An easy alliance that grew bold

“No flag, no weapons,” he reportedly said. Eventually, the shipments arrived under Israel’s flag. For India, desperate for supplies, the deal was worth the political discomfort. For Israel, it was proof that reliability had to be acknowledged openly.

Today, India is the largest buyer of Israeli arms, accounting for nearly 37 per cent of Israel’s total arms exports. Indian companies like the Adani Group are jointly producing combat and surveillance drones with the Israeli firm Elbit Systems, which are reportedly being used to support Israel’s war effort in Gaza.

In September, Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, visited New Delhi to sign a bilateral investment agreement aimed at expanding trade and laying the groundwork for a potential free trade agreement. Bilateral trade is mostly in the defence and security domain.

“India is a growing economic powerhouse, and cooperation with it is a tremendous opportunity for the State of Israel,” Smotrich said after signing the agreement.

How those secret arms exchanges of the 1960s evolved into the full-fledged “brothers in arms” defence partnership that India and Israel share today is worth exploring.

Covert ties

India had opposed the partition of Palestine in 1947, which led to the creation of Israel. The Jewish Nobel Prize-winning scientist Albert Einstein appealed to Nehru to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Nehru declined, citing the need to support Palestinian Arab rights and stating India’s policies had to be “selfish” for realpolitik reasons.

Like Palestine, India had suffered greatly as a British colony and was reeling from the horrors of Partition. Indian leaders such as Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi were sympathetic to the plight of Palestinian Arabs. India was also seen as a major post-colonial world leader, having co-founded the NAM.

But behind the curtain, it was a different story. In 1962, the sudden and intense military threat from China exposed critical shortages in India’s defence preparedness. With limited supplies and outdated equipment, India urgently sought international support.

Israel, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties, responded by covertly supplying small arms, ammunition, and possibly mortars and artillery shells. These weapons were vital for Indian troops operating in the Himalayan terrain, where rapid deployment and reliable firepower were essential.

These quiet dealings deepened. In the 1965 war with Pakistan, Israel again stepped in with supplies. By 1971, with the East Pakistan crisis escalating, the then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorised discreet transfers of equipment and instructors to aid Indian troops and the Mukti Bahini.

None of this was reflected in India’s public statements at the United Nations, which continued to champion the Palestinian cause. But India’s security planners increasingly saw Israel as a dependable partner.

Azad Essa, a journalist at Middle East Eye and author of Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel, believes these early gestures left a deep mark on India’s security elite. “When Israel assisted India during these wars, it signalled to the political class that Israel was a country it could depend on, even without formal ties. That’s when the security establishment began carving out deeper relationships with Israel in secret, and spy agencies like RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] and Mossad soon began cooperating,” he said.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, cooperation between RAW and Mossad quietly expanded. As India faced insurgencies in Punjab, Kashmir, and the north-east, Israeli trainers offered much needed inputs on counterterrorism and intelligence gathering skills. Politicians kept rhetorical distance, but the security bureaucracy was already building reliance.

The relationship came into full view during the 1999 Kargil war. Israel rushed in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery shells, and laser-guided munitions. Technicians worked overnight to fit Israeli Litening pods on India’s Mirage 2000 fighter jets, allowing precision strikes against Pakistani posts. Satellite imagery and intelligence gave an edge. What was once tentative, secretive assistance had by then become a tested lifeline.

Blossoming relationship

The formalisation of ties in 1992 turned those covert dealings into a structured partnership. The timing mattered: The Cold War had ended; the Soviet Union, India’s main arms supplier, had collapsed; and India had opened its economy. Israel, meanwhile, was emerging as a leader in cutting-edge defence technologies, especially drones and missile systems.

For India, Israel offered weapons without the political baggage that often accompanied Western suppliers. For Israel, India meant a vast market with long-term potential.

Kabir Taneja, deputy director and fellow with the strategic studies programme at the think tank Observer Research Foundation, said: “Israel is like a Walmart for defence equipment and India has no barriers on what it wants to pick from the shelves.”

“What India requires from Israel right now are advanced UAVs and systems that fill existing gaps, whether that’s drones or anti-drone technology,” he added.

Drones became the centrepiece of cooperation, as the Kargil war exposed the need for better surveillance in high-altitude battlefields. India bought Searcher and Heron UAVs from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

These systems quickly became workhorses along both the China and Pakistan borders. Through the 2000s and 2010s, the fleet grew with IAI-made Heron-1s, Searcher Mk IIs, and loitering munitions such as the Harop, which could dive into enemy radar sites.

