China's expanding rocket force

This article examines the impact of China’s modernisation of its missile force, in particular its conventional and dual-role missile capabilities, their organisational development, deployment and posture; and its implications in the Indian context. It concludes that People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) expanding missile inventory poses a serious strategic and operational challenge to India in the event of a future conflict. Therefore, India needs to closely watch the development of the Chinese conventional and dual-role missile capabilities, and build its strategic missile force to protect its vital interests.

Strategic orientation

The PLARF plays a dominant role in all aspects of deterrence critical to China’s national security. Not only nuclear, but also conventional deterrence, including aspects of space, and informational deterrence. Chinese white papers have emphasised this expansive thinking and they consider the PLARF as the core component of China’s strategic deterrence. Originally, the PLARF was solely responsible for nuclear-armed missiles; its role charter has since expanded to include conventional missiles, while its nuclear focus has not wavered. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategists believe that conventional missiles serve as a powerful deterrent in coercive diplomacy, in addition to their role in PLA joint campaigns. 

They provide the ability to undertake long-range strikes with precision, or simply as missile barrages — which is a clear advantage on a conventional battlefield and for which there is no substitute, as of now. The PLARF has consequently focused on qualitative improvements in China’s conventional missile force, by maintaining these forces at a certain scale and level of readiness to leverage their effect in a regional or a border conflict.

A few aspects merit attention. At the apex level, while the Rocket Force is commanded by the PLARF commander, the formal decision-making of the force on matters of manpower, training, and equipping rests with the PLARF standing committee. Remarkably, it is the political commissar who chairs the PLARF standing committee, while the PLARF commander acts as a deputy at this forum. In essence, it is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that decides how to shape the Rocket Force — whether it needs additional missile brigades and launchers, of what type or in what numbers; or the dispersal of the missile force into remote silos due to the geographic proximity of its adversaries; or the development of road-mobile launchers; or the hypersonic glide vehicles and MIRV/FOBS technologies to increase the efficacy of its missile force. While MIRV stands for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, FOBS is the abbreviation for fractional orbital bombardment system.

At a functional level, the PLARF headquarters under the PLARF commander comprises four departments — the staff, political work, logistics, and discipline. The staff department oversees operational and training matters, while the political department handles ideology, political loyalty, and personnel matters. The staff department also mans the command and control nodes down to forces in the field. Additionally, the PLARF headquarters has specialised units under its direct command for conduct of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic countermeasure (ECM), and inventory security tasks. The logistics and equipment department controls the PLARF’s research and development (R&D) functions for new missile equipment. In a nutshell, the PLARF headquarters is fully organised to plan, coordinate, and undertake a mix of nuclear and conventional missile strikes in regional and global contexts.

At an operational level, the working relationship between the PLARF and the Joint Theatre Commands still needs some clarity. Simply put, the six missile bases do not geographically overlap with the five Theatre Commands. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the PLARF is well-enmeshed into the Theatre Commands. PLARF units are also seen taking part in routine PLA exercises. This indicates a fair degree of jointness between the two, but perhaps only in the context of deployment of conventional missiles. The nuclear component of the force — although subordinate to the missile base in peacetime — is under the control of the China Manned Space (CMC). Given this duality in PLARF’s role, it might be fair to deduce that the authority to launch even conventional missiles might initially rest at the CMC level.

Growing missile force

Established as an independent branch of the PLA in 1966, the PLARF was originally raised as the Second Artillery Force, and designed to handle China’s inventory of land-based missiles. Initially, the inventory included the short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) — DF-1 & DF-2 — and later the PLA inducted the intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — DF-3, DF-4, and DF-5. In the 1990s, China added the road-mobile solid-fuel MRBM DF-21 and two versions of SRBMs DF-11 and DF-15. In the 2010s, it added the road-mobile solid-fuel ICBM DF-31; the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) Changjian CJ-10; the first hypersonic missile DF-17; an improved version of the road-mobile DF-31 called DF-41; and a newer IRBM DF-26, which could take on a mix of tasks.

