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Exploding sleeper cells of the sea

Naval mines have re-emerged as potent instruments of modern conflict but India is not immune to their destructive power

11 min read
Updated On: Jan 10 2026 | 5:15 AM IST
Martand Mishra
INS Kozhikode (M-71), a Karwar-class minesweeper commissioned in 1988, carrying out mine-laying and clearing operations before it was decommissioned in 2019 (Photo: Indian Navy)

INS Kozhikode (M-71), a Karwar-class minesweeper commissioned in 1988, carrying out mine-laying and clearing operations before it was decommissioned in 2019 (Photo: Indian Navy)

In December 2023, close to a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, a commercial cargo vessel named Vyssos, heading to Ukraine on the Danube River to load grain, was damaged by a naval mine in the Black Sea. 
Weeks earlier, the United Kingdom had announced the transfer of two minehunter vessels to Ukraine to help clear sea lanes clogged by mines laid by Russia, underlining that these weapons continue to threaten civilian shipping and cause immense disruption to critical global trade routes and security. 
  Naval mines, often seen as relics of 20th-century warfare, have re-emerged as potent instruments of modern conflict, most visibly in the Russia-Ukraine war. The disruption that naval mines can cause to global trade and security is immense. 
India is not immune to such disruption, which can mean the difference between open seas and a watery grave.

