Countering China in India's backyard

Centuries-old tryst

After Ming emperor Yongle’s death, admiral Zheng He’s voyages to the IOR in the early 15th century came to a halt, and the so-called “treasure ships” were dismantled. In the centuries that followed, China had no maritime presence worth the name in the Indian Ocean. It was only around 2008 that the PLAN began to use its anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to develop a quasi-permanent presence. The global financial crisis, and the waning US presence in the Asia-Pacific (Apac) region in the noughties accelerated this trend, most visibly in SCS. Over time, the PLAN began to maintain between three and six Chinese warships in the IOR for patrolling and conducting escort missions, as averred by the Chief of Naval Staff of India in April 2023.

  The PLAN’s growth has been phenomenal over the past 15 years or so. It has evolved from a “brown water” navy to a “blue water” force, backed by massive construction of a surface and sub-surface fleet commensurate with its global ambitions. China’s “Near Seas Defence and Far Seas Protection” strategy of 2015 was accompanied by a fundamental shift from coastal defence to the high seas. Its effects are palpable across the Indo-Pacific, from the “First Island Chain” in the Pacific at one end to the IOR at the other extreme. China’s presence in the IOR has manifested itself through dual-use BRI projects such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in Rakhine State in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Gwadar in Pakistan as well as Ream in Cambodia and Djibouti in Africa. It is a matter of great irony that the development of Hambantota port had initially been offered to India. It is only after India failed to respond that it was offered to China.

  Beyond these toeholds, the frequent presence of Chinese dual-use survey and research vessels, and fishing fleets, many of which are reported to be engaged in illegal unreported and unregulated fishing, complement the PLAN’s activities in the IOR.

China’s “all-weather” and “ironclad” partnership with Pakistan features a wide spectrum of collusion, ranging from defence and security engagement to the flagship China Pakistan Economic Corridor under the BRI. As things stand, within a decade, Pakistan’s naval fleet is likely to be overwhelmingly Chinese in origin, thus providing for even greater interoperability. China has also developed stakes in deep seabed resources in the Indian Ocean, having secured exploration rights from the International Seabed Authority in an area with rich polymetallic sulphide deposits in the Southwest Indian Ocean, not far from Mauritius and Madagascar. China has also put in place collaborative arrangements for marine scientific research with Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

  India’s dilemma

  In the 1970s, India supported the objectives of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace mooted by Sri Lanka, aimed at keeping at bay great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. With the passage of time, India’s position has changed in favour of an abiding presence of traditional stakeholders in the IOR. Initiatives such as the Indian Navy’s Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) have contributed to security and prosperity as have other regional frameworks like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). An outsider to the IOR, China is as yet only an observer at the IONS, and a dialogue partner of the IORA. 

Hugo Grotius’ principle of the "freedom of the seas" (Mare Liberum, or The Free Sea) asserts that the high seas are international territory and open to all. This is enshrined in the principle of the "freedom of the high seas”, codified in Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded in 1982. Freedom of navigation is the bedrock of international maritime law, which gives all nations, whether coastal or landlocked, the right to use international waters for lawful activities such as navigation, commerce, fishing as well as research. During a recent visit to China in July 2025, this writer had the opportunity to interact with Chinese scholars. One, a former PLA officer, brazenly asserted that the PLAN can and will enter the Indian Ocean. He added, albeit with a touch of rhetorical flourish, that “the Chinese aircraft Carrier Strike Group would expect replenishment support in Mumbai in the near future”.

  Even if one disregards the operatic manner of an individual scholar, there is no gainsaying the fact that India must carefully weigh its options in the face of a growing Chinese presence in the IOR. One of the fundamental challenges is that some IOR states, in fact, welcome a Chinese presence. Keeping China out of the IOR is not feasible from the standpoint of international law. The development of military deterrence, on the other hand, requires a focussed approach backed by the planned allocation of even greater resources. India has every right to protect its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from any illegal presence or activities. At a geopolitical level, it must examine options that can mitigate the adverse impact of an expanding Chinese outreach in the IOR.

  Several media reports have inferred that China has built or is building a surveillance post in the Coco Islands of Myanmar, just north of the Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) islands of India. This is a matter invested with considerable speculation, without a definitive conclusion. In his memoirs titled Breaking the Glass Ceiling, Lieutenant General Shakti Gurung (retired), who served as India’s defence attaché in Myanmar two decades ago, clearly states that he “did not come across any convincing facts that could support this assumption”. He also relates an instance when the then No. 2 in Myanmar's military regime, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, had requested India to provide a radar to be positioned on these islands. However, nothing came of it. It is instructive to note that such opportunities come but are rarely grasped. However, in recent years, India has gifted a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar, and delivered supersonic BrahMos missiles to the Philippines.