After the reforms of 2015-2017, the PLARF’s institutional importance also rose, with the Rocket Force being upgraded to a full service. This upgrade did not involve a grade change, unlike the army, navy and air force, which were subsumed under the Theatre Commands. Besides, it also came with an increase in the number of missile brigades — a total of 10 brigades were added between 2015 and 2017 — which equated to more than 33 per cent expansion in the size of the Rocket Force. Ever since, China’s leadership has been focusing on upgrading its missile capability in terms of its numbers, range, and accuracy. Unmistakably, the PLARF has evolved from being a small, unsophisticated rocket force into a large, modern missile force with a wide range of advanced nuclear, conventional, dual-role, hypersonic, and sea-based systems.

Of the six missile bases (61 to 66) that oversee 45 missile brigades, there are around 21 nuclear brigades, 14 conventional brigades, eight dual-role brigades, and five unidentified brigades. Base 61 with a mixed-strike capability covers the Taiwan contingency; Base 62, again mixed, covers the South China Sea and is also known to possess anti-ship missile capability; Base 63, although mixed, is largely a nuclear-missile capable base; Base 64, opposite South Asia and Central Asia, is primarily a nuclear base and is equipped with DF-41 ICBMs; Base 65 overlooks the Korean Peninsula; and Base 66 is the strategic punch of its Rocket Force and is based in central China. Besides, the PLARF’s missile support bases numbered from 67 to 69 look after specialised tasks of stockpiles, engineering, and testing-cum-training, respectively.

While the PLARF structure has largely remained unchanged over these decades, a few developments are significant. One, there has been a marked increase in the number of missile brigades assigned to each base. Two, each brigade operates only one type of missile. The number of missile launchers also vary for each type of missile brigade. According to some estimates, SRBM brigades have 27-36 launchers; MRBM/IRBM brigades have 24-36 launchers; ICBM brigades operate 6-12 launchers; and the newly constituted DF-41 ICBM brigades have up to eight launchers. Consequently, it is estimated that the PLARF currently has 162-216 SRBM launchers, 87-96 MRBM launchers, 78-96 GLCM launchers, 216 IRBM launchers, and around 110 ICBM launchers in its inventory. By the 2030s, this figure is likely to grow to at least 108-144 SRBM launchers, 156-192 MRBM launchers, 78-96 GLCM launchers, 252 IRBM launchers, and 500-odd ICBM launchers. All figures here are sourced from Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey report on PLARF Order of Battle, 2023.

Each missile base, in turn, has its integral support regiments, which work behind the scenes to ensure that the launchers and the inventory are well-maintained; and the launchers reach where they are needed to reach and get successfully fired. These missile support regiments are referred to as the training, communications, operations, support, and equipment inspection regiments. The last one is particularly important, as it is responsible for handling the warheads. Each missile brigade also has another 4-6 missile support battalions, akin to missile bases, to undertake communications, operations, and technical functions 

such as loading, hoisting, propellant injection, testing assembly, and warhead mating of missiles, when ordered.

Two other developments matter, as well. First, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of missile silos in China. Construction of three very large missile silo-fields has been reported at Yumen in Gansu province, Hami in Eastern Xinjiang, and Yulin in Inner Mongolia — about 300-plus sites in all. Whether these silo-fields indicate an increase in the missile inventory, or, as some experts argue, that these additional silos are part of a PLARF strategy to deceive the adversaries to expend their missile counter-strikes on dummy targets, cannot be said with conviction. These could have even been built to accommodate the inventory of the additional missile brigades, created in 2015. Conversely, the remoteness of some of the silos is also intriguing as these could be challenging to access and that makes the wartime management of the inventory even more difficult. The purpose of the missile silo-fields is yet to fully unfold.

Second is the development of the FOBS. An FOBS differs from an ICBM in that an ICBM goes up and comes down along a defined parabolic path, while an FOBS initially enters into a low-earth orbit and then glides back to attack the target. The FOBS has several advantages, including the shorter trajectories, less time to reach the target, and evasion of the electronic warfare (EW) radars. However, they have issues of low payload and accuracy. But as these parameters improve, it could well be a weapon of choice for the PLARF to offset the advantage of the Western missile shield. In the regional context, they possibly have limited utility, but could still be deployed unconventionally to strike at targets in India’s hinterland, or its island territories.

