioned as the region’s “preferred security partner” and “first responder” in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

A defining feature of the doctrine is its effort to distinguish contemporary conflict terminology from each other — explicitly mentioning Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, and Grey Zone Operations (GZO), the latter defined as operations conducted in a “no-war no-peace” (NWNP) zone designed to secure gains while staying below the threshold of armed conflict.

The Indian Navy was early to embrace indigenisation and that has attained critical mass in certain areas. For instance, its Directorate of Naval Design is capable of designing the entire range of vessels, from patrol boats to aircraft carriers. Armaments and electronics, too, have seen significant indigenisation though dependencies remain. Propulsion is an area that needs attention.

In the sub-surface domain as well as naval aviation there is much to achieve on this front. The submarine fleet is in distress to say the least with 16 conventional platforms, over half of which are waiting to be phased out. The next major programme, under Project-75I that has long been in the works, is now awaiting conclusion. Even so, the first boat will join the fleet only 6-7 years later. The SSN programme is even more long-drawn, as the first of two boats sanctioned is expected to be ready only by 2036.

In both ships and submarines, the irony is that the next major projects are far from realisation, which means the pace of double-digit inductions over a couple of years is short-lived, while platforms continue to be phased out or some of them forced to operate with fixes.

In naval aviation, the carrier-based fighters, existing MiG-29Ks and the future Rafale-M, are both imported. The much-touted twin engine deck-based fighter, proposed to be developed domestically, is nowhere on the horizon. And the next aircraft carrier (IAC-II), which is in effect a replacement for INS Vikramaditya is yet to take shape. Any further delay will impact the carrier tempo. Similarly, barring the Dornier aircraft at the low end of maritime surveillance, the rest are imported, be it the long-range P-8Is or the range of medium and high-altitude UAVs. In contrast, China has fielded three carriers in record time along with stealth fighters on its third carrier, the Fujian.

Over the last two decades, India has significantly expanded its military diplomacy with the navy at the forefront. This is reflected in the range of partnerships and scale of naval exercises that the Indian Navy undertakes at bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels. The capacity building and capability enhancements to the maritime neighbours and littoral states in the IOR has progressed well, deepening partnerships and addressing security concerns.

Maritime domain awareness (MDA) has been a major focus and the Indian Navy plays a pivotal role in it, with the Information Fusion Centre-IOR positioning itself as the nodal point for the region. India has also signed a series of bilateral logistics support agreements, white shipping agreements, and navy-to-navy agreements among others. All these are enablers for operationalising partnerships.

Accelerated shipbuilding

A major factor for the slow pace of induction is long construction times coupled with delayed procurement processes. Speeding up shipbuilding, both military and commercial, must be a top priority. Indian shipyards continue to have long lead times, despite some progress recently. China, on the other hand, has an unprecedented pace of shipbuilding, unmatched in modern times. It is rolling out an Indian Navy equivalent in numbers every five years.

On commercial shipping, Indian seafarers account for 12.16% of the global seafaring workforce, ranking behind the Philippines, according to the Ministry of ports, shipping and waterways. Meanwhile, India owns just 1,526 ships i.e. about 1.2% of the global shipping fleet and has just 0.06% market share in the global shipbuilding market. This is in sharp contrast to the volume of seaborne trade.

The Economic Survey 2022-23 had identified shipbuilding industry as a strategically important industry due to its role in energy security, national defence, and the development of the heavy industry. It also noted that shipbuilding has one of the highest employment multipliers of 6.48 generating mass employment in remote, coastal and rural areas. The Union Government has since rolled out a comprehensive package of ₹69,725 crore to revitalize India’s shipbuilding and maritime ecosystem.

China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder, China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC), built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II, a report by CSIS noted. From 2000 to 2025, China’s share of global shipbuilding output grew from less than 5 per cent to more than 53 per cent, the report states.

In August 2025, China consolidated its massive shipbuilding ecosystem with a $16 billion merger of CSSC and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). The new entity, CSSC, became the world’s largest shipbuilder with a 17 per cent share of the global market and total revenue of about $18 billion, as reported by Wall Street Journal. The order book was for over 530 vessels totaling 54 million deadweight tonnes.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is numerically the world’s largest. According to a 2024 report to the US Congress, it has over 370 ships and submarines, a majority of them being major surface combatants — frigates, destroyers, cruisers, amphibious vessels, aircraft carriers and replenishment vessels. And this figure does not include around 60 Houbei class patrol boats that carry anti-ship cruise missiles. The overall number would have crossed 400 with around 20 platforms commissioned in 2025 alone, and is projected to reach 435 ships by 2030.