  Envisaging a strategic response

  India must carefully examine the facts of the Chinese presence, and take necessary and appropriate steps. If keeping China out of the IOR is not an option, obviously the steps considered by India have to bank more on gathering timely and accurate intelligence about the PLAN’s presence and activities. This implies the development of effective surveillance capabilities, both surface and sub-surface, as well as a degree of deterrence capability.

  Specifically, India should develop enhanced air and maritime surveillance platforms for regular monitoring of the Bay of Bengal as well as the western Indian Ocean. To achieve this, the Indian Navy’s fleet of P-8I aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets should be augmented, alongside expansion of underwater domain awareness with sensors, sonars, and integrated networks for real-time tracking of submarines and surface vessels.

  India must strengthen its coastal and island defences by investing in rapid response and expeditionary capabilities in the A&N and Lakshadweep islands. Priorities should include advanced amphibious warfare ships, missile systems, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Enhancing air defence and fighter aircraft presence on its island territories that reach out far into the IOR is integral to this task. This should be accompanied by the upgradation of runways, naval air stations, jetties and storage facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Command, which is India’s first tri-service command.

  Simultaneously, India must enhance defence diplomacy with IOR states through joint exercises, information sharing, and gratis (without charge) transfer of certain military assets. Such proactive engagement can help ensure that their ties with China do not undermine India’s security and strategic interests. India should also strive to rapidly expand its maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities through arrangements with IOR nations for timely sharing of Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long-  Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) data.

  India should also step up its Island Development Programme to ensure sustainable development of its island territories. In particular, it should expedite the Great Nicobar Island project, which involves the establishment of a major transhipment port, an international airport, and a township to leverage the islands' strategic location. Trade and tourism should receive a boost as a result of these actions, so that remote island territories are not exploited by others.

  Defence diplomacy with IOR states, joint exercises and patrols, information sharing, training and capacity building, and equipment provision, including the Coastal Radar Systems, should be accompanied by regularly sensitising IOR states about India’s core interests and red lines. For instance, the stationing of Chinese troops on their territory or hosting China’s surveillance presence in their ports or waters should be unacceptable.

  India’s ties with key maritime neighbours such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives have improved as a result of visits exchanged between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterparts. With Sri Lanka, the issue of continental shelf demarcation could crop up (there is a conflict of claims over the Afanasy Nikitin Sea Mount, which is rich in deep seabed minerals). Modi has recently announced a Deepwater Exploration Mission for critical minerals. India should try and involve Sri Lanka and the Maldives, where possible, in such missions in order to enhance mutual trust. Forging a long-term partnership for the exploitation of deep seabed minerals is in India’s interests. Failure to do so could potentially lead them to envisage a greater role for China in exploration activity in their EEZs.

  Moreover, there is considerable potential for India to promote its outreach to Global South nations in the IOR through initiatives such as Mahasagar (“Mutual and holistic advancement for security and growth across regions”). This initiative needs to be fleshed out and branded, like China’s BRI. India should rebrand its Lines of Credit and Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programmes as well as existing cultural and economic schemes under the rubric of Mahasagar. All stakeholders in India must have a common understanding of new foreign policy initiatives, especially for the IOR. It is vital to outline the details of such proposals, with clear-cut goals and objectives, within a fixed time following their announcement, and to ensure seamless coordination between the central and state governments in terms of their implementation.

  Like its sister arms, the Indian Navy has splendid capabilities. It should be used by the government to carry out small-budget, high-impact projects in its areas of interest. To this end, the Indian Navy has done well to recently launch its maiden initiatives of Indian Ocean Ship Sagar (“Security and growth for all in the region”) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement to enhance interoperability and consolidate its stature as the “preferred security partner” and “first responder” in the IOR.

  Deepening cooperation

  The IOR’s importance for India cannot be overstated, as the historian diplomat K M Panikkar presciently wrote 80 years ago: that without a well-considered and effective naval policy, “India's position in the world will be weak, dependent on others and her freedom at the mercy of any country capable of controlling the Indian Ocean”.

  As stated by Modi during the recent visit of his Mauritian counterpart, India remains fully committed to strengthening the security of Mauritius’ EEZ, and enhancing its maritime capacity. As with Mauritius, India should similarly work with other IOR states on joint surveys, navigation charts, and hydrographic data of their EEZs.

  India should continue to expand its MDA in the IOR through other key initiatives such as sharing AIS and LRIT data. It should increase the number of training slots for defence personnel from the IOR. Above all, it should develop both defensive and offensive capabilities, so as to dominate choke points during conflict.

  China’s presence in the IOR is a fact that can neither be wished away nor ignored. India’s efforts should be centred on what can be done to deepen its own cooperation with IOR states, especially seizing opportunities and completing projects on time. India’s credibility in its immediate neighbourhood must grow organically in the wake of successful high-level visits. Apart from proactive execution of strategic projects driven by the host nation’s priorities, efforts should be made to enhance intra-South Asian trade and investment flows. Failure to grasp opportunities to emerge as the preferred choice as development partner in the IOR is hardly an option for India.

  (The author is director-general, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal)