India's strategic liftoff

The opinion piece claimed: “Among all buyers, India values Southeast Asian countries the most.” In its assessment, India was “especially targeting” the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, describing them as the “seaters” of Indian missiles. Evidently, China is wary of the battlefield capabilities of the BrahMos, which flies at nearly three times the speed of sound, can be launched from land, air and sea platforms, and, at least in Indian service, has an extended range of 450–800 kilometres (km), up from its original 290 km cap. The CICIR opinion piece was published at a pivotal moment in India’s emergence as an arms supplier: about a month before the first BrahMos system was delivered to the Philippines in April 2024 under a $375-million deal signed in January 2022 for three missile batteries, making the country the weapon’s first export customer. The allegations and attribution of motive aside, it would prove prescient, a little over two years later, in identifying the countries that would buy the weapon from India, or seek to.

During a state visit to India last August, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr told a news outlet that his country would buy more BrahMos missiles. In May this year, Vietnam became the second Asean customer, with Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh revealing at Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue that a deal was signed. Two months later, Indonesia joined the club, with one domestic report stating India would supply two missile batteries worth $200 million. This coincided with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 6–8 state visit there, during which the list of outcomes included “cooperation on BrahMos Missile System” and an “Air-to-Air Missile Cooperation Agreement”. The latter is understood to refer to the Astra, an indigenously developed weapon. Malaysia and Thailand are also understood to have expressed interest in the BrahMos, which has clearly found its mark in a region where countries are pursuing military modernisation. But turning that breakthrough into a larger share of Southeast Asia’s defence market will require more than a world-class missile. Doing so would move India closer to its stated goal of raising annual defence exports by almost a third to ₹50,000 crore (over $5 billion) within the next three years, while strengthening its strategic position in a region central to the Indo-Pacific. Whether BrahMos becomes the foundation of broader export success or remains a notable exception will depend on India’s ability to broaden its pitch, align with regional priorities and compete against the United States (US), China and middle powers that already enjoy a head start. The question is whether India can capitalise on its advantages, overcome its limitations and establish itself as a credible long-term supplier.

“The BrahMos fits well into Indonesia’s current defence priorities,” Broto Wardoyo, who heads the Department of International Relations at Universitas Indonesia, told Blueprint. He said the rationale lay in Indonesia’s efforts to strengthen deterrence, noting that its defence doctrine places considerable emphasis on preventing an adversary from entering a defined area or, if it does, restricting its freedom of movement.

Deterrence depends in part on the credibility of the weapons and capabilities that underpin it, and the missile’s credentials were no doubt strengthened by its combat debut during the four-day India–Pakistan clash in Operation Sindoor last May. That sharpened its appeal to potential buyers. But the momentum behind its exports has deeper roots than a single conflict.

The Philippines’ BrahMos acquisition predated Operation Sindoor, while discussions on potential sales to Vietnam and Indonesia had been underway for years, said Abhishek Sharma, junior fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation. “The performance of these systems definitely makes a better case for purchase. However, multiple factors are at play when any decisions are made, including performance,

cost-effectiveness, and the nature of the relationship with the defence importer. The BrahMos fits the bill perfectly, satisfying the buyer on these three criteria,” he added.

There are indeed indications that defence acquisition policies across Asean are shaped by efforts to build indigenous capabilities, enhance operational autonomy and strengthen resilience to geopolitical shocks and supply chain disruptions.

Wardoyo pointed out that Indonesia, the largest economy in Asean, is actively diversifying its defence partnerships and expanding procurement from multiple countries, including Türkiye, France, China, South Korea, Italy and India. “India should therefore be seen as part of Indonesia’s broader defence modernisation strategy, not as an exceptional case. At the same time, Indonesia wants defence procurement to strengthen its domestic defence industry. Whenever possible, the country seeks technology transfer, industrial cooperation, or joint development rather than simply purchasing military equipment,” he said.

Such considerations are not unique to Indonesia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies noted in a 2025 analysis that “many” Southeast Asian countries had “codified defence-industrial offset policies as part of their long-term military modernisation plans”. Offsets are conditions attached to a defence sale that allow the buyer to manufacture components or subsystems, or become part of the seller’s supply chain.

Geopolitical considerations may also be at play. “Defence procurement is driven primarily by two factors: the security environment and the balance of power. On both accounts, the Southeast Asian region is becoming more insecure and unstable,” said Sharma, pointing to the impact of China’s rising military expenditure, the US’ retrenchment from the region, and intra-regional rivalry on regional security. “Considering these drivers, we can expect Asean members to increase their defence expenditure in the coming years.”