The partnership also expanded into missile defence. The Barak-8 surface-to-air missile, jointly developed by IAI and India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), marked a shift from off-the-shelf purchases to co-development.

A major political boost came with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, the first ever by an Indian prime minister.

One of the most consequential outcomes is the Adani Elbit Advanced Systems, launched in Hyderabad in 2018 as India’s first private UAV factory. The plant produces Hermes 900 drones and counter-drone systems, based on Israel’s own battlefield experience. Some of these have been reportedly deployed in Gaza, linking Indian manufacturing indirectly to Israel’s conflicts.

Oshrit Birvadker, senior researcher at the Israel-based Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, explained the significance: “Joint ventures are facilitating the transfer of advanced military technology directly to India. This reduces import reliance and builds local capacity. But it also creates diplomatic complications, especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

For Israel, India’s role is equally important. “India’s consistent purchases provide a stable and vital source of revenue,” Birvadker said.

Raising the stakes

Even in times of conflict, with its own reserves stretched and more than $1.5 billion worth of arms exports to other countries delayed since October 2023, Israel ensured uninterrupted arms supplies to India.

Israeli drones and missile systems played a crucial role in India’s four-day conflict with Pakistan in May. India deployed a mix of Israeli-origin drones and loitering munitions, notably the Harop, for precision strikes across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir as part of Operation Sindoor.

India also used Harpy drones to detect and destroy enemy radar installations. The Barak-8 missile system secured airspace against possible retaliation. These high-precision interceptors were integrated into both naval and land-based platforms.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed these systems were used effectively in Operation Sindoor.

Agreements between IAI and Indian firms such as Elcom Systems and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) laid the foundation of co-producing drones domestically. This clear shift from simple procurement to joint development and manufacturing aligned with the Make-in-India initiative.

The Adani-Elbit joint venture (JV) highlighted this transition. The Hermes 900 UAVs built in Hyderabad can handle long-endurance missions, from surveillance to strike operations. The same facility also manufactures counter-drone systems, drawing directly from Israel’s experience in asymmetric warfare.

Adani has since developed its own variants of these platforms — the Hermes 900 reconfigured as the Drishti-10 and the Hermes 450 as the Drishti-6 — tailored to Indian requirements and marketed as indigenised systems.

Through its JV with Israel Weapon Industries called PLR Systems, Adani has moved deeper into defence. PLR produces advanced rifles in Gwalior, including the artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled ARBEL systems designed to plug into digital battlefield networks.

Adani’s $1.2 billion acquisition of Haifa Port in 2023 reinforced this integration. Haifa, a key Mediterranean hub, is part of the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor announced in 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi.

The purchase anchors India inside Israel’s strategic infrastructure while giving the latter long-term Indian involvement in its economy, especially at a time when some Western investors are reassessing exposure to Israel. Thus, India is no longer just a customer but a key stakeholder in Israel’s military supply chain.

But dilemmas remain. If drones produced in Hyderabad are deployed in Gaza, India risks reputational costs. The intertwining of commercial logic with humanitarian concerns underlines how arms trade and strategic interests go hand in hand.

Birvadker said, “By maintaining strong ties and supplying defence materials to Israel, India’s traditional support for the Palestinian cause has been called into question. This position may lead to friction with Arab nations and other countries that criticise Israel’s actions, potentially complicating India’s foreign policy in the Middle East and on the global stage.”

Growing interdependence

In 2022, during the Israeli defence minister Benny Gantz’s visit to New Delhi, he and his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh signed the India–Israel Vision on Defence Cooperation, a 10-year roadmap covering R&D, UAVs, cyber defence, and AI.

By mid-2025, these commitments began to take shape. In July, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh and Israel’s director general of defence, Major General Amir Baram, agreed to institutionalise cooperation on emerging technologies and expand JVs in drone production.

Beyond defence, labour agreements have sent over 20,000 Indian workers to Israel since 2023, mainly in construction and caregiving. While controversial in some quarters, these deals reflect growing economic interdependence.

Yet, the embrace of Israel cannot be seen in isolation. India still depends heavily on the Gulf states for energy and hosts nearly nine million migrant workers there. Alienating its Arab partners or Iran is not an option.

India has tried to keep matters compartmentalised. “Everyone is very clear. India doesn’t overlap its policies in the region. That’s how it’s been since the 1950s,” said Kabir Taneja.

As Israel faces growing international scrutiny, India’s deepening partnership reflects a careful strategy to safeguard its interests while navigating rising diplomatic risks.