Overall, the PLA is of huge importance to the readiness of its missile force, largely in response to the US’ strategic posture. In the past, while it was vulnerable to the numerical and ISR superiority of the US, the rapid modernisation of the Rocket Force seems to be changing and offsetting this disadvantage, and improving its credibility in a possible conflict over Taiwan. This impacts India as well, as its conventional missile force is inevitably better prepared to target India. Consequently, the readiness of India’s strategic missile force assumes importance. This further leads to questions on the efficacy of India’s missile force operating philosophy, robust organisational structures, reliable command and control arrangements, secure communications, timely deployment, and alert levels. Each of these aspects, individually and collectively, would help shape the deterrent that India wishes to create against China.

Implications for India

PLARF’s modernisation has serious implications for India. From a military perspective, missile bases 64 and 62 are important. Located at Xining, Base 64 with its seven missile brigades — five nuclear and two dual-role — covers most of the Indian hinterland. Base 62, located in the Yunnan province has seven brigades — two nuclear, three conventional, and two dual-role — which can also strike deep at targets on Indian territory. Together, these two bases deploy a total of seven nuclear and seven conventional/dual-role brigades. The latter are expected to hold some 174-240 conventional/dual-role launchers. If each launcher is authorised six missiles on it and another three in reserve (the scaling of missiles is assumed for the purpose of the calculation), the total number of missiles opposite India would approximately amount to 1,566-2,160 missiles.

Besides, China can also switch part of its SRBM brigades deployed in the East. By doing so, its inventory opposite India could spike by another factor. Equipped with the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 systems, these SRBM brigades can enable the PLA to strike at critical time-sensitive targets (TSTs) — C2 nodes, concentration areas, logistic installations, and airbases — in the opening stages of the conflict. With the DF-11 and DF-15 gradually being replaced by the DF-17 in SRBM brigades; and the DF-17s also replacing the DF-21s which are held with the MRBM brigades, it would make the PLARF conventional missile arsenal even more potent in a future conflict. Besides, the IRBM brigades, which are now equipped with the DF-26 system, can easily undertake conventional tasks, with one such brigade at Korla in Xinjiang.

Two aspects matter. At a structural level, the size of China’s arsenal in terms of how many launchers does the PLARF possess in each missile category — SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM — is important. PLARF’s large inventory of SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs could have a paralytic effect on India’s ability to prosecute its defensive or offensive operations. Coupled with this would be its magazine depth and the industrial surge capacity. These factors collectively dictate the number of strikes that the PLARF could launch against India’s key infrastructure and positions south of the Himalayas. And, it would also be fair to assume that the PLARF could easily out-run India’s retaliatory capacity. This can be problematic, which India’s planners would have to address to take this cycle of strikes and counterstrikes to logical outcomes, even if parity in missile inventory does not exist. Continuous monitoring of China’s production capacities, and its deployment pattern would be important to assess its overmatch to India’s counterstrike capability. 

PLA soldiers assigned to a brigade during an air defence training exercise in April 2026. Photo: China military website

At an operational level, China’s construction of its missile silos, and the introduction of road-mobile launchers provide the PLARF with a fair degree of agility — to hide, shoot and scoot — in a conflict. The Tibetan massif provides ample space and opportunities to disperse its missile force to strike at targets south of the Himalayas. Further, its vast and high-capacity road-rail network would enable ease of mobilisation of short- and medium range PLARF assets from East to West. This complicates India’s ability to track the movement of China’s conventional and dual-role launchers. This, also, stresses the limited ISR assets at India’s disposal to plan and execute its counterstrike missions. Therefore, India needs to expeditiously develop its road-and rail-mobile missile launchers in required numbers, and also accord importance to the silo-isation of its missile force, to improve its survivability. Investing in right technologies, including tunneling and boring capacities, has to be an important facet of India’s missile force strategy. As a case in point, the Iranians, despite their limited engineering resources at hand, have done pretty well to tunnel-ise their missile force to fight, and yet survive to fight another day in the current war.

