Rethinking the nuclear dimension in India-Pakistan relations

  There is another important factor that characterises a possible nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Reaction time to a possible attack by nuclear weapons is extremely short, given the geographical proximity of the two countries. Command-and-control becomes much more challenging, particularly since several categories of delivery vehicles, whether missiles or aircraft, are of dual use; they can carry conventional as well as nuclear munitions. It is only upon impact that the nature of the weapon would become known. It is these ambiguities which act as a far greater deterrent against either side contemplating crossing the nuclear threshold. Let us hope that this continues to restrain both countries.

India and Pakistan subscribe to different doctrines of nuclear use. India has maintained a posture of No-First-Use (NFU). It will use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. This was later expanded to include retaliation against an attack by chemicals and biological weapons, both of which are classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), just as nuclear weapons are. It was also clarified that retaliation would follow an attack with such WMD, not only against the territory of India but also against Indian armed forces operating outside the territory of India. This has expanded the ambit of the retaliation-only policy. India’s doctrine also asserts that any use of nuclear weapons against it would invite “massive retaliation” designed to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the adversary. Thus, the Indian doctrine does not subscribe to the theory of “graduated response”, which was popularised during the Cold War years. This posture was eventually given up since it was realised that any level of nuclear exchange, once initiated, would inevitably escalate to the strategic level. A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms, and this should be borne in mind in the India-Pakistan context. 

  An NFU policy requires a specific structure of the country’s nuclear deterrent. In order to absorb a first strike by a nuclear adversary and still be able to retaliate, it is necessary to have a survivable arsenal of nuclear weapons and a still-intact delivery system. It also requires that the NCA should be able to take and convey decisions on a retaliatory strike from radiation- hardened command-and-control facilities which have already been established in India. The most survivable second-strike capability is submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) which can roam under the seas undetected for long periods of time and be able to launch nuclear missiles when orders for doing so are received from the NCA. India now has two such nuclear submarines armed with 700 km range missiles, which may be a sufficient deterrent against Pakistan but not yet against China. China is believed to be assisting Pakistan develop its sea-based nuclear deterrence.  

India’s nuclear doctrine does not couple nuclear and conventional weapons together. There is implicitly a fire-break between the two. India’s nuclear weapons are meant to deter the use or threat of nuclear weapons by an adversary and not to deter a conventional threat. They are not war-fighting weapons. But every nuclear weapon state faces a paradox — the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is based of the credibility of their use. The adversary must believe that in the eventualities spelt out in its doctrine, there will be both the capacity and willingness to use nuclear weapons.

  Pakistan has a different nuclear doctrine. It embraces the option of first use in case of an existential threat facing the country, such as the imminent loss of large territory, the impending destruction of its armed forces, and severe economic and political destabilisation. Pakistan will meet these threats through “full-spectrum deterrence”, ranging from tactical all the way to the strategic level. Nuclear weapons compensate for Pakistan’s perceived inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis India. This results in a constant indulgence in nuclear brinkmanship as a deterrent against India’s conventional threat. It is not that Pakistan is deterring India directly but rather using nuclear brinkmanship to mobilise international pressure on India to refrain from or halt its military operations against Pakistan. Nuclear brinkmanship by Pakistan triggers legitimate concerns among the major powers and international community generally about a possible escalation of hostilities to the nuclear level. Inevitably calls for restraint follow and inhibit India’s response to Pakistan’s conventional and sub-conventional aggression against India. The risk of nuclear war deflects attention away from Pakistani cross-border terrorist activity. India may call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff but it is unable to persuade even its friends and partners to do the same. Nuclear flag waving has its uses. Most recently, President Vladmir Putin of Russia has done the same in the Ukraine War. Unless we understand this dynamic it will be difficult to craft a counter strategy.

  The India-Pakistan nuclear equation must also be seen in the larger geopolitical context. The one constant that India must bear in mind is the China factor. Despite its recent descent into dysfunctionality, the Pakistani state remains a low-risk, low-cost proxy against India. China will always upgrade Pakistani capabilities to the extent that it can continue to fulfil its role as an anti-India proxy. It was China which enabled Pakistan to emerge as a nuclear weapon state in the mid-1980s, providing the design and probably the material for its first nuclear test, carried out at a Chinese test site. We have witnessed Chinese support to Pakistan during the recent military clashes between India and Pakistan. Even if China does not wave the nuclear flag to constrict India’s room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Pakistan, that threat is implicit both in the nuclear and conventional fields and cannot be ignored. In a recent analysis published by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Wei Shen Gay, a scholar at the school cautions against taking a view that China’s support to Pakistan in case of a India-Pakistan conflict would be “only rhetorical with no tangible matching actions”. 

  He says: “However, such a perspective underestimates China’s resolve and assumes it will sit idly by on the sidelines—an assumption that could be detrimental to India’s strategic decision-making by promoting a misguided view.”A two-front challenge is a reality.

  In both conventional and nuclear terms, India should pace itself with China and not with Pakistan. Pakistan is a sub-set of India’s China challenge. As Pakistan’s military arsenal becomes more Chinese-oriented, countering Chinese capabilities in the India-China context will also, to an extent, take care of the Pakistan challenge. Reports indicate that some weapon categories used by India, such as the indigenous Akashteer and the Indo-Russian collaborative Brahmos cruise missiles performed well against Pakistan’s Chinese sourced systems. If the Chinese found the India-Pakistan military exchanges a valuable test of its military technology and hardware, these are by the same token, a very useful exposure for India’s military to what it may be up against in a confrontation with China.

  India and Pakistan both being nuclear weapon states, a certain degree of hyphenation already exists between them and can be easily activated, as we have witnessed in Operation Sindoor. The original Pakistani provocation of the dastardly terrorist outrage in Pahalgam receded into the background as concern mounted in the international community about the possible escalation of hostilities to the nuclear level. The challenge for Indian diplomacy is to keep international attention focused on the cross-border terrorism aspect. It would be better for India not to keep harping on how it has found space under the nuclear overhang to carry out significant conventional or sub-conventional attacks against Pakistan. Pakistan is then forced to convey that this space has become narrower precisely because of Indian conventional attacks. Let us keep to the main assertion we must make and act upon; every act of cross-border terrorism will invite an appropriate punitive action by India at a time and place of its own choosing. There is no need to spell out what this may be.

  It is in the interest of both India and Pakistan not to let any armed hostilities between them escalate to the nuclear level. The consequences for both would be catastrophic. This points to the need for the two countries agreeing upon and scrupulously implementing a range of bilateral confidence building measures. Engagement and dialogue would eventually be unavoidable. While there is an “iron brotherhood” between China and Pakistan, whatever could be done  to reduce the salience of the proxy relationship between them, would be a gain for India. There are contradictions visible in the “iron brotherhood” which may be exploited. These include Chinese impatience with Pakistan’s inability to ensure the security of its personnel deployed on several Chinese-assisted or-invested projects. Some of the major projects conceived under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, originally branded as the flagship of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, have been delayed, abandoned or are losing money. Pakistan’s current economic distress may make it more amenable to seeking limited accommodation with India.

  In the current atmosphere of anger and resentment and the outpouring of nationalist sentiment, it may be unrealistic to find receptivity to some of these ideas. But the art of diplomacy lies in seeking out the possibilities, however remote they may seem, to foster greater understanding and, above all, to prevent war. Beyond the bilateral, the nuclear capabilities of the two neighbouring countries impose this responsibility upon their leaders to their own people and to the international community. 

Shyam Saran is India’s former foreign secretary and former chairman of the National Security Advisory Board. Views are personal.