What lies ahead in China's Taiwan 'reunification' plan?

Amid rising tensions and military posturing, China's Taiwan policy continues to evolve. The next few years will be crucial

7 min read
Updated On: Aug 31 2025 | 9:13 PM IST
Chinese warship Luyang III sails near the US destroyer USS Chung-Hoon, as seen from the deck of the US destroyer, in the Taiwan Strait on June 3, 2023 (Photo: Reuters)

Chinese warship Luyang III sails near the US destroyer USS Chung-Hoon, as seen from the deck of the US destroyer, in the Taiwan Strait on June 3, 2023 (Photo: Reuters)

At one point, Taiwan President Lai Ching-te was supposed to travel to Guatemala in August this year.  Guatemala may not be a world power, but it’s one of the few countries in the world that recognises Taiwan’s government as the rightful ruler of China.  But the trip was cancelled abruptly: The administration of Donald Trump made it clear it would not allow Lai to transit through New York.  Previously, United States Presidents have generally let Taiwan’s leaders make short stops in the US. This time, Trump may have been signalling that his negotiations with Beijing were more important than signalling the traditional friendship with the island that China claims as part of its own territory, but which has steadily become more and more autonomous and distinct.  Today, the status of Taiwan has become one of the most potentially explosive issues between China and the US.  It is also crucial to the 26 million people who live in the Republic of China on Taiwan, one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies, but one formally unrecognised at the United Nations or by most major global powers.
  The origins of the Taiwan issue lie in history.  In 1895, after the war between China and Japan, the island became a Japanese colony.  However, in 1943 at the height of World War II,  the Cairo Conference brought together US President Franklin D Roosevelt with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, who declared that after the war was over, Taiwan would be returned to the Republic of China, the Nationalist state run by Chiang.  In 1945, at the end of the war, Chiang’s government took possession of the island.  But in an irony, having regained Taiwan, Chiang lost the mainland four years later in 1949, when he was defeated by Mao Zedong’s Communists in the civil war.  During the Cold War, Chiang’s regime maintained that it was the true Republic of China and would one day reconquer the mainland.  But the world gradually came to recognise the People’s Republic of China, with its capital in Beijing.  The Taipei government lost the China seat at the United Nations in 1971 and recognition from the US in 1979.  From 1979 onwards, all official relations between China and the US have been between Beijing and Washington.  The number of countries that now recognise Taiwan as the official China is down to about a dozen, mostly in the Caribbean or Pacific. 
  Still, Taiwan was not simply left to the mercies of the mainland.  In 1979, the US also passed the Taiwan Relations Act, often referred to as the Taiwan Recognition Act, which mandated the US to offer support for Taiwan’s self-defence in the case of an attack.   For the next quarter-century or so, China was unhappy at the continued US support of Taiwan, but did not make the island’s status a major issue.  The US and China were cooperating in trade and finance, and even in technology, both of them wary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  But the arrival of Xi Jinping as paramount leader in 2012 stimulated a new sense of urgency in Beijing on the Taiwan issue.  
  Since 2016, the Taiwan presidency has been in the hands of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party dedicated ultimately to independence for Taiwan, an outcome which Beijing declares is a “red line” that would lead to a military assault on the island.  In practice, Taiwan’s President from 2016 to 2024, Tsai Ing-wen, was subtle in her declaration of Taiwan’s growing autonomy without formally declaring independence.  Her successor, Lai Ching-te, has also avoided China’s red line, but has been bolder in suggesting that Taiwan has the right to seek its own destiny separate from China. In turn, Chinese leaders have condemned Lai as a “splittist”.
  The DPP period has coincided with Xi’s increasing sense of confidence about his political goals, and he has declared that the Taiwan problem cannot be left to a “future generation”, though he has given no timeline or blueprint as to how he intends to alter the situation.  But military threats against Taiwan have become more frequent, with endless sorties by fighter aircraft across the Taiwan Strait making it clear how easily China could attack the island from the air if it chose. These demonstrations of military muscle have led to a wider sense that a confrontation may be coming.
  Certainly, there are many analysts in Washington, DC, who are increasingly concerned about the fate of Taiwan. Matt Pottinger, who served as deputy national security advisor in the first Trump administration, has published a book titled The Boiling Moat, which emphasises the importance of keeping Taiwan safe by helping it to secure its own defence.  US advisors have pushed Taiwan to increase the military service period for its young men (which has now gone up from four months to a year).  And Japan has made it increasingly clear that it regards the continued status quo on Taiwan as in its own national interests, too.
Think tanks in Washington and Taiwan have held tabletop wargames that aim to map out what would happen in the event of a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan.  To be clear: Any such invasion would be hard to bring off. Even with the PLA’s fast-improving military capacity, an amphibious assault with the transportation of thousands of troops would be much harder than sending over fighter aircraft.  Taiwan’s beaches offer poor prospects for a D-Day-style landing.  In addition, American support has concentrated on Taiwan developing a “porcupine” strategy with the capacity to make Chinese troops pay dearly for any invasion.  That said, many of the wargames do end with a Chinese victory, and tremendous human and economic cost to the US, Asia as a whole, and the global economy.  Another scenario is the straits being blockaded rather than invaded; but that act too would likely be regarded as an act of confrontation by the  US, with similar reactions. 
  An additional factor has four letters: TSMC. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, is the world’s most famous semiconductor company and is the sole source of the highest-specification chips needed around the world. A conflict would, as of now, gravely impact the world’s supply chains for almost all electronic and technical equipment, from cars 
to information technology systems.
  What is the most likely scenario?  It’s plausible, as the Pentagon suggests, that Xi wants the PLA ready to be able to launch an assault on Taiwan in 2027. However, that doesn’t mean the attack will happen in that year.  The rational arguments against are many: An attack would at least trigger sanctions that would tank China’s sputtering economy, and it would also do immeasurable damage to China’s claim that it is a peaceful force for stability in Asia. 
  More likely in the short term are attempts to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics. The major parties are already heavily polarised, with disagreements over the economy as well as relations with the US and China. This ecology has created fertile ground for Chinese-sponsored social media disinformation to shape Taiwan’s politics. The presidential election of 2028 will be a testing ground for whether Taiwan can combine domestic stability with a coordinated response to an increasingly confrontational China.
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Written By :

Rana Mitter

Rana Mitter is the ST Lee Chair in US-Asia relations at the Harvard Kennedy School
First Published: Aug 31 2025 | 9:12 PM IST

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