A single force cannot manage India's boundaries

Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) to recommend that it be placed under the Army’s command.

  Gopchade’s extant proposal needs to be considered in the context of conditions prevailing along India’s borders vis-a-vis those in South Africa. The border management systems prevalent in India have been undergoing periodic upgradation since Independence. The Department of Border Management already exists within the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, and its charter is to coordinate activities of all stakeholders involved in border management including the BGFs.  The department was set up following the recommendation of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security set up after the Kargil War. Additionally, the Land Port Authority of India under the department is responsible for coordinating the activities at integrated check posts and land customs stations to ensure smooth movement of goods and people across the borders. These two agencies enable close coordination amongst all stakeholders in managing borders including BGFs.

  Further, what needs to be considered in all its aspects is whether having a single BGF will suit the operational environment, terrain configuration, and demography of India’s borders. It is also pertinent to note that the system was introduced in South Africa only in 2023 and it may not have been possible to evaluate its efficacy in the short period for which it has been in existence.

  The length of South Africa’s land borders at 4,862 km (Botswana 1,840 km; Namibia 967 km; Mozambique 491 km; Eswatini 430 km; Zimbabwe 225 km; besides 909 km along Lesotho which is landlocked within South Africa) is less than one third of India’s land borders, which measure 15,106.7 km along seven countries. Even South Africa’s coastal border measuring 2,798 km is only a little more than one-third of India’s (7516.6 km).

  For South Africa, the limited extent and almost similar terrain along its borders allows for a single BGF to guard them in entirety. Their main challenge relates to migration from neighbouring countries because of its relatively better economy and employment avenues. Unlike India, South Africa’s neighbouring countries have friendly relations with it. The population density along the borders is thin and there are hardly any trans-border crimes. The limited number and nature of crimes, remoteness of border areas from major population centres, and consequently law enforcement authorities being located away from the border areas makes it a functional necessity to delegate the powers of police, customs, immigration, and other border control aspects to the BMA. The conditions there also obviate the necessity of militaristic border-guarding infrastructure. 

The proposal of a single BGF for India goes against the GoM’s recommendation of “one border one force”, that is separate BGFs for borders with different countries. Accordingly, a new BGF, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), was raised and deployed in 2001 to guard the India-Nepal and India-Bhutan borders by converting the then Special Service Bureau into a uniformed BGF. The role of the Assam Rifles was also enhanced to include the guarding of the India-Myanmar border. The Border Security Force (BSF) continues to guard the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders, and the ITBP the India-Tibet border.

  In India’s case, varied operational challenges, terrain conditions, and inimical neighbours are some factors that are detrimental to the idea of a single BGF. For its two hostile neighbours, India requires militaristic infrastructure and methodology of border guarding, while the management of open borders with three other neighbours requires a totally different approach.

  The India-Pakistan border is particularly sensitive because of Pakistan’s open support in fomenting terrorism in the border regions of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The militaristic method of guarding this border needed to be augmented by an obstacle system, necessitating the construction of fences to prevent infiltration by militants and supply of logistics to sleeper cells of militants and smuggling of drugs from Pakistan. The BSF has to remain on its toes constantly to counter the changing methods of militants and smugglers, say tunnels and drones. The Line of Control along Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and approximately 200 km of the international border in the Jammu sector witnesses almost daily trans-border firing, attempts at infiltration, and Border Action Team attacks on forward defended localities. In these areas, border management actually takes the form of border defence.

  Given a large portion of the border with China is disputed, guarding it is militaristic and is done by both the Army and the ITBP. India employs a similar methodology along the Bangladesh border too mainly because of aggression by criminals. Heavy population density, similarity of language, centuries-old cultural and family ties, intertwined economies of both countries, and large riverine stretches make the 4096-km-long border porous and extremely complex to manage and control illegal migration and smuggling of daily-use goods.

  The Nepal and Bhutan borders are open, with citizens allowed free movement across them. Although these are peaceful borders with very little crime, they are prone to exploitation by forces inimical to India for infiltration of militants and smuggling of drugs and weapons. The SSB, which guards these borders by establishing border outposts, monitors movement of people and goods through intelligence-based operations.

  The border along Myanmar too is open. The extremely difficult terrain precludes constant surveillance and is patrolled mostly based on intelligence inputs. The Free Movement Regime along this border (suspended by India since 2023) also poses a problem of keeping track of tribal people coming in and going out.

  So, the varying nature and extent of India’s borders necessitates multiplicity of BGFs, each of which has to be especially trained to tackle operational challenges of the particular area of deployment. Creating a single large monolithic BGF, besides not suiting Indian conditions, will also pose several administrative, personnel management, and logistical challenges, as the requirement of training and equipment for different areas will vary drastically.

  In summary, the idea of a single BGF is impractical. Also, in view of functional necessity, each BGF has been delegated adequate powers under the Bharatiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita, the Customs Act, the Passports Act, the Emigration Act, and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, among others.

  In October 2021, the government rationalised the BSF’s powers to carry out search and seizures and made it uniformly applicable for up to 50 km from the international border in the bordering states. The delegation of limited powers under various laws as per requirement has worked well.

  So, extending the charter of BGFs to include other border control tasks like customs, immigration, and investigation of crimes committed on the borders will dilute their efficiency in their core function of border guarding and compel diversion of resources for these tasks. Such expansion of roles will necessitate enhancing training infrastructure for BGF personnel in these aspects. Police being a state subject, delegation of investigative powers to centrally controlled BGFs may also become a cause of conflict between the states and the Centre.

  The border management practices in India are dynamic in nature and undergo periodic review depending on the emerging challenges. Bringing about drastic changes in the existing structure is likely to be counterproductive, especially since the operational circumstances have not witnessed any.

  The proposal may however be examined to identify good points which may suit our conditions. Granting more teeth to the Department of Border Management is one such aspect. The focus should also be on modernising the BGFs both in terms of technology and human resource management.