Quad cooperation: Balancing power in a shifting Indo-Pacific landscape

Balancing security and diplomacy, India navigates Quad, Asean, and Brics dynamics

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as Quad, evolved from a perceived need to preserve “a free open and inclusive Pacific” in response to China’s territorial assertiveness in the region. It speaks much for its utility that foreign ministers of the four member-nations — the United States (US), India, Australia, and Japan — felt the need to reaffirm the grouping’s steadfast commitment to its aims on December 31,  2024, marking the 20th anniversary of “Quad cooperation”. This term refers to the informal initiative by the four countries to come together and extend assistance to countries affected by the 2004 Tsunami. The successful nature of this cooperation prompted a proposal from then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and the formal inauguration of the Quad took place three years later in 2007. Although the Quad had its roots in benign cooperation over humanitarian aid, its key focus has since shifted to shared maritime security. To this end, the annual Malabar joint naval exercises, which have been conducted between the US and India along the Malabar Coast since 1992, were expanded with the participation of Japan in 2007 and Australia in 2020.

 

Although the Quad is increasingly being positioned as a broad-based alliance that extends beyond maritime security to promoting democratic values, climate change, and health, its primary principle remains countering the rise of China in a region through which trillions of dollars’ worth of US trade passes. No surprise, then, that Beijing refers to the Quad as the “Asian Nato” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The primacy of the China factor in the Quad’s raison d’etre was clear when Australia, under Kevin Rudd’s premiership, withdrew from the grouping in 2008 following diplomatic protests from China, but rejoined in 2010. Significantly, it was under Donald Trump’s presidency (2017-21) that the Quad regained its impetus and President Joe Biden has been active in taking the initiative forward. The proximate impulse for the US’ enthusiasm for the grouping lay in the aggressive expansion of Chinese influence via the Belt and Road Initiative. In the meeting in September last year, the last before Mr Biden demits office, the remit of the Quad was expanded to inter-parliamentary exchanges, cooperation in commerce and industry, and exploration of mutual investment opportunities.

 

For all the diplomatic attention accorded to the Quad, there have been concerns on its impact on the most consequential grouping in the Indo-Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean. The exclusionary nature of the Quad has long been criticised as marginalising Asean, China’s near neighbours with close security and trade ties. It is significant, therefore, that the foreign ministers’ pledge mentioned the centrality of Asean in its concerns. For India, the Quad remains an essential balancing act. In 2024, tensions with the US over an alleged Indian government involvement in the plot to assassinate Sikh separatists on US soil meant that although New Delhi held the rotational chair for last year’s gathering, the summit was finally held in the US. India is expected to host the summit sometime in the second half of this year. India, however, is also a participant in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where a military contingent has participated in joint counter-terrorism exercises. The rapid expansion of the original Brics grouping, with the addition of five new members and another nine countries as partner states, is positioning India, along with China, as a voice of the Global South. This balancing act will be tested under a second Trump presidency.