'We will have a sort of a cold war'

Because the assessment here is that if Russia gets away with the impression that they are allowed to do what they want in Ukraine, that they will not stop there and select another target. And unless Russia is halted in Ukraine, we ourselves will be threatened.

So, that required really ramping up our defence industrial capacity, first of all, to support Ukraine and also to strengthen our own defences.

But added to that is then the new strategy of the second Trump administration, which early on already in February this year (2025), they sent (Pete) Hegseth, Secretary of Defense at the time (and) now Secretary for War. He came here and said, you have to take ownership of your own conventional defence because the US is going to focus on China. Basically, this has really undermined trust in NATO and the collective security guarantee of NATO.

So, the conclusion is Europeans must be able, if necessary, to deter any aggression by themselves or if deterrence fails, to defend themselves at least in conventional terms.

Is Europe's current rearmament best understood as a short term response to the Ukraine war? Or does it represent a deeper structural shift in how European governments think about war, deterrence and military power?

The direct cause certainly is the Ukraine war. At the same time, we are seeing a structural change in our alliance with the US.

Until now, a basic assumption of all of our strategies of NATO, of the European Union (EU), of our individual states, was that the US is an ally. So, in the end we will always be on the same side.

And since the Trump administration published their National Security Strategy, that is no longer the case. In a way, the US is now a normal country to us. We will agree on some things and disagree on others, but you can no longer automatically assume that the US will always come to our aid.

That is my assessment. And if such a basic assumption of your strategy is no longer valid, you have to really revisit your entire strategy.

But has that sunk in with all of our decision-makers? That's another question. Some of them initially reacted in my way — a very timid way — saying: Oh well, no, in the end the US still loves us, so it's not so serious, and so on. I think that's a wrong reaction.

What we see in the security strategy is the explicit aim to do away with the EU, to cultivate resistance against the EU. It is even literally said by supporting extreme right parties. So this US administration can hardly be called an ally of Europe.

So, that's a fundamental shift. Some people may argue that there may be a new policy after this current administration, which is true. But we don't know who will be the next president.

And President Trump has more than three years to go. So, this will not just stop tomorrow.

Where do Europe's most serious capability gaps lie today and how difficult will they be to close?

Our most serious problem is the so-called strategic enablers. We have large armed forces, but they have not been constructed to operate independently. They have been built to operate under American command, using American command-and-control structures, intelligence, air defence, strategic transport, deep strike, and so on and so forth.

NATO planning assumes that those American capabilities will be made available. If now that is no longer sure, that leaves a big gap in our arsenals. And that's our priority, I think, to address it — it's those big strategic enablers.

It also means that it is not just sufficient for every individual European country to increase the national budget and increase national capabilities, because these big ticket items cannot be acquired by any individual country, not even the largest European state.

So, this requires a degree of collective effort of pooling some of the additional defence spending and acquiring, say, military satellites, an offensive deep strike capability, more cyber defence, secure communications, and so on.

How should we understand the relationship between Europe's rearmament and NATO? Is it primarily rearming to strengthen NATO, or is it also about reducing long-term dependence on the US?

They go hand in hand. I mean, there has been for a long time the idea to harmonise or maybe even integrate the European defence effort through the EU. And I have always been a fervent supporter of that.

But that effort started in 1999, so more than 25 years ago, and it has not worked. The EU has not been able to influence the defence planning of the member states. So in the middle of 2024, even before the reelection of Donald Trump, the debate shifted in Brussels to the idea of creating a European pillar in NATO.

And that's the way forward. So, you stay in the alliance, because if we can maintain the alliance with the US — the military alliance — that would be a big bonus, but it has to be a real alliance between equals.

Otherwise, it will not work. As we see in the National Security Strategy of the US now, if Trump thinks we are weak, he will not take us into account. So, if you want to maintain the alliance, we have to build a paramilitary force.

So, the way I see it: you maintain the political structure of NATO, you maintain a command structure. And in terms of military planning, you need to create an independent European military pillar, meaning that the military capabilities of all the Europeans together, even without any American contribution, have to make up a complete set of forces, so that we can do any operation we would want to do without needing a single American asset if necessary.

And then you have an equitable alliance that would create a political balance, balance of power within the alliance. And you can come to a redefinition of NATO.

The Ukraine war exposed major weaknesses in Europe's defence industrial base, particularly in ammunition production. Has Europe shifted to a wartime production mindset, or are institutional and political constraints still holding it back?

I wouldn't say that we are moving to a real wartime production. We are not in a war economy in the sense of shifting civilian production to military production.

In a way, it's also not necessary. We are not at war and we are rich enough, we have enough resources. Objectively speaking, we ought to be able both to have a strong defence industry and maintaining our normal civilian production.

