Bridging the Gulf

Nearly five decades on, that relationship has come full circle. On September 17, 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) at Al Yamamah Palace in Riyadh. An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn described it as “the most significant upgrade to Pakistan–Saudi defence relations in decades”.

The pact, which had been under talks for years, was accelerated by Israeli airstrikes on Doha that targeted members of the Hamas negotiating team and sent shockwaves throughout the region. Qatar, historically the United States’ most trusted ally in the Gulf, was waking up to a harsh reality.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest country and a traditional recipient of US security guarantees, recognised that it could no longer rely solely on American protection in the face of a rising Israeli threat.

India offered a cautious response, saying it would “study the pact’s implications for national security and regional stability” and urged that parties to the SMDA “keep in mind mutual interest and sensitivities”.

Contrary to reports in the Indian media that exaggerated the pact’s direct impact, diplomats argued the agreement does not pose a direct military threat to India; in fact, it shows a new West Asian order that is increasingly determined to chart its own security course.

Talmiz Ahmad, former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said, “India is not involved in this agreement. It is entirely a response to the fact that Israel is currently perceived as a principal military threat across Asia.”

Nonetheless, a clause in the agreement stating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” has triggered alarm bells in India.

The agreement comes just months after India and Pakistan went head-to-head in May in the aftermath of a terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam. While the full text of the Saudi-Pakistan pact has not been officially published, this clause is widely seen as the lynchpin of the strategic arrangement.

“Pakistan may seek to leverage the pact’s collective defence clause to portray any future Indian military action as aggression against both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, internationalising a bilateral conflict and eroding India’s diplomatic space,” Ajay Bisaria, former Indian ambassador to Pakistan, said.

A longstanding relationship

The Saudi-Pakistan defence relationship is rooted in decades of shared strategic interests, stretching back to the early Cold War. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has provided training, advisory support, and operational cooperation to the Saudi armed forces, while Saudi Arabia reciprocated with financial and logistical assistance that strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities.

During the 1971 conflict with India, Pakistan received Saudi financial and diplomatic backing. Between 1982 and 1987, over 20,000 Pakistani troops were deployed in sensitive regions of Saudi Arabia such as Tabuk and the Eastern Province, performing training and operational duties. Similar deployments took place during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when Pakistan stationed thousands of troops in Saudi Arabia to deter potential escalation.

Beyond Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military influence has extended to other Arab states like Jordan and Egypt. One notable episode occurred in 1970, when Pakistani officers under General Zia-ul-Haq helped quell Palestinian uprisings during the Black September conflict in Jordan at the request of King Hussein. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Pakistani fighter pilots flew Egyptian MiG-21 fighter jets against Israel at Egypt’s behest.

In recent years, the Saudi-Pakistan partnership has embraced joint exercises, weapons procurement, and defence production initiatives.

“Pakistan’s foremost desire is to present itself as a strategically relevant state to Arab Gulf states in the evolving world order,” Khurram Abbas, a Pakistan-based defence analyst, said. “Growing Indo-Arab relationship was viewed as an attempt by New Delhi to isolate Pakistan from reliable economic and strategic partners of the Arab Gulf region. Therefore, through this agreement, Pakistan is eager to take a greater strategic role in the Arab Gulf security architecture, so that it could limit Indian influence in the Arab Gulf region,” he added.

Currently, roughly 1,600 Pakistani military personnel are stationed in Saudi Arabia mostly in advisory and training roles, consistent with the 1982 security protocol that formalised Pakistan’s support in enhancing Saudi defence capabilities.

An Islamic Nato?

In the SMDA, the clause that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” echoes Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (Nato’s) charter, which obliges member states to treat an attack on one as an attack on all.

In the wake of Israeli strikes on Doha in Qatar, an emergency summit was organised by the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, where Egyptian officials proposed a Nato-style joint task force for Arab nations. Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani emphasised the need to safeguard sovereignty and confront Israeli aggression.

Meanwhile, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — announced that they would activate a provision in their joint defence agreement which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar said that several Islamic nations could follow suit and join the SMDA, adding that if more joined, “this will become a Nato-like alliance”.

