Independence on a tightrope: India's foreign policy choice

India has carefully calibrated relations with Russia, but EU's decision to impose price cap on Russian oil will be the next testing point for India in balancing its national and strategic interests

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s praise for India’s independent foreign policy at the Valdai Club conference in Moscow late last week can be viewed as a pragmatic recognition of the realpolitik embedded in New Delhi’s geopolitical calculations. Ever since Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine that started on February 24, India has been forced to weigh the benefits of its strengthening alliance with the United States against the needs embedded in its ties with Russia that date back to the Soviet era. This has demanded an intricate balancing act by New Delhi, principally because India’s defence forces largely rely on Russia for hardware and spares, even as it is building closer defence and economic ties with the US through the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to counter growing Chinese power in the region.

Though India has consistently abstained or voted against anti-Russian resolutions in the United Nations, it has leavened these moves with some understated but unmistakable criticism against Russia for not exploring dialogue in its differences with Ukraine. In mid-September, at a face to face meeting, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also expressed disapproval for Mr Putin’s Ukrainian adventurism in direct terms. These critiques, however, did not prevent Russia from becoming a major supplier of crude oil to India, accounting for almost a fifth of its overall imports. In September, Russia became India’s largest supplier because of its willingness to offer competitive rates, forcing traditional West Asian suppliers to cut prices and ending, for a while, the hegemony that the region exercised over fossil fuel supplies.  Foreign Minister S Jaishankar has also been unequivocal in defending India’s continuing relationship with Russia to Western powers. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also acknowledged the ties as one of “necessity”.

This reality was, in fact, recognised in June this year when the IPEF grouping of 14 countries was formed. The creation of “four pillars” under this rubric was reportedly the result of an Indian demand. India has joined three of these “pillars” holding up the IPEF, but chose to stay out of the one concerning “connected economies”.  It is also worth noting that India did not attract sanctions last year despite buying Russia’s S-400 air defence missile systems. But the US has been unhappy enough to renew its F16 fighter aircraft deal with Pakistan recently and in taking the lead in removing the country from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force despite India’s repeated complaints of Islamabad’s continued sponsorship of terrorist groups. 

New Delhi’s calibrated diplomatic readjustments since February have raised concerns in the public discourse that India is reviving historic ties with Russia at the expense of the US, which remains its best bulwark against China. This notion is somewhat exaggerated. For one, Russia is no longer a key source of new defence equipment—Europe, the US and Israel are emerging as key suppliers. For another, India is nowhere near the largest buyer of Russian energy — Europe remains in top spot. The European Union’s decision to impose a price cap on Russian oil in December will be the next testing point for Indian diplomacy in balancing its national and strategic interests.