But we have been very late in moving. And it's only now really this year, after three years of war in Ukraine, that we really see an acceleration in increasing our defence industrial production capacity. So, there is good news, but at the same time, there is not enough cooperation between states or between national industries.

The projects like the new fighter aircraft or the new main battle tank, both of which have Franco-German cooperation as the core — in the end, they are not taking off, and that is unfortunate.

If Europe is to rearm, which countries are poised to lead that effort? Many people are saying Germany, but does Germany really want to rearm itself?

Germany is very serious in rearming itself. And of course, they have enormous resources that they are investing. Though let's not forget for the moment (that) the largest army within the EU is Poland.

But it can't be Germany alone. What we need is a group of countries to take the lead in terms of defence industry, but also in terms of setting the strategy. What is it that we want? And that group must include the United Kingdom — not in the EU, sadly not anymore.

I think Brexit is a big loss for all sides. So, you need London, Paris, and Berlin. And I would also say Poland as the core, that would take the lead.

And those countries are also the core of the “coalition of the willing” that thinks about how Europe supports Ukraine, together with the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries, and in fact, my own country, Belgium. They are the most determined.to continue to support Ukraine.

From Russia's perspective, how is Europe's rearmament likely to be interpreted? Does this strengthen deterrence, or does this also increase the risk of escalation and/or miscalculation?

The risk is limited. Of course, we see that the Russians try to spin it as Europe starting an arms race, of Europe provoking. But it is too obvious that this is just spin. And the reality is that Russia is the only country that invaded any other country.

And there are no European troops or NATO troops outside your NATO territory. And it's only the Russians who have invaded. It's the Europeans who, after the end of the Cold War, disinvested too much from defence.

So, we're not escalating, we're not starting an arms race. We're going back to where we were in the 1980s in terms of levels of defence spending and strength of our forces. You could argue we are in a way going back to normal.

Given uncertainty in the US right now, to what extent is Europe’s rearmament an attempt to future-proof itself against possible changes in US policy?

It certainly was not the motivation. The motivation was the Ukraine war, but the change in strategy from the Trump administration then reinforced that in a way.

Trump has been very effective. So many of his predecessors have said to us “in Europe, you should do more”, but it never really worked because implicitly they said: but until you do more, we will protect you.

And Trump is basically saying, those who don't do enough in my eyes, I may not protect them. So, in the end, it works because that scares people, but at the same time, it directly undermines the credibility of NATO and of NATO deterrence. It works because it actually enhances the danger. That is very clear.

So again, it is very much in our interest to maintain the military alliance with the US. But with Trump there, this alliance can only work if we build up our strength and it becomes an alliance of equals.

People like to say Trump is transactional. I don't think so. A transaction means a give and take. Trump only likes to take — he doesn't like to give. Trump is only transactional when you force him to. So, we can only have a good transaction with Trump from a position of strength.

We're not there now, so we need to build up that military strength. Then, I hope we can maintain the alliance in a more equitable way.

Does a more heavily armed Europe change strategic calculations for regions such as the Indo-Pacific or South Asia?

Unlikely, in my view, or not directly. For a long time already, the US — since (US President Barack) Obama basically decided to reprioritise — until then in their external strategy, it was sort of Europe first; and now it's Asia first, and Europe therefore at most second.

You could argue that the more Europe rearms and is capable of ensuring its own deterrence and defence, the more the US is free to focus on Asia. So, in that sense, there is an influence.

But Europe is not building up a global power projection capability. So, the idea is not that Europeans will play a bigger military role in Asia. The idea is that we can deter or defend our own territory, and that we have power projection capacity, say, in our broad neighbourhood.

But we are very far from the type of global power projection capacity that the US has and it is also highlighting the ambition to be there.

Would we see long term peace between European states and Russia, or would this mean an arms race in Europe?

I think however this ends, we will have a sort of a cold war between Russia and Europe for a long time, because the trust has been totally destroyed. So, even if there is a peace agreement, people will be very suspicious of Russia implementing that. And it would be very unwise, therefore, to just normalise economic relations with Russia. The risk would be too high.

That trust will take a long time to restore — many years, maybe even a generation — and it will depend on Russia's good behaviour.

Of course, seen from Brussels, having bad relations with Russia is not an objective in itself. Ideally, we would have good neighbourly relations. But that depends on the Russians.

I'm not saying no mistakes were made on the European side at all, but none of the mistakes justified going to war against a sovereign country and occupying 20 per cent of its territory.

The difficulty will be that the US may well normalise relations with Russia. Europe, I am sure, will not follow, and that will be another difficult issue then between Washington and Brussels.