Their budgets have, in fact, already been rising. Excluding Laos, Southeast Asia’s military spending climbed to $67.1 billion in 2025, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (Sipri) Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2025 report shows. This represented a 15 per cent rise in real terms over the previous year, the steepest single-year increase of any subregion in Asia and Oceania and second steepest across the world behind Central and Western Europe (16 per cent).

The trends suggest that demand for defence hardware exists and is likely to grow. “Expecting this to translate into increased defence exports will depend on the extent to which India can meet regional needs and whether it has the required systems,” said Sharma.

Success in the missile domain is only the opening salvo in India’s larger campaign for the regional market. Wardoyo’s remarks point in the same direction: “I expect future Indonesia–India defence cooperation to be driven less by individual weapons systems than by the shared objective of strengthening Indonesia’s deterrence posture and defence resilience.”

“Asean is likely to become an increasingly important destination for Indian defence exports, not as India’s largest market overnight, but as one of its most strategically significant ones,” Cchavi Vasisht, associate fellow at the New Delhi-based think tank Chintan Research Foundation, told Blueprint. Vasisht’s colleague, research consultant Unnati Misra, added that industry estimates project total exports of up to ₹65,000 crore (over $6.7 billion) by 2030 if momentum continues. “Industry estimates suggest the Asean region could account for 25–30 per cent of defence exports by 2030.”

Just how far India has to travel is laid bare by the region’s existing supplier relationships. Of the Asean states that ranked among the world’s 40 largest arms importers over 2021–25, according to Sipri’s Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 report, not one counted India among its top three sources of weapons. Indonesia, the highest-ranked at 18th, sourced 40 per cent of its imports from Italy, followed by the US and France. The Philippines, at 23rd, relied primarily on South Korea (42 per cent), ahead of Israel and the US. Singapore, ranked 26th, sourced 40 per cent of its imports from Germany, followed by the US and Israel. Thailand, at 40th, obtained nearly half its arms—49 per cent—from China, followed by the US and Israel. The incumbents are already well entrenched.

The pecking order is also undergoing a shake-up, according to Sipri data. Russia’s share of Southeast Asia’s arms market fell from 30 per cent in 2004–08 to nine per cent in 2019–23. Over the same period, China’s share rose steadily from five per cent to 12 per cent. The US held a 16 per cent share in 2019–23.

But the market also contains dynamics that India could seek to leverage. A January 2025 analysis by the Australian think tank Lowy Institute identified several.

The US’ defence sales in the region may be constrained by its reluctance to part with advanced technology, as well as by the high cost of its systems, the conditions and restrictions attached to arms sales, and the possibility of embargoes. Meanwhile, China’s prospects may be limited by territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where it has become increasingly assertive.

Crucially, the Lowy Institute analysis pointed out that one factor behind Southeast Asian countries’ historical preference for Russian arms — which have since lost market share because of the threat of US sanctions and the impact of the Ukraine war — was the perception that they were “less politically conditional” than supplies from the US.

This is a concern India could potentially address. “Systems similar to the BrahMos from the West are very costly and come with terms and conditions, making maintenance and sustenance difficult. Supplies from India don’t have such baggage. Military matériel such as the Kamorta-class corvette, Akash air defence system, Pinaka rocket artillery, the Astra air-to-air missile and anti-drone systems will enjoy the same advantage,” said Vasisht, pointing to other categories of equipment India could look to sell in the region.  

Asean’s crowded arms market

But India will have to move quickly. The Lowy Institute analysis concluded that countries in the region are likely to increasingly turn to other defence suppliers — particularly middle powers such as France, Germany and South Korea — intensifying competition.

Competing against this group of countries — almost all of which have long exported big-ticket defence systems —highlights another challenge for India: does it possess comparable indigenous systems ready for export today?

“There aren’t many countries competing in the same segment, particularly missiles. Therefore, India is placed comfortably. However, for other weapons or equipment, such as fighter jets or air defence systems, the number of vendors increases. South Korea, in particular, emerges as a serious contender against India, with notable wins in the fighter jet category,” said Sharma.

“To become a major defence partner, India will have to cater to specific big defence needs beyond missiles, which is currently not the case, as other players dominate that space,” he added.