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  India’s major ports — Kandla, Mumbai, Kochi, Visakhapatnam, and Kolkata — are crucial nodes in the country’s maritime and economic architecture, handling the bulk of its energy imports, exports, and naval movements. These ports operate through narrow approach channels and congested sea lanes, where even minor disruptions can have outsized economic and security consequences. 
  The security of these waters is often analysed in terms of surface and air threats, while a key undersea risk remains largely unaddressed — naval mines.
  These mines offer a low-cost, high-impact solution in naval warfare. They can deny access to ports and sea lanes without a continuous military presence. Like some kind of sleeper cells in the sea, they can remain inactive yet effective for extended periods, forcing navies into time-consuming and resource-intensive clearance operations.
  Despite a coastline of 11,098.81 kilometres and India’s dependence on the sea for more than 90 per cent of its trade by volume, the Indian Navy today does not possess a single dedicated mine countermeasure vessel (MCMV) or minesweeper. 
  India used to have a decent mine warfare capability through specialised MCMVs that were tasked with safeguarding harbour approaches and sea lanes from underwater mines. The backbone of this capability was the Pondicherry-class minesweepers — 12 vessels acquired from Russia between the late 1970s and the 1980s. INS Kozhikode, the last of this class, was  decommissioned in 2019.  These ships, along with the Karwar subclass, conducted India’s mine-laying and mine-clearing operations until age and hull fatigue made them inoperable.  
All MCMVs were phased out by 2019, leaving the Indian Navy without a single specialised minesweeper in its fleet. 
Vice Admiral Paras Nath (retired), group president of Crown Group, a maintenance and overhaul provider to the Indian Navy, highlighted how both the platforms and threats have transformed over time. “In 1982–83, I commanded INS Bulsar, a 
wooden-hulled minesweeper. These ships were designed that way to counter magnetic mines,” he said. 
  “Earlier, minesweepers had wooden hulls because magnetic mines would get attracted to metal ships and explode,” Nath said, noting that material choice itself was once a primary survivability measure. While this capability was later expanded with the induction of the Pondicherry and Karwar classes, Nath acknowledged that the momentum was lost thereafter. “There has been a definite gap in acquisitions,” he added.
  Mine warfare
  The evolution has changed the nature of mine warfare challenges. “Today, magnetic mines are not the biggest threat. The more dangerous ones are acoustic mines,” Nath said. “A ship’s propellers and engine generate noise, and acoustic mines are triggered by specific sound frequencies.” 
As a result, modern platforms now rely on non-magnetic hulls such as glass reinforced plastic, advanced metallurgy, and sophisticated sensors and sweeping systems to detect and neutralise diverse threats, thus ushering in technology-driven mine warfare.
  Minesweepers' role is often underestimated but remains strategically important. “Minesweepers are small vessels, much smaller than frigates or destroyers. Their main role is not combat, but clearing channels,” Nath said. “Mine clearance is not a one-time activity. It is a continuous process. Mines can be laid overnight using submarines or underwater platforms.” 
  India is not completely bereft of solutions: It has interim measures in place, but these “clip-on” solutions cannot be compared with dedicated minesweepers. “Earlier, minesweeping gear was permanently fitted and towed behind the ship,” Nath said. Clip-on systems offer flexibility by allowing platforms to perform multiple roles when not engaged in mine clearance. 
  However, they have limitations too. “The advantage is flexibility,” he said, adding that “these systems cannot fully replace a dedicated minesweeper fleet”. 
  Modern navies deal with influence mines, which explode in reaction to a ship's magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signature. These smart and programmable mines can be timed to target specific vehicles, while staying dormant until activated.
  The striking disparity between the cost and impact gives them their lasting relevance. A naval mine can cost only a few thousand dollars. But the cost of clearing a naval mine can be 10 to 20 times higher, requiring specialised ships, sonar systems, remotely operated vehicles, and skilled crews. 
  Notably, even a few mines at harbour approaches can stop commercial and naval traffic for days or weeks, resulting in financial losses. Mine clearance is a slow and methodical process.
  These mines also exert a great psychological deterrence beyond physical damage. The mere suspicion of the presence of a naval mine can force navies to divert routes or  suspend operations. 
  Use of mine warfare remains a critical but specialised naval domain. Several major navies already possess dedicated mine warfare platforms as a core maritime capability. The United States is phasing out its Avenger-class MCMVs in favour of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and remote mine-clearance platforms, reflecting a shift towards safeguarding personnel.
  A critical test
  Commodore Anil Jai Singh (retired), vice president of the Indian Maritime Foundation, argues that mine warfare remains one of the most misunderstood yet strategically potent forms of naval conflict. “Mine warfare is not about open-sea combat or guns firing. Naval mines are laid in waters, offensively, defensively, or at choke points — to deny access,” he said. While earlier approaches relied on physically sweeping fixed mines,  but mine clearance itself is now inherently risky. “There is always a risk that a minesweeper itself could pass over a mine and explode”, Singh said.“The effort today is to take the man out of the loop as much as possible.” 
  At the platform level, survivability is engineered into the design. Mine countermeasure vessels have shallow drafts and non-metallic hulls, which reduce the likelihood of triggering mines, he noted. Singh agreed that a “clip-on system” serves only as a temporary fix, not a long-term solution. 
