Revisiting foundational principles
When the WTO was founded in 1995, the world was neatly divided into developed and developing countries. The underlying philosophy was to help developing countries integrate into the world economy with flexibilities built in through Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) and consensus-based decision-making. These were foundational principles designed to prevent majoritarian manipulation and coercion through coalitions. Thirty years on, these principles warrant a closer look.
The rise of emerging economies
The S&DT concessions granted in 1995 were well-intentioned. What was not envisaged was how economic status would evolve — some countries graduating, others falling behind. The last two decades have seen the resurgence of emerging market economies (EMEs). About 30 large EMEs today are the driving force of the global economy, accounting for an estimated $6.7 trillion of the $26.26 trillion in world merchandise exports in 2025. If services are included, the value rises to $8.75 trillion.
S&DT, consensus and MFN: The dilemma
Developed countries and EMEs together number about 60 of the WTO’s 166 members. The remaining members are low-income developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), whose combined share of global trade is no more than 10 per cent. Making a separate category for EMEs is politically sensitive — it risks fragmenting the solidarity of the Global South and weakening its collective leverage, a fragmentation developed countries have long sought to highlight. Aspirational countries need greater flexibilities to meet development objectives while the poorest seek even greater concessions and market access, including from EMEs.
The way forward may be for EMEs to voluntarily forgo some S&DT flexibilities, each according to its level of comfort. If India shows the way, others may follow. India can credibly lead this transition even in the most sensitive areas. In agriculture, it can shift support from Amber to Green Box through decoupled direct benefit transfers in place of price-linked minimum support price-based procurement. Such decoupled income support — not linked to production, prices or factors of production — qualifies as Green Box under Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and is exempt from reduction commitments. This would ensure benefits reach poor and marginal farmers without leakages.
Accumulation of foodgrains far beyond the requirements of the public distribution system is a huge drain on the exchequer, besides encouraging the overuse of agro-chemicals and depletion of precious groundwater. The same principle can guide India’s approach to the fisheries subsidies negotiations — replacing capacity-enhancing fuel and vessel subsidies with targeted, sustainability-linked income support for fisher families.
Such transitions would give India the moral authority to argue for changes in the rulebook in the larger interest of developing countries. The ability to subsume a national position within the lowest common denominator of a larger rulebook is a skill India needs to nurture if it is to assume a leadership role at the WTO.
Similarly, the principle of Consensus, however well-intentioned, was inherently flawed. It presumed convergence among members despite vastly divergent economic strengths. In practice, even a small country can hold negotiations hostage and block outcomes, including Ministerial Declarations — as seen at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11) in Buenos Aires in 2017 and at MC14 in Cameroon in March 2026, where hosts had to settle for a Chair’s Summary. Some modification is necessary to prevent such logjams. The model used for the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2014 is worth exploring: Members agree in principle by consensus, but implementation follows differentiated timelines based on each member’s preparedness, while developed countries take on obligations from day one.
Another pillar — MFN, which ensures non-discriminatory market access — has been undermined by unilateral tariffs. As Ms Okonjo-Iweala has repeatedly stressed, while over 70 per cent of trade still flows under MFN, the erosion is real. The long-term implication is clear: Countries will seek to offset MFN distortions through bilateral and plurilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs), a trend that does not augur well for developing countries outside the FTA architecture. While many will continue to abide by MFN trade, the new frontier is non-tariff barriers — regulatory friction, standards, conformity assessment, and logistics facilitation. Active Indian engagement here can help steer balanced outcomes in the interest of the Global South.
Plurilaterals are integral to trade
The plurilateral initiatives first proposed at MC11 — investment facilitation, MSMEs or micro, small and medium enterprises, ecommerce and gender — have become contentious. India’s position that these are non-trade issues is increasingly untenable. In a highly interdependent global economy, these issues are integral to trade. India has already taken commitments on them in bilateral agreements, yet hesitates to participate in multilateral rule-making at the WTO.
In fact, the New Delhi Brics Declaration of September 2026 has itself recognised the importance of identifying “appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the WTO legal framework”. Staying out is not an option — rules made outside by a critical mass inevitably impact outsiders. India’s participation can ensure balance and defend the interests of the Global South.
The crown jewel: Dispute settlement
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the crown jewel of the WTO, has been crippled since 2017 when the US blocked appointments to the Appellate Body. It was a major blow to a system seen as ensuring fairness and equity. The European Union’s alternative model — with mediation, non-appeal settlements and enforcement — could be a starting point. It calls for creative thinking. India’s long experience in trade disputes, both at the WTO and bilaterally, can add immense value in crafting an acceptable model for all.
India can lead
It is time for India to actively participate in reviving the WTO. If middle powers, including the EU, come forward, the chances of revival will brighten. Canada’s idea of middle powers leading the WTO's revival is worth serious deliberation — and India is well-placed to lead it.
The writer is former secretary (economic relations), Ministry of External Affairs