Vasisht also identified South Korea as the sharpest competitor, pointing to its $713 million June 2025 deal with the Philippines for 12 FA-50 fighter jets and its deep entrenchment in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. “This shows it’s competing on speed of delivery and localisation.”

While India expands its catalogue of arms, that does not mean its existing capabilities should not be marketed

more aggressively. “India’s job is to be the preferred supplier within specific categories — coastal and anti-ship missile systems, offshore platforms, and radars — rather than trying to displace or compete with South Korea or the US,” said Vasisht, adding that Asean states are diversifying their suppliers.

Noting that India has addressed some of the structural problems that once caused delays and frustrated buyers, Vasisht said, “The BrahMos model has built in the right instinct: contracts routinely bundle batteries, operator training and logistics support rather than selling bare hardware.”

However, she argued that gaps remain. After-sales support for BrahMos and other exported systems, for instance, still runs largely out of India. “Analysts have specifically flagged the need to establish regional service and maintenance hubs in strategic partner countries to build customer trust and generate recurring revenue.”  Russian platforms regionwide, Misra added, position India as a potential regional maintenance, repair and overhaul hub, amid disruptions to Russian supply chains.

Expanding defence export offerings will depend in large part on increasing investment in research and development (R&D), a gap Vasisht called for bridging, arguing that it matters for the upgrade cycle buyers actually pay for. “Overall Indian R&D spending sits at around 0.7 per cent of the gross domestic product, against roughly 2.4 per cent in China, and 3.5 per cent in the US.”

China’s R&D prowess and expansive defence-industrial ecosystem continue to pay dividends. Indonesia’s announcement that it will acquire J-10 fighter jets from China is among the latest examples.

China’s influence in the region also stems from its status as Asean’s largest trading partner since 2009, with two-way merchandise trade reaching $772 billion in 2024. Given China’s jaundiced view of Indian defence exports in the region, as evidenced by the CICIR opinion piece, there could be apprehensions that India will face hurdles. The region, however, also contains dynamics that could temper those concerns.

“This is a consensus amongst Asean countries that we do not want to choose sides…,” Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said in March, underscoring that Singapore and Asean would continue to pursue an open and inclusive approach to engaging the major powers.

This opens up space for India to deepen engagement, even with mainland Asean countries where China’s influence is strongest.  “We have seen some positive changes underscoring that India is on the correct trajectory with Cambodia and Laos. More bilateral exercises, port calls, and staff exchanges are taking place,” said Sharma. However, he cautioned that meaningful defence cooperation will take time, noting that this aspect of India’s ties with the two countries remains uninstitutionalised. Underscoring the broader focus on appointing defence attachés to Southeast Asian countries, Sharma said, “Some recent appointments, including to Cambodia, underscore that India

is paying attention.” Overall, Sharma assessed that India has to focus on establishing institutionalised cooperation mechanisms with regional members through frameworks such as the defence cooperation committee, the defence industrial and logistics committee, and security dialogues.

“This is currently not the case with all members.”

India has had a comprehensive strategic partnership with Asean as a bloc since 2022, and holds formal, declared partnerships with six of its eleven member states: Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Asean’s ties with China are “a manageable hurdle rather than a decisive barrier,” said Vasisht, noting that the October 2024 India-Asean joint statement illustrates the diplomatic register both sides have settled on: defence and security cooperation framed around international law and “resilience”, not confrontation with China.

“Strategic balancing is a defining feature of Asean behaviour,” she said, adding that, seen against this backdrop, Asean nations’ preference for avoiding overdependence on any single supplier, maintaining strategic autonomy, and building asymmetric deterrence constitutes an advantage for India,

which can help them achieve those objectives with cost-effective, Western-compatible hardware without directly provoking China.

“The key issue is not whether a state has ties with China, but whether India can present itself as a reliable, affordable, and politically acceptable alternative. Therefore, India must position itself as a neutral, reliable security partner,” said Vasisht.

India’s defence exports have registered a roughly 25-fold increase over the nine years from 2016–17 to 2025–26, rising from around ₹1,520 crore to over ₹38,000 crore. The success of BrahMos has now widened India’s opening in Southeast Asia. What remains is to press home the advantage.

As Vasisht concluded: “… The question is no longer whether India can close deals in the region, but whether it can convert this into a durable industrial relationship with local assembly, joint production, and follow-on systems beyond BrahMos rather than a missile-only footprint.”