Who needs a national security strategy?

The UK is not alone, others without a codified constitution include Israel, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia and Canada, among others. This buttresses the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan’s argument in his book Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India’s Military, citing Israel not publishing an NSSD, too.

Each nation takes its own unique approach. UK’s NSSD was initially “stimulated by the US national security strategy development (and a wish on the part of some British commentators to see a distinctive UK voice in global security strategy)” claims David Omand, former permanent secretary and security and intelligence coordinator at the UK Cabinet Office, writes Alan Stolberg. The UK at least pieced together an NSSD in 2008, while Israel continues to neither have an NSSD, nor a codified constitution. South Africa published its first NSSD, the 1996 White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, when it abolished apartheid. It needed a document to showcase both internally and externally what its new definition of national interests and national security was. China published its first white paper titled China’s National Security in the New Era more than a decade after formulating the National Security Commission and National Security Law. The white paper states that “a higher level of security is now required to support higher-quality development.” Not publishing an NSSD has supported Israel’s nuclear ambiguity stance, but probably its ambiguity became a burden and, after the October 7 (2023) attack, Israel legislated and mandated the next political regime to provide one. The United States (US), mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, publishes one, frequently, reflecting its security strategies with the changing geopolitical zeitgeist. 

Pakistan has also published an NSSD. But with its repeated denials on the use of terrorism as state policy in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, the world is pushed to read the full doctrine by piecing together facts and factoids more without the NSSD than within. For example, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s speech at the UN General Assembly in 2025, where he categorically extolled, not just for national security but global security, the lofty effort Pakistan undertakes against radical Islamic terrorism.

Why do some countries not codify their NSS? Every country looks at its own security needs and decides whether it is in their best interest to publish a single NSSD or not. And if yes, what shape or form it should take.

Thus, saying India does not have a national security strategy or doctrine is akin to claiming that the UK does not have a constitution.

In 2019, the UK Supreme Court judgment in Gina Miller versus the prime minister, stated: “Although the United Kingdom does not have a single document entitled ‘the constitution’, it nevertheless possesses a Constitution, established over the course of our history by common law, statutes, conventions and practice. Since it has not been codified, it has developed pragmatically, and remains sufficiently flexible to be capable of further development.”

A very similar argument can be made about India’s national security doctrine and strategy. India since its independence has been facing threats which continue till date and top the nation’s threat landscape. In 2017, the first CDS, General Bipin Rawat first publicly articulated the 2.5 front threat. In 2024, EAM S Jaishankar aptly told a journalist that, “Every country has its own way of communication, its own way of policy formulation. Because someone else puts out a document every three years or four years, it is not necessary I follow that model. I could have it ... you know I could tell you that it exists but I have to kill you if I tell you ... so the point is different countries deal with this differently.” He then went on to state, “There is, I think, a growth in the sense of what is national security in the country and I think we would deal with it our own way.”

So there is a method and design in what is India’s national security doctrine and strategy, but to codify/publish it is a different discussion altogether. As stated by the EAM, similar to the UK constitution, India’s NSS continues to pragmatically evolve. That it is not reactionary but proactive can be deciphered in many ways. One of the most cogent examples can be found in the abrogation of Article 370 on Jammu and Kashmir, which took years to execute. Another example can be found in the escalation matrix that India has shown against Pakistan over the past few terror attacks. After the 2016 Uri attack, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that blood and water cannot flow together and suspended India’s participation in the Permanent Indus Commission. Pakistan might not have seen it coming even after a similar post-Pulwama warning, but the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty post-Pahalgam underscored the matrix. Surely there are several such matrices in the works. Incorporating the economic front, the EAM cited the elevation of semiconductors from an economic competitiveness issue to a national security one. Today generative AI can help provide an exhaustive list as per one’s own perspective of national security.

Many foreign researchers view Operation Sindoor not only as a success but as a learning for their own nations. Arizona State University’s Small Wars Journal published an essay titled India’s Wake-Up Call: Why US Defence Reform Must Match the Speed of Modern War. It states, “India’s overwhelming success demonstrated something more enduring than airpower. It validated a national defence doctrine built around efficient domestic industrial strength”, adding that the US needs to improve its own new weapons procurement policies similarly.