However, observers suggested this is largely rhetorical with minimal operational effect.

“Some have mentioned an Islamic Nato, an Arab Nato, or an Eastern Nato. To be frank, there is no basis for this in reality. I do not believe there is a strategic consensus or shared perspective among the countries involved, which would be necessary for such a broad security arrangement,” said Ahmad.

No nuclear umbrella

A non-signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Pakistan has long faced allegations of nuclear proliferation, most famously through Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic weapons programme. Khan was accused of running an illicit network transferring sensitive nuclear technology to countries such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea in the 1990s to the early 2000s.

These episodes have cemented Pakistan’s reputation as a state willing to bend international norms in pursuit of strategic influence.

In 2013, a BBC report revealed that Saudi Arabia had invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects and believed it could obtain atomic bombs at will.

However, officials from both countries stressed that the current agreement does not extend to nuclear cooperation or deterrence guarantees.

When asked in a media interview whether Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence would extend to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said that the capabilities Pakistan possesses would be available under the terms of the agreement. But he later clarified that a nuclear umbrella was “not on the radar”.

A senior Saudi official, speaking anonymously to Reuters, later described the pact as a comprehensive defence arrangement covering all military means.

Israel remains West Asia’s only nuclear-armed state. For many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Israel’s actions have deepened apprehensions of strategic vulnerability.

In recent years, Iran’s suspected pursuit of a nuclear weapon has further unsettled the balance, prompting traditional rival Saudi Arabia to warn that if Iran were ever to acquire a nuclear weapon, the kingdom would feel compelled to follow suit.

Yet experts underline that there is no nuclear risk from the SMDA. “Pakistan is in no position to share nuclear weapons technology with any country, including Saudi Arabia, and nuclear weapons are not a strategic factor in West Asia. Conflicts in the region, whether involving Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, or Iran, do not hinge on nuclear capability,” said Ahmad.

India’s Gulf outreach

For India, the SMDA presents a set of challenges as Pakistan aims to counterbalance India’s growing influence in the Gulf. Pakistan has long viewed India’s expanding partnerships with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as an attempt to isolate Pakistan from critical economic and strategic partners. This agreement allows Pakistan to reclaim a degree of regional influence.

However, Saudi Arabia remains a pivotal partner for India. Bilateral trade, defence cooperation, and investment links have steadily increased since Prime Minister Narendra Modi elevated the Gulf as a foreign policy priority.

India’s economic stakes in the Gulf remain substantial. At over $176 billion, trade with the GCC accounted for nearly 15.8 per cent of India’s total trade in 2023–24. Saudi Arabia alone represented about $43 billion, including $31.4 billion in imports and $11.6 billion in exports.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, offered an opportunity for India to expand its footprint in the region. Linking Gulf infrastructure, energy, and trade networks with Europe, the corridor positioned India as a strategic bridge while countering growing Chinese influence in West Asia.

However, the corridor has faced challenges. As of mid-2025, progress remains cautious and largely in the planning stage, with core segments yet to be contracted or funded.

Bisaria emphasised IMEC’s importance and said: “India can anchor its Gulf outreach in initiatives like IMEC to foster shared connectivity, while emphasising mutual security interests and closely watching Saudi–Pakistan defence ties.”

The geopolitical instability in the region — particularly the conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran — have complicated efforts to advance the corridor. Egypt has stressed that resolving the Palestinian issue is crucial for IMEC’s success and for peace in the region.

To ensure the Saudi–Pakistan pact does not limit its strategic space, India must accelerate economic integration and deepen defence and maritime security cooperation with the region.

A region in flux

Today, the Gulf region is again unsettled. The Gaza conflict, Israel-Iran tensions, and political upheaval in Syria show how volatile the region can be.

As Ahmad said: “The situation in West Asia is extremely fluid. India has strengthened its bilateral ties across the region, from Israel to Saudi Arabia and Iran, but it must continuously navigate a changing strategic order, where alliances shift quickly and regional threats evolve almost daily.”

Although the Saudi–Pakistan pact is not a bloc yet, it does show that the Gulf powers are increasingly shaping their own security policies independent of traditional Western frameworks.