Navy's under-equipped warships serve little purpose

Sequencing of Navy procurement must be questioned

The confidence that the Navy must gain in its own capabilities following the acquisition of three new vessels - the "induction" of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier in June, the commissioning of the Kolkata destroyer two weeks ago, and of the Kamorta corvette last week - would be entirely justified. These are impressive vessels, each one of them. Each also represents a significant upgrade when compared to the vessel(s) it will replace or complement. The Vikramaditya, at 44,500 tonnes, is in an altogether different class from the virtually superannuated Viraat at 28,700 tonnes. The Kolkata is formidable in every way, while the Kamorta stretches the definition of the corvette, being midway to a frigate in size and capability. Both the Kolkata and the Kamorta have some stealth characteristics, and involve significant levels of indigenisation. They are also the first in two lines of ships that will be delivered (one hopes) at annual intervals. When the prime minister declared somewhat expansively at the commissioning of the Kolkata that no country would dare challenge India after its commissioning, the sentiment can be understood.

But as this newspaper has reported on each of the celebratory occasions, the acquisition of new warships has been a highly problematic one. The saga over the makeover of an old Russian carrier into the Vikramaditya, at three times the original cost and after considerable delays, has been oft told. Yet the aircraft carrier will have to wait for three more years to get its long-range surface-to-air missiles (LR-SAMs), due at first in 2011. The Kolkata, meanwhile, was originally scheduled for commissioning in 2008, and is six years late. This warship is to use the same LR-SAM missiles, a variation of the Barak-8, still being developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) jointly with the Israelis.

The Kolkata has the additional disability of not yet getting its active towed-array sonar (ATAS), for detecting submarines. The DRDO tried for two decades to develop an ATAS system, then finally gave up. Getting a substitute organised has taken its own time, and is a saga by itself. The Kamorta, meanwhile, will also miss having the ATAS - a particularly vital piece of equipment since the ship is designed for an anti-submarine role. This becomes all the more debilitating since the essential complement of a helicopter for anti-submarine operations is also nowhere in sight.

In other words, the Navy is commissioning ships without essential equipment on board - missiles, sonar and helicopters. While it might be argued that an aircraft carrier is not greatly handicapped by the absence of long-range SAMs, since it will operate in a carrier battle group that has destroyers and frigates, the point is that even the destroyers and frigates in the battle group are without the same LR-SAMs. When destroyers and corvettes also have to do without proper sonar systems, serious questions need to be asked about the sequencing of the procurement process, and why there is no synchronisation of delivery.

Naval shipbuilding is subject to delays and cost revisions everywhere, but India's record is particularly poor. The DRDO has already been pulled up by the prime minister recently for its endless delays on several projects. The shipyards have their own share of problems, and the Navy's changing of specifications midway through shipbuilding does not help matters. If India's naval preparedness is to be put on a different footing, all these issues need to be addressed, and fully equipped ships need to be built in six or seven years, not 10 or 12.