Some people might have the wrong expectations from the NSSD. They envisage it as a large corpus that elaborates policies down to the dregs, identifying each threat and elaborating solutions. That is far from reality. Moreover, some argue for utilising a whole-of-government approach where every department and agency has a say in the strategy’s development; such a strategy could be watered down with every agency’s concern being listed and no specific identified focus.

The NSSD, if and when compiled, only provides that “one ring to bind them all”, taking The Lord of the Rings analogy – the top-most level of abstraction (the ring) in any nation’s security strategy that precipitates into other classified and unclassified strategies and policies across whole of the government. That unclassified top NSSD needs to be abstract enough to not compromise the security strategy with specifics while providing guidance towards meeting national interests. In the article ‘Unpacking Trump’s NSS’, Carnegie Institute’s James Acton aptly states, “A normal NSS(D) is neither a playbook nor a fantasy novel, but a rough guide to policy.”

This brings up some pertinent questions: Do we really need a singular document? Why write a single NSSD? Is there a genuine need, especially when there are developed nations thriving even without codified constitutions? Are there other and better ways to reach the same objective, as the EAM said?

Surely, publishing an NSSD helps institutionalise the grand strategy for the whole of government and nation. This helps the government and nation to work in sync and meet the enshrined national interests, both internally and on the international stage.

But in today’s mediatised world, the same NSSD runs the risk of being weaponised against the nation.

This weaponisation need not be large or go viral, but can create micro undercurrents.

The US Army War College’s Alan Stolberg published a rubric to cover the major aspects of any nation’s national security strategy documentation, titled How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents. Apart from covering the basics, the report provides rich insights through comparisons of case studies on the development of NSSDs of five nations – Australia, Brazil, South Africa, the UK, and the US.

While other nations provide parts of Stolberg’s rubric, the US provides the most detailed guidance on its NSS in a single starting document. He observes that the NSS is a reflection of the national interests identified by the political leadership. A good example of this articulation can be found in 2002, when US President George W Bush sent back the NSSD draft to his National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice voicing his dissatisfaction with the words, “It doesn’t sound like me”. Hence, the draft was redrafted in his own words. The 2025 NSSD and the compendium 2026 National Defence Strategy document also show similar congruency with the views of President Donald J Trump. 

In Arthashastra, statesman and philosopher, Chanakya states that national security and economic stability are inseparable. Thus, at the apex level of national security, aspiration or national interest implies a high standard of living for its citizens.

In 2022, the prime minister articulated this grand strategy in his vision of a Viksit Bharat by 2047. This national interest unfolds into a national objective of a $30-$40 trillion economy by 2047, looking at international benchmarks. Thus, any and every activity initiated externally or developed organically in- house that moves the nation away from this national objective is a security challenge. The more it deviates, the higher the security threat.

Thus, every extension of Operation Sindoor would have possibly created a diversion.

Stolberg argues that an official document helps in three ways: It brings the various arms of the executive in sync with the security vision of the political leadership. It provides guidance to the legislative arm to facilitate the same. And lastly, it is a strategic communication tool for both domestic and foreign audiences. The NSSD eventually dovetails into other documents that help execute upon the NSS’ vision. 

It can be safely argued that even without an apex NSSD, the PM’s clarion call has set the cadence towards a developed nation by 2047, for not only the whole government but the nation as a whole. During the 2026 Raisina Dialogue, a visibly elated President Alexander Stubb of Finland stated he was “super happy” about the joint Instagram post with the Indian PM as the post eventually reached over 5.1 million views. His glee is understandable, as the total population of his country is a little over 5.5 million. When the Indian prime minister leads the world with the most followers on social media (Instagram and X), with a reach more than that of the next six leaders combined, then no document can provide strategic communication better than him.

Meanwhile, speaking at the same Raisina Dialogue, US deputy secretary of state Christopher Landau stated that “We are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago.” Thus India might need to take a more scenic route towards Viksit Bharat.

Even without an NSSD, the unfolding strategy is quite apparent and the government continues to fill the gaps, as and when required. Quoting the report of the group of ministers on national security, 2000, Priyanka Patel and Arun Vishwanathan stated in their research paper, India’s National Security Strategy Document: Rationales and Challenges (Political Science Review, 2023), the two most important factors that shape national security of a country are its external environment and internal situation, along with their intersection. The Raksha framework stands squarely at that intersection. The framework adequately covers i) strategic partnerships, ii) capacity building, iii) indigenous defence exports and iv) maritime security.