PLARF’s increasing interest in the growth of its conventional missile force impacts India’s policy choices in the development of its own missile force. Thus far, India’s missile force has been guided by its nuclear doctrine. With conventional missiles assuming a prominent role in warfare, there might be a case to rethink the employability, and the role and structure of its strategic missile force. Whether this should continue to be based on a twin-architecture fused together for separate conventional and nuclear missile-strike tasks, or is there a case to raise a separate conventional missile force in light of India’s recurring tensions — with our northern and western adversary — is a moot question. At face value, a bifurcated-architecture that separates the nuclear and conventional missile forces functionally, might look lucrative in Indian context. Whether this would require separate, independent structures, command and control arrangements, and management of the force, needs further discussion.

This would also raise questions on the size of the conventional missile force. In particular, technological preferences and choices to match our adversaries’ missile-warfare capabilities; the extent to which the melding of the legacy and newer missile technologies could take place; and the possibility of overlap of conventional and nuclear force functionalities. More importantly, it would raise questions on its integration and delegation of control at the Theatre Command level. Whether the Theatre Commands would be competent enough to prosecute these strikes given the political sensitivity and escalatory constraints on the use of these platforms in territorial contexts. At the Theatre level, a commander’s ability to control escalation would be the key factor influencing the employment of the missile force. Besides, the Theatre commander would have to deal with other management aspects to include ISR, C2, surprise and deception, and force survival, which would pose a separate set of challenges. In essence, to fight a missile war successfully, a conventional missile force would require its own set of resources and functionalities.

What could India do? In this context, three policy and posture aspects would assume importance. First, India might need a reliable counterstrike strategy to absorb the initial salvo of Chinese conventional missile strikes, and yet endure to strike back, to degrade the pace of the PLA’s ground offensive. 

For this, it will have to create a “missile sponge” that not only absorbs the PLARF strikes, but also leaves us with residual inventory to strike back at China. This is easier said than done, but a sound counterstrike strategy could help to ride-out the course of the conventional missile war with China. Decoys or deception could play an important role in absorbing the initial missile attacks. Besides, creating missile-silos and making the missile force road- and rail-mobile, and less trackable, would be important.

Second, India might have to rethink its air-defence, which currently seems inadequate and less potent for a possible missile war. With the air-defence not proving to be a very reliable concept, in Ukraine and West Asia, it assumes added importance to reassure the populace and provide a degree of protection to our vital infrastructure and assets. Further, China’s development of its FOBS can also complicate India’s ability to secure its hinterland infrastructure, skies and oceans from unexpected directions of attack. Additionally, it entails that the “air-defences” need to be integrated into the “missile-shield” for the survival and employability of the missile force. This might entail deploying a high performance and integrated “radar fence” along the Himalayas in support of the missile force. Who might own this, and who operates it are questions that might need serious debate and discussion, to flesh out the electronic-warfare and air-defence systems that best suit the three services and the missile force.

And third, a numerical increase in the number of conventional launchers would make India’s missile force more survivable and versatile. Besides, an increased capacity enhances the deterrent effect, and helps hold back the erosion of our retaliatory strike capability. In fact, this increase could strengthen our peacetime deterrent, especially when China is rapidly developing its new missile technologies. The challenge, however, is more complicated, with the Chinese conventional and nuclear missile systems now intermingled into a dual-role. This intermingling of capabilities can confuse India, and a conventional launch could be mistaken for a nuclear one, resulting in escalation. Likewise, a missile strike emerging from any other mixed site could have similar connotations. This creates the ambiguity, which China could exploit in a conflict situation.

The wars raging in Ukraine and Iran, and India’s short conflict with Pakistan in May 2025, offer enough new lessons 

in missile warfare. It might make sense to study these wars comprehensively to review and decide on India’s current missile force structure and its future employment strategy at the level of conventional war-fighting. Besides, India’s security planners might also need to decide how they want to ride out China’s initial volley of conventional missile strikes, while simultaneously finding opportunities to strike back with India’s limited missile inventory and to shape outcomes in a future conflict.