The pace of construction and induction is at an industrial scale that no other country on earth can match. The carrier programme best captures the trajectory. In November 2025, the PLAN commissioned its third and most powerful carrier, the 80,000-ton Type 003 Fujian in the presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping. It is the world’s largest non-nuclear-powered carrier with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (Emals). It has since been operationalised in record time. By September 2025, the carrier conducted catapult-assisted takeoffs and arrested landings with the J-15T trainer, J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter, and KJ-600 airborne early-warning aircraft. The US is the only operator of carriers equipped with Emals. A fourth carrier, the nuclear-powered Type 004 displacing 120,000 tonnes and designed to carry 90-100 aircraft including J-35s and stealth attack drones, is already under construction. The Pentagon’s 2025 China military power report assesses that the PLAN intends to field nine aircraft carriers by 2035, close to the 11 carriers the US Navy is congressionally mandated to field.

Another trend is the growing firepower per tonne. Ten 13,000-ton Type 055 cruisers — each carrying 112 vertical launch cells, more than most Western destroyers — are already in service, with four more under construction. Similarly, the Type 076 Sichuan joins three operational

Type 075 landing helicopter dock (LHDs) and eight Type 071 amphibious transport docks, reflecting China’s preparation for a Taiwan contingency capability.

China’s underwater fleet, too, follows a similar trend. As per the 2024 report, PLAN was operating six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 conventional submarines. Latest numbers put it at 72 submarines in 2026. This is expected to reach 80 units by 2035 given a rapid expansion underway.

In addition to stealth fighters, high altitude drones, a critical force multiplier that has expanded is the space domain.  As of January 2024, China’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellite fleet contained more than 359 systems, more than tripling its on-orbit collection presence since 2018. This includes over 100 low earth orbit (LEO)-based Jilin-1 imaging satellites, according to the US Department of War’s annual report to the Congress. That number has since crossed 500. China is also investing in a starlink-like constellation in the LEO.

A Chinese commercial company Shanghai Gesi Aerospace Technology Company plans to put in place a 12,000 G60 Starlink LEO communication satellite constellation. China’s active assistance with real time information and imagery was evident both during Operation Sindoor with Pakistan and with Iran during the current conflict.

Beyond tonnage and numbers, what makes this expansion strategically consequential for India is its reach. China’s “near seas defence, far seas protection” doctrine has translated into action with its first and only overseas military base in Djibouti opened in 2017. It sits astride the Bab-el-Mandeb and hosts up to 10,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel. While that remains the only overseas military base, with several other reported attempts, China has built a wide range of dual-use port facilities across the IOR that spread its influence far and wide and provide logistics support and operational turnaround.

For India, in addition to force accretion, the partnerships and agreements provide the broadbasing and collaborative frameworks as the gap widens.

Pakistan’s navy is now essentially a China-dependent force like the larger military. Nearly every major procurement underway or planned is of Chinese origin — Hangor submarines, Type 054A frigates among others in addition to the four Babur-class corvettes from Turkey and the subsequent co-design of the Jinnah-class frigates to be fielded by 2027-28. These 3,300-tonne, 119-metre frigates were described by Pakistan’s navy chief as the navy’s first indigenously designed and constructed large warship. This dependency-induced collaboration has enabled significant force accretion for Pakistan. Operation Sindoor in May 2025 outlined the contours of the China-Pakistan collaboration. With this, Pakistan is quickly building numbers with Chinese assistance despite not having a significant domestic defence industrial base — along with the induction of the Chinese-built Type 054A/P frigates and Romanian-built offshore patrol vessels (OPV). Overall, Pakistan’s ten-year naval modernisation plan envisages roughly 50 new ships — frigates, submarines, corvettes and OPVs.

The submarine leg is the most consequential. The Hangor-class, a Type 039A derivative equipped with Stirling Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), displacing around 2,800 tonnes and an estimated 2,000-nautical-mile range. The other three boats built in China are now in sea trials. These eight will join the five ageing Agosta-class boats, significantly augmenting the sea-denial capability. The Hangor fleet’s real significance is regional: It materially closes Pakistan’s undersea capability gap with India just as India’s own SSN and P-75I programmes remain years from delivery, a huge deficiency in the sub-surface fleet. During Operation Sindoor, the Pakistan Navy was mostly boxed in and restricted to its coast in the face of the Indian Navy’s forward deployment. It may not be that constrained in the next conflict.

The geopolitical overlay matters as much as platforms. On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed a trilateral defence pact called the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement which considers an attack on one as an attack on all three. While the primary focus of the pact is clearly the situation in West Asia, how it works during the next India-Pakistan crisis has to be seen.

A strong, technologically potent naval armada and the broader shipbuilding ecosystem is not just a narrow security enabler but a national imperative to ensure continued economic progress. Towards this, budgetary allocation is the precursor and not the end. It needs the entire chain — procurement process, construction and induction — to be streamlined and prioritised.