Before India became a declared nuclear-weapon state in May 1998, issues on national security were dealt with in various committees of the Cabinet or through high-level task forces set up by the government to advise on them.
The apex forum for national-security policy and decision-making was a Cabinet committee chaired by the prime minister, and it included the ministers of home affairs, defence, external affairs and finance. For long it was the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) and, later, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
There was no office of national security adviser (NSA). Under Indira Gandhi as prime minister, however, the chairman of the Policy Planning Committee in the Ministry of External Affairs, first D P Dhar and later G Parthasarathi (India’s former ambassador to China), served as the prime minister’s most senior advisers on issues including those relating to national security. This arrangement was discontinued under V P Singh, who, as prime minister, set up a National Security Council (NSC) on August 24, 1990, with the prime minister as chairman and the ministers of home affairs, defence, external affairs and finance as members, to serve as the principal policy and decision-making body on national security. The Council held its first and only meeting on October 5, 1990. The same decision created a Strategic Core Group, chaired by the Cabinet secretary, for inter-agency coordination on national security. While the idea of a NSC did not take root, the Strategic Core Group was the precursor of the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), also chaired by the Cabinet secretary, established in April 1999 as part of the architecture put in place after India’s nuclear-weapon tests in May 1998.
The Narasimha Rao government (1991-96) preferred a more flexible approach to national security and rejected the idea of a standing NSC. Rao argued in Parliament that under India’s system of collective Cabinet responsibility, such matters were best handled by specific Cabinet committees or groups of ministers.
The Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, which took office in March 1998, set up a task force under K C Pant, who was earlier defence minister, to recommend the constitution, role and responsibilities of an NSC. Its recommendations proved timely in the transformed security environment that followed India’s nuclear tests and its emergence as a nuclear-weapon state. The task force recommended converting the existing Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) into an NSC Secretariat (NSCS) and appointing an NSA. In November 1998, the Vajpayee government announced the setting up of an NSC headed by the prime minister, and it included the ministers in the following ministries: Home affairs, defence, external affairs and finance. The deputy chairman of the Planning Commission too was part of it. The post of NSA was created alongside it, and Brajesh Mishra, then principal secretary to the prime minister, became India’s first NSA, holding both posts concurrently. The JIC was merged into the new NSCS.
The members of the SPG, which was headed by the Cabinet secretary and had been set up in April 1999 for inter-agency coordination, included the secretaries to the ministries of home affairs, defence, external affairs and finance; the three services chiefs; and the heads of the intelligence agencies, with the NSA and the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission attending as special invitees.
In December 1998, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) was set up, with members drawn from retired senior civilian and military officials, economists, academics, scientists, and representatives of the media and the private sector. It was conceived as a non-governmental brains trust to advise the NSC on matters relating to national security. It was the first NSAB, headed by K Subrahmanyam, which prepared the draft of India’s nuclear doctrine.
Unfortunately, this brief spell of transparency and public accountability has never been attempted again, and opacity has returned to the working of India’s national-security establishment and its processes. When he was prime minister, Manmohan Singh considered a similar review in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008, but was persuaded to settle for an internal review, the results of which are not in the public domain.
The recommendations of the KRC, and of the GoM built on them, included a standalone NSA; a CDS as the single-point military adviser to the government, supported by a tri-services Integrated Defence Staff Headquarters; a Defence Intelligence Agency; and a National Technical Research Organisation for advanced technical intelligence gathering. The last two were set up in 2002 and 2004, respectively. A standalone NSA, with the rank of minister of state, was created by the Manmohan Singh government in 2004, but responsibilities were initially divided: J N Dixit, a former foreign secretary, served as NSA while former Intelligence Bureau director M K Narayanan was appointed special adviser to the prime minister on internal security. This led to some tension between the two officials. After Dixit’s death in January 2005, Narayanan became NSA with responsibility for both external and internal security. This arrangement has continued since, though the NSA has become a much more powerful figure under the Modi government since 2014. The post of CDS, by contrast, was created only in December 2019, two decades after Kargil.
During the Manmohan Singh government (2004-14), the national-security establishment appeared to acquire a degree of stability. Efforts to implement the recommendations of the KRC continued, and in 2011 a task force on national security was set up under the chairmanship of Naresh Chandra, former cabinet secretary, who headed the NSAB from 2011 to 2013. Its report, submitted in 2012, was not made public, presumably because it uncovered serious shortcomings in India’s security institutions and processes, including domestic security at both central and state levels.
I succeeded Chandra as chairman of the NSAB in 2013, and a major task given to the board by the prime minister was to draft a comprehensive national-security strategy for India. This had been attempted before, but the earlier drafts never saw the light of day. Our expectation was that this time the outcome would be different. The intention was to put the draft on the NSAB website and invite public debate on its contents. There could then be revision and refinement before the government adopted a national-security strategy as a formal document. In early 2014 the NSAB produced a 40-page draft titled “Building Comprehensive National Power: Towards an Integrated National Security Strategy”, but as general elections were round the corner, it was decided to submit it to the incoming government for a decision on how it could be taken forward. A presentation on the paper was made to the new prime minister, who appreciated its perspectives and recommendations, but regrettably there was no followup. The proposal to put the draft on the NSAB website was not approved. My term as NSAB chairman came to an end in February 2015, and the national-security setup subsequently underwent major changes. These are considered below.
In August 2019, through an amendment to the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, made under Article 77(3) of the Constitution, the office of the NSA and the NSCS were given a formal place in the machinery of government, with their role and responsibilities spelt out. This is, however, an executive instrument that can be amended by the same process. It confers no legislative sanction.
The NSAB was reconstituted after my departure in February 2015. Its composition became ad hoc, with its members drawn from retired intelligence, police and diplomatic-service officers reporting to the NSA and not to the NSC. They delivered inputs to the NSA on issues determined by him. The civil-society character of the NSAB is lost. In April last year, the NSAB was reconstituted again under the chairmanship of Alok Joshi, a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing, the external intelligence agency, and of theNational Technical Research Organisation, with new members drawn, as before, from the ranks of retired officials.
The current security setup in India is also opaque, with no parliamentary or public accountability. Although the NSA holds Cabinet rank, he is not a minister and hence is not answerable to Parliament. He, therefore, lies outside the system of ministerial responsibility, which is a key feature of parliamentary democracy.
There is, therefore, a case to be made for a national-security law that accords legislative status to India’s national-security setup, lending legitimacy to national-security institutions and offices with a precise delineation of roles and responsibilities. This would combine operational flexibility with institutional stability and enable parliamentary oversight, which could be carried out confidentially where necessary.