Stolberg said, “National strategies that were in place for nations that functioned as democracies were either classified or, if unclassified, typically found in senior leader speeches, testimony before legislative branches of government, or in interviews or press conferences provided to the media.” This aligns well with the PM’s global outreach and the public statements on India’s NSS by other top leaders of his Cabinet. Consequently, building on such available but distributed public information, generative AI can compile publicly available data and provide guidance on any nation’s national security strategy at any length. The government does not need to compile them into a single document itself.

In the case of the US NSSD of 2010, Stolberg writes, “Much of the information contained in the NSS was extracted from the administration’s policy—often articulated in key presidential speeches—essentially codifying what was already stated” quoting US National Security Staff officers, Colonel Ronald Tuggle, and Ambassador Mary C Yates.

Thus, AI prompts such as the one below can instantly spin out the latest version of India’s NSS, customised for the specific seeker: What are India’s primary national security interests and national objectives as laid out by the PM. And what is the nation’s strategy to achieve them?

Most of the children of generative AI, namely Google’s Gemini, X’s Grok, and OpenAI’s ChatGPT spell out very similar responses, with no appreciable hallucinations, citing primarily the government’s Press Information Bureau (PIB) reports. And provide further links deeper into the individual ministries and their various efforts and programmes to meet the identified national interests and objectives. The results primarily map a road towards Viksit Bharat, through self-reliance, zero tolerance of terrorism, nuclear deterrence, economic and technological security, diplomatic balancing, strategic autonomy and multilateralism etc.

These all seem to be in line with the views for a Viksit Bharat shared by Raghuram Rajan, the former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor, currently professor of economics at University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business. But at a mock class he left an open question for extra credit – Why does India want to be a superpower?

Because, “If you want peace, prepare for war”, says the old Latin adage (Si vis pacem, para bellum) originally by Vegetius in the old Roman military tract De Re Militari. That’s the obvious answer for any Stanford Graduate School of Business student. It’s a fundamental tenet nations are built upon. In his first few addresses to the American Congress, in the early 1790s, George Washington made multiple references to it. The most apt one was, “If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”

Many naysayers quip the absence of a codified NSS creates ad hoc or mis-calibrated policymaking, resulting in incomplete or missing policies. The Indian context does not support this claim. India’s major threats have been primarily consistent since Independence and the nation has steadily upgraded its strategy to meet them. Threats are evaluated almost on a hands-on basis and are vectored up the system through various Cabinet committees, like the Cabinet Committee on Security, Strategic Policy Group, National Security Council, and the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Group.

To name a few specific efforts, both military and civil, command theatreisation, atmanirbharta, the Indus Water Treaty, Unified Payments Interface, space, the missile and drone programmes, the nuclear programme, semiconductors, submarine programmes, all fall into the larger security jigsaw puzzle, squarely. The trade-offs between national objectives, their timing, internal capabilities, international constraints, reconciling cultural & traditional diversities, etc. lead to decisions and policies sometimes taking a more scenic route than the originally envisaged one.

For example, military theatreisation has been in the works for a while. Operation Sindoor showed seamless interactions between the three services in the western region, which is on its way to becoming the official western theatre – one of the first three theatres envisaged in the command theatreisation process. The other two theatres are the maritime theatre and the northern theatre. Another example can be gleaned from the present global energy security crisis where petrol and other petrochemical prices hyperventilated in most nations, while India did not see any of that fluctuation. Realigning crude oil procurements around the Strait of Hormuz and American tariffs might seem like a reactive effort but it was based on deep proactive relations of the past.

The only conceivable component not visible in a UK-constitution-like NSS is benchmarking how the nation is faring in its voyage to 2047. Surely, the political leadership, the National Security Council Secretariat, Niti Aayog and other agencies routinely check the course and make corrections as and when required.

AI can also help identify requirements and public perception. And if, in one of those course corrections, the leadership decides that more of the NSSD needs to be published, surely it will be provided – like the Raksha framework.

To summarise, the top level of abstraction, with a whole-of-nation approach, in India’s voyage towards becoming a developed nation by 2047, any effort that adds a detour is a national security risk. The larger the detour the larger the threat. This builds a constantly evolving national security strategy that is dynamic and pragmatic. All strategies to mitigate such detours are part of the national security strategy envelope – nothing empowers the citizen more.