The Nato conundrum

A possible Trump presidency is bad news

The second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine approaches on February 24 but all eyes in Kiev, Moscow, and Brussels, headquarters of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), will be focused on the US presidential election in November. Donald Trump, the near-certain Republican nominee, appears to have a strong chance of returning to the White House. That Mr Trump’s victory would be the worst possible outcome for the EU and Ukraine was underlined on February 10, when he stated that under him the US would not defend a Nato country that spends less than 2 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defence. On the contrary, he asserted, he would tell the Russians “to do whatever the hell they want”. This statement, which predictably loomed large over the Munich Security Conference last weekend, violates Article 5, the operating fulcrum of the 75-year-old agreement, which posits that an attack on one Nato member is construed as an attack on all. It is also, by implication, bad news for Ukraine, which is struggling with an acute shortage of defence equipment against a resurgent Russia, worsened by a resistance in the Republican-dominated Lower House of the US Congress to renew military and civilian aid. Ukraine is not a full Nato member but part of its decade-old “enhanced opportunity partner interoperability programme”, which means it cooperates closely with the group. Military setbacks to Ukraine would threaten European security.

Under-spending by Nato members has been an issue that irked Mr Trump and Presidents before him. But his latest threat — which The Economist has described as a “mobster’s racket” — ignores the fact that the 2 per cent investment guideline is not a binding commitment. It was a pledge first made in 2006 by Nato defence ministers as a means of smoothing burden-sharing arrangements and was reiterated in 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimea. Though the Trump administration had a valid point about most Nato members ignoring this commitment — in 2014, only three members spent 2 per cent or more of GDP on defence — the situation has changed since then because Europe fears an attack by Russia soon. By this year, 18 of Nato’s 31 members are expected to meet this target. The Baltic countries, which form the first line of defence in the event of a Russian attack, have started building a network of trenches and fortifications along their eastern border. Given the asymmetries in both conventional and nuclear weapons between Europe and Russia, it is unclear how far Nato can muster an effective deterrent without US military support. Analysts suggest that Europe will have to spend much more.

For India, the question is how it should respond to a possible Nato-minus-US configuration. The alliance has been the centre of the post-war security architecture. It is worth noting that in June last year, India rejected feelers from the US that it (India) should explore a Nato-plus engagement focused on China. The group includes Nato plus five US allies — Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and South Korea. Though this informal grouping could offer security cover in its territorial tensions with China, the foreign ministry’s position was that joining it would have limited New Delhi’s strategic autonomy, particularly given India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). New Delhi’s diplomatic balancing acts have stood it in good stead. Any alterations in transatlantic relations should invite a similar approach.