  He positioned mine warfare as a critical test of India’s long-term defence self-reliance. “Atmanirbharta is non-negotiable,” he said. “Indigenisation in every class of ship is increasing incrementally.” However, he warned, “Everyone is willing to give you know-how on how to build or operate a platform. Very few are willing to give you know-why — the design logic and engineering understanding that allows you to modify, upgrade, and innovate independently as threats evolve. That know-why is something India must develop on its own.” 
While India urgently needs these platforms, but dependence on external suppliers for a core maritime security function carries inherent risks, underscoring the necessity of building indigenous mine warfare systems.
  Singh said Pakistan has mentioned the use of naval mines in its war strategy as a low-cost, high-impact tool to challenge India’s maritime dominance. With new Hangor-class diesel-electric submarines from China to deploy torpedoes and mines covertly, this poses a significant threat to India.
  According to government media statements, more than 90 per cent of India’s trade by volume and over 70 per cent by value moves through maritime routes, while more than 80 per cent of its oil and gas are transported by sea. This level of reliance leaves little margin for disruption.
  “When a country is so dependent on sea-borne trade, it cannot afford disruption from anywhere around it. Even a small disruption at sea can have disproportionate consequences for trade, energy security, and economic stability,” Singh warned. 
India is uniquely positioned to provide continuous maritime security and free sea lines of communication in the region.  “Countries outside the region look to India as a preferred security partner in the Indian Ocean,” Singh said.
  India’s expanding naval posture and regional initiatives are therefore not merely national security measures, but stabilising forces in a contested maritime space. As Singh put it, “The maritime domain will drive 21st-century geopolitical and geoeconomic outcomes, and maritime security underpins all of it.”
  Nath acknowledged that India’s mine countermeasure gap is due to poor transition planning, which should not have been allowed to emerge. “Yes, I agree, there has been a lapse. The retirement of older minesweepers was not matched with timely replacements,” he said. However, he added, “Now things have started moving, and we should be hopeful.”
  India’s renewed push to develop 12 indigenous MCMVs marks a crucial attempt to close a capability gap exposed since 2019. Previously, such vessels were made for the Indian Navy in 2005, centred around a collaboration between Goa Shipyard Ltd and South Korea's Kangnam Corporation, which failed in 2014 following allegations that Kangnam used unauthorised middlemen to influence the contract.
  The deal was further delayed in 2018 owing to commercial deadlocks under the “Make in India” programme, including a one billion-dollar technology transfer fee and disagreements. 
  A fresh Request for Information was issued in 2023 by the Navy, with a stress on indigenous production. 
Each vessel will feature non-magnetic hulls, Indian-built sonars, remotely operated vehicles, and influence sweep systems. Goa Shipyard will lead construction, with private sector participation encouraged to accelerate timelines and build domestic expertise.
  In July last year, the Defence Acquisition Council approved the long-pending plan to revive the MCMV programme, with an estimated cost of about ₹44,000 crore. The project will now be pursued under the Buy (Indian–IDDM) category, which means the ships must be designed, developed, and built in India using indigenous technology. A formal request for proposal is expected to be issued to Indian shipyards by March 2026. 
The order for 12 vessels will likely be split between two Indian shipyards and is expected to roll out in 7 to 8 years after the contract is signed. 
  A strategic necessity
  Commodore Abhay Singh (retired), research fellow at the New Delhi-based Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, also argued for a dedicated fleet of minesweepers. 
  Abhay Singh said India should look into the use of unmanned systems in mine warfare. “India has capabilities in salvage and submarine rescue that can be adapted for unmanned ordnance disposal, but fully operational unmanned MCMVs remain aspirational,” he noted.
  He acknowledged challenges in building modern MCMVs indigenously. “Even if we order from a country like Korea, it could take five to six years before the first ship is operational. The platform must be future-ready to counter threats 10-15 years ahead.” 
  Abhay Singh highlighted mines as a key asymmetric tool for weaker powers, posing high costs without engaging in full-scale conflict. “The Indian Navy desperately needs this capability. We need to accelerate programmes, allocate resources, and ensure platforms are effective against future threats.”
  India’s gap in having a dedicated MCMV is no longer a theoretical vulnerability but an evolving risk to its economic lifelines and maritime credibility. As mines evolve into smarter tools of disruption, the absence of dedicated mine countermeasure vessels exposes a country to unimaginable harm.
  The renewed push from the government for indigenous MCMVs signals overdue recognition. Technological readiness, timelines and execution will determine whether intent translates into capability. For India to be the principal security provider in the region, naval mine countermeasures are not an add-on but a strategic necessity. 
  The challenge now is to ensure that India does not merely catch up, but builds a resilient, future-ready mine warfare capability that matches its strategic ambitions at sea.  
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Written By :

Martand Mishra

Martand Mishra has started his reporting career with defence coverage. He is a graduate of the Indian Institute of Mass Communication. He enjoys reading books on defence, history and biographies.
First Published: Jan 10 2026 | 5:15 AM IST

In this article : Indian Navy

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